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Iran's Agents Reportedly Operate in Turkey

900A0208A London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 12 Dec 89 pp 16-21

[Article by Ilyas Harfush: "Cover Story: Iranians in Turkey: Of 100,000 Refugees, Some of Whom Were Fleeing the War, 15,000 Work for Iranian Regime; Total Volume of Trade Between Ankara and Tehran Is 3 Billion Dollars; Turkey's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tells AL-MAJALLAH, 'We Are Asking Iranians Not To Interfere in Our Internal Affairs'; Iran's Consul in Trabzon Organizes Secret Cells"]

[Text] Almost half a million Iranians can be found living in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and cities in the eastern areas of Turkey as well as villages near Turkey's borders with Iran. Some of those Iranians came to Turkey to flee the war in Iran. For them, Iran's borders with Turkey were the easiest borders they could cross to find safety and a certain measure of freedom. Some Iranians used Turkey as a stepping stone to European countries and to America: while in Turkey, they either utilized their own resources to go where they wanted to go, or they relied on the United Nations Organization. Sources in the Turkish press say that a third group of Iranians came to Turkey on a mission for the Iranian regime. This group of Iranians residing in Turkey is the one which worries the Turks most because it represents a constant source of tension on security and political matters between the two neighboring states.

How do Iranians live in Turkey? Why do they come to Turkey? How do they try to leave Turkey so they can establish permanent residence in western countries which are willing to accept them? Given the political and social contradictions between the two regimes and two societies, how do the conditions of Iranians in Turkey affect Iranian-Turkish relations, which are extremely delicate and sensitive? The following report, which was prepared in Istanbul and Ankara, attempts to answer these questions.

There are many similarities between the Laleli section of Istanbul and the cities of Tabriz, Isfahan, and Shiraz, and there are similarities between the Tehran Bazaar and this section of Istanbul, which is located in the middle of a low-income area in the old part of the city, not far from the city's tourist landmarks, such as the Sultan Ahmad Mosque and the palace of the Ottoman sultans, which is known as Topkapi Palace. Anyone who is asked about that section of the city knows that whoever is inquiring about it is inquiring about the Iranian community which has settled in Istanbul. This Iranian community owns most of the stores, warehouses, and private businesses in the Laleli section of Istanbul, an area which has become quite similar to areas and neighborhoods in European cities where Arab and Islamic communities have settled. These areas reflect many of the characteristics of these communities' lives and many of their social customs as well. And yet, the matter is different for Iranians in Istanbul because their customs and traditions are quite

similar to those of Turkish society. It would be very difficult to make a distinction between businesses operated by Iranians and businesses owned by Turks, if it were not for the fact that Iranians use the Persian alphabet [as published] to identify themselves. Iranians can also be seen wearing distinctively Iranian clothing on the streets of that city section where they occupy homes and apartments alongside Turkish residents and members of other communities who came to Istanbul. One of these communities is an Islamic community from Yugoslavia whose members emigrated to this city to live and work.

Iranians are quite wary when they talk about conditions of their residence and life in Turkey. The fact that most of them do not speak foreign languages makes communicating with them even more difficult. In addition, they become wary when asked any questions about their political attitudes and their relations with the ruling regime in Tehran. Turkish press sources say that Iranians choose to reside in this part of Istanbul because that section of the city has traditionally been a socially conservative area. All of its residents are middle-class people. The area has usually served as a place of refuge for those who come to Istanbul under difficult circumstances, whether they be students or workers from neighboring countries.

Iranians residing in Istanbul are employed in retail stores, travel agencies, and currency exchange centers. The usual customers for these business establishments are Iranians who are always traveling between Turkey and Iran for business reasons. These business establishments also serve Iranians who come to Turkey to use it as a stepping stone to other countries. Press agencies in Turkey do not deny the fact that within the Iranian community in Istanbul there is a group of Iranians who were sent by Iranian authorities to spread the ideas of the Iranian regime among Turks. According to these sources it is estimated that the number of Iranians in that group is approximately 15,000 persons.

It is difficult to notice signs of Iranians in the streets and neighborhoods of Turkish cities outside the Laleli section of Istanbul. In Ankara, for example, Iranians live in various city neighborhoods, and they can be found in professional and vocational occupations. At the same time large groups of Iranians go to the U.S. Embassy and to other western embassies every morning, carrying identification documents and passports—that is, those who were able to get those documents from the authorities in Tehran—in an effort to obtain entry visas to the United States and to European countries, Australia, and Canada. Iranians who had sought temporary refuge in Turkey (entering Turkey illegally sometimes) found their attempts to find a country where they could go become frantic and grave when they faced the possibility of deportation by Turkish authorities. For many Iranians who are thought to be affiliated with factions of the Iranian opposition, the consequences of being deported are well known. Unconfirmed information in Ankara indicates that efforts to obtain travel documents and

entry visas to a number of European countries, including the Scandinavian countries, are accompanied by forgeries which are carried out on a broad scale by document-forging networks within a number of Middle Eastern organizations.

The entry of such a large number of Iranians into Turkey (500,000 is the figure which is being mentioned) goes back to the early days of the Iraq-Iran war when the borders between Iran and Turkey saw large numbers of Iranians fleeing Iran and the existing conditions in that country to go to Turkey. From a security standpoint, these borders are considered "easy" to cross because the lines on the border overlap and the area is difficult to control. Furthermore, political conditions in Iran [as published] did not allow the authorities to exercise strict control over the influx of people from Iranian territory. From the standpoint of overlooking what was happening on the borders, Iranians coming into Turkey and Turkish authorities as well benefited from a 1964 law which allowed Iranians to enter Turkey and stay in the country for 3 months without obtaining a visa and without having to obtain residence papers from Turkish police.

At that time the number of Iranian refugees to Turkey was 1 million persons. Others estimate the number of Iranian refugees to be 1.5 million, most of whom were either people who reaped no benefits when the new regime was established, or people who opposed the new regime. These refugees were middle-class or poor people who could not afford to go to the capitals of Europe where well-to-do Iranian figures and families went. As time passed and political conditions in Iran changed, a number of those Iranians started going back to their country, while others managed to go to other countries. Thus, in the absence of official figures which can provide a true picture of Iranian presence in Turkey, the number of refugees which is being mentioned now declined to half a million persons.

With such a large number of refugees security problems were unavoidable. Most of these problems were the result of developments in the Iraq-Iran war. Security problems were also caused by the role which the Iranian community in Turkey played. A few individuals in that community and some Iranian organizations as well collaborated with the Kurds who were fighting the Turkish army in the southern border areas. As much as Turkey tried to maintain what officials called "positive neutrality" between Iraq and Iran in an attempt to keep the specter of war away from the Turkish borders, the actions taken by large numbers of Iranian and Kurdish refugees had a negative effect on security, economic, and sometimes political considerations that pertain to Turkey's relations with a number of its neighbors in the area.

Secrecy and Silence

Information on Iranians in Turkey is surrounded by a dense cloud of silence and secrecy. Starting with the number of Iranians in the country, it is thought that

there are between 6,000 (according to the Turkish Ministry of Interior) and 600,000 (according to the figures being mentioned in Turkish and foreign press circles) Iranians in Turkey. Even UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] sources in Ankara, and UNRWA is the agency looking after the affairs of a number of Iranian political refugees in Turkey, become wary when talking about those refugees. They are on their guard when they talk about the number of refugees and the circumstances under which they sought refuge, and they refer those who inquire into such matters to UNRWA's headquarters in Geneva, explaining their action as one that was attributable to the position of Turkish authorities on this matter. It is a position that stems from Turkey's "geographical wariness" with regard to the subject of Iranian refugees.

UNRWA sources state that Iranians in Turkey whose affairs are being protected by the relief agency are political refugees. That is, they are people who oppose the regime in their country, and UNRWA is trying to arrange their asylum in other countries. These UNRWA sources estimate that at the present time the number of these refugees is 4,000 persons. The United Nations Organization has filed applications with Canada, Australia, and the United States, asking these countries to grant those Iranian refugees asylum. In an interview with AL-MAJALLAH a UN official in Geneva stated that the countries which agreed to accept a number of Iranians last year were Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and Britain. In addition, Australia and Canada have been accepting a larger number of Iranian refugees. But while Australia and Canada give refugees residence permits and the right to work, European countries set different conditions for their entry and residence in those countries.

The UN official said that residence in European countries, in Australia, and in Canada could be provided for approximately 1,000 Iranians every year. He said that countries respond differently to this matter, and he also indicated that, because of their "geographical wariness" regarding this matter, Turkish authorities refuse to recognize the fact that they have Iranian refugees in Turkey. The UN official mentioned that Turkey was one of the signatories to the 1951 treaty to protect refugees and rectify their conditions. He affirmed that all Iranians living in Turkey who were being assisted by UNRWA were either people who belonged to groups which opposed the Iranian regime, or they were people who had been personally persecuted by that regime. Consequently, they cannot return to their country. UNRWA offers financial assistance to those refugees who need it, and this assistance varies depending on the conditions of each refugee. The UN official spoke about the measures which are being taken to register those Iranians, and he said that Turkish authorities require them to return to border points where they are registered by UNRWA before asylum and residence applications can be filed with the concerned western governments. Thus,

UNRWA's mission in looking after those refugees consists of caring for them, paying their expenses within available resources, and talking with the countries which are willing to take them in so that visas can be provided for them.

Conditions of Iranians in Turkey have a direct effect on Turkish-Iranian relations. Given the political crisis between the two countries, which exploded on the scene last April, these relations are generally teetering between being broken and being restored. As a result of that political crisis Iran's ambassador in Ankara returned to Tehran. Ambassador Mutaqqi, a man who is well-known for having good relations with Ali Mohtashemi, the former minister of interior, returned to his country, and the Turkish ambassador in Tehran was called to Turkey for consultations. Whereas the Turkish ambassador returned to his post after Khomeyni's death, Iran's ambassador did not return to Ankara. Observers view this incident as merely another significant milestone in the story of relations between Turkey and Iran. Sometimes these relations would be tense, and other times they would improve temporarily, but in all cases Turkey has always tried to do what it can to maintain good relations with its neighbor to the east. Given the stormy crises in the region and the existing alienation between Iran and its Arab neighbors, Turkey's reasons for maintaining good relations with its neighbor are economic, trade-related, and political. Turkish officials discuss these reasons, justifying them by saying that they wish to play the role of a good mediator and helpful neighbor between Iran and neighboring Arab countries, especially Iraq. In this regard they refer repeatedly to the role Turkey played during the Gulf war. They talk about how Ankara became the only link between Iraq and Iran since it was the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad and the Turkish Embassy in Tehran that looked after the interests of each of the two countries in the other country. Ankara Airport also became the location where Iraqi and Iranian prisoners were exchanged under the protection of international organizations.

A New Stage

Despite continuing tension in relations between Iran and Turkey due to security, political, and ideological reasons which are related to the nature of the two regimes, Turkish officials, from the new president, Turgut Ozal, to the ministers and other officials, have been trying to convey the impression that they are hoping for good things in the new stage under President Hashemi Rafsanjani. They indicate that Turkey and Iran, with two new presidents, are moving into a new stage on the domestic front and that this change will inevitably have a salutary effect on relations between the two countries.

In this regard Mr Tugay Ozceri, Turkey's deputy minister of foreign affairs, spoke with AL-MAJALLAH about relations with Iran. He reviewed his government's position on the question of the Iranian ambassador's return to Iran, and he discussed commentaries on that matter which were made at the time in Turkish and

foreign newspapers about the Iranian ambassador's interference in Turkey's internal affairs, especially in the local elections which were held last spring. (While AL-MAJALLAH's correspondent was in Ankara, Minister Mesut Yilmaz was in Kuwait heading his country's delegation in talks with Bulgaria regarding the question of the Muslim minority in that country.) Ozceri said, "With regard to Ambassador Mutaqqi of Iran, what happened was that he was called by the Iranian government to assume other responsibilities in his country. Mutaqqi's return to Iran was a decision made by the Iranians. At the present time we are waiting for a new Iranian ambassador, who could come to Ankara soon, especially now that Ozal, the new president, has taken office. It is assumed that Iran's ambassador will present his credentials to the new president."

AL-MAJALLAH asked the deputy minister of foreign affairs, "How do you explain the fact that the Iranian ambassador's transfer to Tehran coincided with the elections campaign in Turkey and with the recall of your ambassador in Iran for consultations?" The deputy minister replied, "I do not wish to add anything more to what I have already stated. That decision was made by Iranian authorities. Ambassador Mutaqqi served in Ankara for 4 years, a normal term for any ambassador. He was promoted twice since his transfer to Tehran. This means that the government of his country is satisfied with his actions."

Ozceri spoke about his view of relations with Iran under Rafsanjani. He said, "We respect the decision made by the Iranian people, and we respect their choice of President Rafsanjani. We welcome what Rafsanjani said about relations between Iran and Turkey at the press conference he held after he was elected. Rafsanjani, who mentioned there were broad areas in which those relations may be developed, will find in Turkey a willing partner, ready to participate in this regard. Turkey did maintain its position of positive neutrality between the two countries during and after the Iran-Iraq war. Now, after the war, it continues to maintain that position. Turkey encouraged Iraq and Iran to end the war. We are pursuing the same policy now so we can move beyond the existing state of no war and no peace. The more effort the two countries make to achieve a complete peace, the better things will be for both of them and for all the countries of the region, including Turkey."

The Turkish official went on to say, "Geography, common interests, and history require that Turkey and Iran live together in peace. This is the policy of the Turkish Government. When we speak of relations between any two countries, especially if they are neighbors, the discussion must touch upon common interests and the respect which each country must have for the other's sovereignty. The discussion must also cover non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the other country. All these self-evident facts must be applied to relations between Turkey and Iran. We are putting strong emphasis on the need to have total respect for the principle of non-intervention in our internal affairs. I do

not wish to concentrate here on any negative aspects of our relations with Iran, but I do want to make it clear that Iranian authorities know the things we are sensitive about. They also know about those areas in which we demonstrate our respect for their sovereignty. The only thing we want from them is that they deal with our internal conditions the same way we deal with theirs. That is, we want them not to interfere in our internal conditions, and we want them to respect that principle completely."

Hidden Signals

The Turkish deputy minister of foreign affairs was making implicit and diplomatic allusions in his talk to several incidents which had occurred in a number of Turkish cities in recent months. Recurrent attacks against Arab and foreign diplomats in Turkey were among such incidents, some of which involved the assassination of some of these diplomats. Furthermore, members of the Iranian community who are thought to be affiliated with the opposition are targets of kidnapping and murder attempts. In addition, a few of the Iranian regime's representatives are engaged in activities in Turkey, and that annoyed Turkish authorities in many campaigns and led them to call for the deportation of these Iranian representatives from Turkish territory. That was what happened with Sabri Hamdani, the Friday prayer leader in the Iranians' mosque in Istanbul. Mr Hamdani was arrested by Turkish authorities for attacking an Arab state in one of his speeches. Hamdani used to be the representative in Istanbul of 'Ali Khamene'i, the Iranian spiritual guide. Iranian sources in Turkey believe that he is affiliated with the State Security Ministry and with Iranian intelligence. They believe he runs intelligence networks which operate among members of the Iranian community in Turkey. Turkish authorities had previously asked Mojtaba Shafe'i, Iran's consul in Trabzon on the Black Sea, to leave the country after he was accused of involvement in organizing cells for Turks, Arabs, and Armenians. Turkish authorities stated that the function of these cells constituted a threat to internal Turkish security.

Western diplomatic sources in Ankara talk about the activities of groups which have ties to Iran, and they say that approximately 15,000 persons who serve as "agents" for the Iranian regime live in Turkey. Their mission is to carry out instructions they receive from Tehran. In addition, they are expected to monitor the activities and the comings and goings of approximately 600,000 Iranian refugees in Turkey. These sources say that Istanbul police are always arresting Iranian "agents" and confiscating magazines, leaflets, and cassette tapes, but that Turkish authorities have those Iranians quickly released so as not to create hard feelings in Turkey's relations with Iran.

Official information in this regard indicates that Turkey and Iran signed an agreement to improve controls on their borders and to exchange convicted criminals. That agreement, which was signed last July in the Iranian

town of Urumiyeh, follows another agreement to revive the treaty on border security which was signed 52 years ago to help curb drug smuggling operations and illegal border crossings.

Statements made by various Turkish officials reflect the concern these officials have for relations with Iran because of what they describe as "the golden opportunity" which is now available for post-war reconstruction and construction. Starting with President Ozal and other officials, emphasis is being placed on the positive aspects of trade relations between the two countries. Mehmet Kececiler, secretary general of the Motherland Party (the ruling party) says that trade figures with Iran rose from \$500 million in 1986 to \$2 billion in 1987, and it is hoped that the trade figure for this year will rise to \$3 billion. This increase in trade with Iran coincides with a noticeable decline in economic and trade activities with Arabs, compared to what those activities were in 1983 when Ozal became president. That was a period of time during which economic and trade relations between Turkey and various Arab countries really flourished. Now, however, a large number of Arab companies and institutions doing business in Turkey find something to complain about. They complain about the quality of Turkish goods, about the way Turks do business, or about the preference given to American and European firms at the expense of firms from Middle Eastern countries.

Dutch Official Discusses Imports, Exports With Gulf

*90OL0129F London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 21 Nov 89 pp 52-54*

[Interview with unnamed head of the Middle East and Africa Division of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs in The Hague by Matar al-Ahmadi; first two paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction; date not given]

[Text] Dutch exports to Arab markets were valued at more than \$2,260 million in 1988, of which about one-third went to markets of Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states, and about one-fourth was received by Saudi markets. Holland accounted for about 60 percent of all GCC imports.

The head of the Middle East and Africa Division of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs was interviewed by AL-MAJALLAH at his office in The Hague where he discussed trade relations between Holland and the Arab World.

[AL-MAJALLAH] The value of your exports to the Arab world exceeded \$2 billion in 1988. Is the Arab market still attractive to the Dutch?

[Dutch Official] The balance of trade remains in favor of the Arab world thanks to our oil imports from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. It is true that the balance of bilateral trade with certain Arab countries is

in favor of Holland. The balance of trade is in favor of the Arabs, however, if [trade with] the region is considered as a whole. The value of Dutch exports to GCC states in 1987 was half that of their exports to Holland. Arab markets are important to us and we are keen to bring Dutch products to them and especially to Saudi Arabia, which is our main market in the Arab nation. We shall endeavor to develop Dutch products in order to keep them competitive.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But the new economic condition has impacted all Arab markets?

[Dutch Official] This is true and we are aware of the change, but [those markets] are still attractive to us, and important also.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did Holland benefit from the then so-called economic renaissance?

[Dutch Official] Certain Dutch contractors and constructors benefitted from that renaissance and helped with a number of major projects in the region.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is your most important export to the Arab world, and your most important import?

[Dutch Official] Holland exports various food products to Arab markets, especially milk, dairy products, and cheeses. Food accounts for 25 percent of all our exports to the Arab world, which also include construction materials, chemicals, and farm equipment. Our agricultural products, be they equipment or foodstuffs, enjoy a good reputation in Arab markets and are very competitive with similar products. Oil is our most important Arab import.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How has the volume of Dutch economic exports to the Arab world been impacted?

[Dutch Official] It declined sharply in the past two years (1987-1988) from its volume at the beginning of the decade. Talking of Dutch exports to GCC countries, we find that they peaked at 3,816.3 million Dutch guilders (about \$1,761 million) in 1982, but declined by more than half to 1,877 million guilders (about \$873 million) in 1987. There was no difference between 1987 and 1988

despite a decline of more than a \$1 million, but it was not as sharp a decline as in previous years.

[AL-MAJALLAH] There are Saudi and Gulf petrochemicals other than oil. It is claimed that they do not enjoy the same treatment accorded Dutch products in Saudi markets, those by Shell for instance. Why?

[Dutch Official] Policies in that regard are set by the European common market to which we belong. We are subject to European market standards which determine import and export taxes on foreign goods and products. Imports are subject to higher taxes if they rise above a certain import ceiling. This issue, as you know, is still being negotiated by the GCC and European market.

[AL-MAJALLAH] You mentioned that Dutch agriculture was a role model for Saudi Arabia and Arab countries. Is it still so?

[Dutch Official] It is true that Dutch agriculture used to be a model to be emulated in Saudi Arabia and other countries, but things have changed. Saudi Arabia now has the farms and cows to support the large output of many domestic dairy firms. Cows were originally imported from Holland but Saudi businessmen have turned to America and Europe in search of better breeds. I know that the largest dairy farm in the world is located in the Saudi capital (Al-Safi Company).

[AL-MAJALLAH] How about Dutch investment in Arab markets? Do you have joint projects with Arab partners?

[Dutch Official] I would like to talk about investment in a country like Saudi Arabia with which we have at least 66 joint projects with ownership ratios between 49 and 51 percent. Even though the Saudi government supports joint projects and welcomes foreign capital, Dutch businessmen are jarred by the fact that certain Saudi businessmen, for instance, do not invest their funds at home, but go after quick profits by investing in hotels and real estate in Europe and America, then sell them at the appropriate time and so on. Saudi businessmen should be farsighted and put their funds to work in long-term investments at home. By long-term I mean 7 years or longer.

Dutch Exports to the Arab World Compared With Exports of Japan, Europe, and the U.S. (in \$thousands)

Importing Country	Exporting Country						
	Holland	Britain	U.S.	Japan	France	Italy	West Germany
Saudi Arabia	470,167	2,198,107	3,227,247	2,761,645	1,193,477	1,467,729	1,538,559
Egypt	326,283	542,405	1,648,149	561,887	931,158	824,173	1,859,887
Algeria	323,820	189,186	444,825	235,824	2,29,820	963,002	823,556
Iraq	119,709	648,182	526,575	1,210,187	491,310	367,208	650,254
Kuwait	121,723	435,480	628,175	1,219,603	292,466	339,306	466,111
UAE	178,243	50,066	485,222	1,032,526	36,380	373,312	487,623
Libya	160,503	380,971	43,453	195,289	225,567	946,786	512,381
Morocco	100,545	122,364	395,135	56.03	1,055,287	198,941	302,214

Dutch Exports to the Arab World Compared With Exports of Japan, Europe, and the U.S. (in \$thousands) (Continued)

Importing Country	Exporting Country						
	Holland	Britian	U.S.	Japan	France	Italy	West Germany
Tunisia	86,196	57,927	146,843	23,685	796,498	327,215	368,834
Oman	93,725	581,292	154,866	288,037	89,641	71,762	168,110
Jordan	70,514	188,501	260,475	183,040	95,872	213,548	183,203
Lebanon	57,642	81,119	99,946	70,937	220,051	277,489	143,664
Syria	58,329	80,691	59,080	91,346	216,908	235,138	211,065
Bahrain	37,005	187,184	88,208	120,580	33,980	56,999	130,288
Yemen Arab Republic	83,844	80,259	82,899	123,358	64,412	76,995	68,390
Qatar	27,364	161,085	59,520	147,538	77,848	54,352	86,619
Yemen PDR	23,104	34,833	17,033	19,957	19,382	13,208	17,955

Development of Dutch Exports to GCC States

Year	Exports (millions of guilders)	Exports (Million \$)
1982	3,816.4	1,766.85
1983	3,630.5	1,688.6
1984	3,679.9	1,711.6
1985	3,093.6	1,438.9
1986	2,671.8	1,242.7
1987	1,877.1	873.07
1988	1,803.5	838.8

Article Views Israeli-South African Nuclear Cooperation

*90OA0103A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH
in Arabic 1 Nov 89 pp 3-6*

[Article by Muhammad Wajdi Qandil: "Israel, Nuclear Missiles, and the Secret of the Deal With South Africa; What Lies Behind Pentagon and U.S. Intelligence Reports? Secrets of the Nuclear Arsenal in Israel and South Africa"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The real cause for the fears and misgivings which erupted when the secret deal between Israel and South Africa came out in the open is the fact that this matter has to do with Israel's and Pretoria's nuclear arsenals, both of which represent unlimited dangers for Arabs and for Africa. [passage omitted]

Israeli technicians, approximately 75 engineers, have also been working for years at the Overberg testing area near Pretoria. There is an assembly plant in that area which was built in accordance with the Israeli model so that Israel and South Africa can use it to manufacture long range missiles which can carry nuclear warheads. [passage omitted]

This does not mean that Arab countries should rush into a heated race, whose consequences would be unreliable, to acquire a deterrent nuclear capability to counter the Israeli threat. Nor does it mean that Arab countries should waste their capabilities and resources and set off

another drain on their resources to enter into a race with Israel and South Africa for total destruction. Governments which can afford a nuclear capability should not rush into deals to purchase missiles and nuclear warheads. [passage omitted]

As I indicated earlier in my warning, it is essential and necessary that we pay close attention to what is happening so that we can mobilize an international position that would apply pressure on Israel and South Africa to rid the area and the continent of nuclear weapons. This must be done so that the threat of assured destruction can be moved out of the continent.

Egypt refuses to become involved in the nuclear arms race because it would unleash unforeseen suffering into the area and would lead to destruction and death even as the area strives to get rid of destructive nuclear weapons and missiles.

There is no doubt that the mere fact that Israel, with South Africa's assistance, has nuclear weapons in its possession implies a standing threat to Arab national security. Such a threat would be a factor when Israeli decisions are being made, and no one can control the circumstances and the factors that would have an effect on those decisions. Who can guarantee that in using a nuclear deterrent, power will not be foolish and arrogant? [passage omitted]

Although the United States had asked Israel to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty after receiving information about the secret cooperation between Israel and South Africa, the U.S. administration did not follow up regularly on this matter. Consequently, Israel turned a deaf ear to American protests, and it refused to sign the treaty. Israel refused to allow inspection of the Dimona reactor even though it knows where the United States stands on this matter. Israel knows that the United States opposes the transfer of technology and the production of nuclear weapons.

This means that Washington has known about this matter for years. It means that the United States and Israel have had their differences on this matter.

Why then was this question brought out in the open at this time? Why were details about the nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa leaked by U.S. intelligence and the Pentagon? Why has the fallout from the American report been so widespread? [passage omitted]

Washington undoubtedly has known a great deal about Israel's nuclear activity and about its cooperation with South Africa since the days of the Reagan administration. And yet, Washington has been silent since last January when news about the secret cooperation between Israel and South Africa was confirmed.

It seems there are strong factors behind the fact that this issue was unexpectedly brought out in the open.

1. It seems that President Bush's administration is starting to lose patience with Israel's intransigence—the intransigence of Yitzhak Shamir—and with Israel's rejection of Baker's 5-Point Plan. Accordingly, the Bush administration finds itself hard pressed with regard to the Middle East problem and peace efforts in the region. That is why it is using another approach to embarrass Israel and put it in a dilemma by bringing the question of Israel's nuclear cooperation with South Africa out in the open. This is especially critical for Israel because its cooperation with South Africa conflicts with the strategic cooperation agreement it has with the United States, and that makes Israel vulnerable to a suspension of the military assistance it receives from the United States. [passage omitted]

2. It seems that Israel's nuclear activity, especially in the military field, has gone beyond legitimate bounds. Given what is being said about Israel becoming the sixth nuclear power in the world, Israel's nuclear activity is a threat to security and stability in the region.

Because this situation opens the door to a nuclear arms race in a volatile region that is likely to explode, the United States wants to curb possibilities for competition between the Arab countries and Israel for the acquisition of advanced missile technology.

There is information that what Israel is trying to get from its cooperation deal with South Africa is the capability to build ICBM's which can carry hydrogen bombs, not just limited nuclear warheads. This means that while the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed to limit their nuclear weapons and while each has destroyed some of its nuclear missiles, a third power that is beyond control and authority and has the capability of destroying the world has entered into the picture.

3. According to CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] information, it seems that Israel leaked U.S. technological secrets about manufacturing long range missiles to South Africa, and that puts U.S. national security in jeopardy.

Attempts have been made by Israeli agents to penetrate the Pentagon and commit espionage to obtain technology. There is, for example, the case of the spy Pollard, and there are other cases as well. There are misgivings in

Washington about the extent to which the U.S. nuclear arsenal has been compromised and the extent to which American security has been penetrated by Israel's agents.

4. Given Israel's and South Africa's joint 1979 experiment to detonate a nuclear device in the Indian Ocean, it seems that military cooperation between the two countries, especially in the area of missiles carrying nuclear warheads, has reached a dangerous level. Recently, an experiment involving a long range missile was conducted on an island in the Indian Ocean. [passage omitted]

5. It seems that the United States under the Bush administration is revising its policy on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It seems this policy is being revised after the question of nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa came out in the open and after it became known that Israel and South Africa had agreed on a deal to produce long range nuclear missiles and a fighter airplane that relies on U.S. technology available to Israel. In return Israel would receive high grade enriched uranium from South Africa. That could lead the United States to reconsider its deal to sell Israel a super computer which is used in manufacturing missiles. Israel wants to purchase that computer under the terms of its strategic cooperation agreement with the United States. [passage omitted]

That is why we must pay close attention to what is happening behind the wall of silence in the Negev desert nearby and in the Kalahari desert far away. We must pause to warn against the nuclear threat that lies within Israel and South Africa, two similar countries that are bound together by the threat they pose and by the fact that both are beyond international authority and control.

As far as Israel is concerned, the question is no longer whether or not Israel has the capability to manufacture a nuclear weapon or whether it has actually manufactured such a weapon! The information which has been confirmed goes beyond such uncertainty and speculation. The question now is this: Does Israel admit having such a weapon, or is it maintaining its ambiguous position so it would not be subject to the nuclear weapons treaty and to international inspection?

Reliable reports indicate that in 1986 Israel continued to build an arsenal of nuclear bombs, which could be delivered by airplanes. These reports, which indicate that Israel has been manufacturing nuclear bombs at the rate of one or two a year, show that Israel's nuclear arsenal at the Dimona reactor, which is located 80 feet below the surface of the earth, contains between 20 and 25 bombs of the same size as the Nagasaki bomb. [passage omitted]

That is why Yitzhaq Rabin, Israel's defense minister, commented on the controversy by saying, "We will not discuss our missiles program under any circumstances." At the same time Shamir was careful to deny the report by the American television network.

There is information, however, that General Ragiv, senior aide to Rabin, is in South Africa supervising the nuclear weapons project from the Israeli Embassy in Pretoria. [passage omitted]

What can this sequence of reliable information about the new nuclear alliance between Israel and South Africa tell us?

Briefly, this information tells us that Israel relies now on South Africa to supply it with the enriched uranium it needs to manufacture nuclear warheads. The information tells us that since Israel itself lacks the territorial depth and the space that would be large enough and necessary for conducting tests on long range missiles, it has found a remote, inconspicuous spot in the southern part of the continent where it can conduct those tests.

Can there be anything more dangerous to Arab and African countries and their security than such a nuclear alliance that extends from Israel in the north to South Africa? Can there be anything more threatening to Arab national security than the presence of a deterrent nuclear weapon in the hands of a power which operates beyond international authority and supervision?

This may be the reason why we must pay close attention and remain vigilant to what is going on under the surface of the earth and behind the conspiracy of silence in the Negev desert and in the Kalahari desert. Had it not been for the United States, Israel's strategic ally, the terrifying secret would not have been exposed and the fallout from it would not have become so widespread.

Leadership of Pannational Movement

46050006C Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 14 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] The members of the Executive Council of the Armenian Pannational Movement are:

1. Levon Ter Petrosyan [Karabakh Committee]
2. Babken Araktsyan [Karabakh Committee]
3. Vazgen Manukyan [Karabakh Committee]
4. Ampartsum Galstyan [Karabakh Committee]
5. Aleksan Akobyan [Karabakh Committee]
6. Samson Khazaryan [Karabakh Committee]
7. Rafael Khazaryan [Karabakh Committee]
8. Davit Vardanyan [Karabakh Committee]
9. Vano Siradekhyan [Karabakh Committee]
10. Ashot Manucharyan [Karabakh Committee]
11. Samuel Gevorgyan [Karabakh Committee]
12. Yerjanik Abgaryan (researcher at the Oriental Studies Institute of the [Armenian] Academy of Sciences)
13. Albert Bakhdasaryan (researcher at the Institute of Mathematical Machines)
14. Arshak Sadoyan (lecturer at the State University of Yerevan)
15. Avedik Iskhanyan (geologist)
16. Vitya Ayvazyan (State University of Yerevan)
17. Smbat Akobyan (student at Art and Theatre Institute)
18. Khachik Stamboltsyan (Compassion Organization)
19. Grachik Simonyan (historian; corresponding member of the [Armenian] Academy of Sciences)
20. Kamo Vardanyan (editor-in-chief of YEREGOYAN YEREVAN)
21. Yuri Movsisyan (economist)
22. Grant Bagratyan (economist)
23. Ktrich Sardaryan (deputy editor of AVANGART)
24. Aydin Morikyan (historian)
25. Rafael Ishkhanyan (professor at State University of Yerevan)
26. Genrik Hovhannisyan (professor at the Institute of Art of the [Armenian] Academy of Sciences)

27. Robert Kocharyan (president of the National Front of Karabakh)

28. Vazgen Sargsyan (writer; member of the staff of GARUN)

29. Rafael Papayan (lecturer in linguistics)

30. Ashot Bleyan (director of the Mkhitar Sebastatsi school)

31. Shahen Petrosyan (member of the staff of the Institute of Mathematical Machines)

32. Aram Mayilyan (member of the staff of the Institute of Mathematical Machines)

33. Aram Hovhannisyan (commentator on radio and television)

34. Levon Ananikyan (commentator on radio and television)

35. Der Husik (from the Ashtarak rayon)

36. Vardan Durnazyan (economist)

Draft Program of Pannational Movement Detailed

46050006B Paris HARATCH in Armenian 8 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] The draft program submitted to the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] held on November 4 to 6 stresses that "the objective of the Movement is to contribute to the political, economic and spiritual strengthening of the nation on which depends the solution of important national problems." The draft program underscores the need for self-reliance stating that otherwise our nation's aspirations are harmed, as our historical experience has demonstrated on numerous occasions. The introduction section of the draft program also notes the growth of unity among Armenians in the last 1 and ½ years, the rise of moral solidarity for battle and the achievement of moral independence.

Article 1 of the "ideological principles" section of the draft program says: "The Armenian people can best utilize its talents and abilities, resolve its mounting national problems and contribute to the development of international civilization by reestablishing its independent state."

The draft program underscores the importance of freedom of speech, press and conscience, a multiparty system and the Armenian language and faith in safeguarding democracy and national survival. The draft program also emphasizes the need for moral and material fortitude for political success and says that this can only be achieved by joining together national forces.

These principal guidelines are followed by the near-term goals of the Movement. The return of Artsakh remains naturally on the forefront and is followed by the need for a new contract between Armenia and the Soviet Union.

According the APM draft program, the said contract must incorporate the autonomy [inknuryunutyun] of government authorities in Armenia, the full recognition of Armenia's right to decide whether to be part of the Soviet Union or not, full autonomy in economic policy and relations with the outside world, the right to draft a new constitution which will echo the true interests of the Armenian people, the strict implementation of the present constitutional clause with regard to the official language of the Republic, the reconstruction of the quake-devastated areas, the improvement of Armenia's ecology and efforts for the recognition of the Armenian genocide by the UN.

The second section of the APM draft program consists of the bylaws of the Movement which we will report in the future.

APM Congress Reportage, First Issue of HAYK Published

First Day of Congress

*46050006A Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 7 Nov 89 pp 1, 4*

[Eyewitness report by editor-in-chief Arpik Misakian from the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement in Yerevan on 4 November]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] On Friday [3 November], the first issue of HAYK, the official press organ of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM], appeared carrying a front-page editorial entitled "The Shore of Our Salvation." The officially recognized paper is published as an eight-page weekly, in an edition size that is the same as that of HAYRENIKI DZAYN. A notice entitled "Attention" in the first issue says: "The editorial board intends to convert gradually to classical spelling. For that purpose, separate articles will be published with that spelling in future issues." The paper adds that the entire proceeds for the first issue will be donated to the Armenian benevolent organization named "Compassion." The first issue was printed in 100,000 copies.

At 9 am on Saturday, delegates and guests began arriving at the congress hall. The Founding Congress opened at 10 am marking a truly historic moment for Armenia and the entire Armenian nation. However, this hurried initial report will probably not be able to convey a full picture of this first session. [passage omitted]

The first speaker at the Congress was [Karabakh Committee member] Levon Ter Petrosyan who spoke on behalf of the Karabakh Committee. As in his speeches in Paris, Ter Petrosyan spoke about the movement that has begun in the Soviet Union in the wake of perestroika and said that Armenia has been on the vanguard of that movement. He said that because the official bodies of Armenia did not harmonize their work with restructuring, popular authorities were formed not as an opposition but as an alternative. [passage omitted]

The next speaker was Suren Arutyunyan who delivered a lengthy and interesting speech which we will report in more detail in the future. Outlining the overall activities of the government and its decisions, Arutyunyan said that it is time to shed prejudices and to take a different posture with regard to the Diaspora. After commending the Social Democratic Clarion [Hunchak] Party, the Democratic Liberal [Ramgavar] Party and the Armenian General Benevolent Union for their work and activities for Armenia over the past years, Arutyunyan reached out to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] [Dashnak Party] amid intense applause and said that the ARF has changed its stance with respect to Soviet Armenia with its recent activities. [passage omitted]

Rafael Ishkhanyan [professor of linguistics at the State University of Yerevan] of the Mashtots Association made a passionate speech largely expressing the ideas contained in his article that was published in HARATCH ("The Rule of the Exclusion of the Third Force"). After a speech by a delegate from Kirovakan, Armenian Communist Party Secretary G. Galoyan tried to explain why the television is not carrying the deliberations of the Congress live and stated that the deliberations of the Congress will be aired in full later on. Commotion erupted when a representative of the television organization declared that television employees have declared a strike because of this decision. The next speaker, a representative of the Compassion Committee of Artik, was followed by the prelate of Yerevan, Bishop Garegin Nersisyan, who spoke on behalf of Catholicos Vazken I. Vazken I called for compassion, harmony, courage and wisdom and gave his blessings emphasizing the need for unity so that the aspirations of the nation are not jeopardized. It was also announced that Arkadi Manucharov [Karabakh Committee member still in prison] has gone on a hunger strike, and it was decided to send a telegram to Moscow on behalf of the Congress. A minor incident—the first of several—occurred when the president of the organization called "Protoparliament" [Nakhakhorhrtaran] protested the fact that only he was invited from among the leaders of the 12 associations that make up his organization. He said that representatives of those associations are outside waiting to be admitted into the Congress. A vote was taken and their entrance was rejected (the said associations are opposed to the APM). [passage omitted]

Second Day of Congress

46050006A Paris HARATCH in Armenian 8 Nov 89 p 1

[Report by Arpik Misakian from the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement in Yerevan on 5 November]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Grant Khachatryan, a representative of the Constitutional Association (one of the 12 groups that make up the Protoparliament) criticized the APM [Armenian Pannational Movement] in his speech. Feliks Safaryan, the president of the Protoparliament and the originator of the previous day's

unpleasant episode whose only purpose was to disturb and to annoy the Congress, expressed regret that the APM does not wish to be a single unit but a strong organization. He said that his motto is a "free, independent and united Armenia." [passage omitted]

Speaking on behalf of the Hunchak Party, Diran Hakimian greeted the people of Armenia and Artsakh and said that his party has demonstrated the importance it attaches to the APM by sending a high-level delegation. He said that his party will initiate the creation of a pan-Armenian movement in the Diaspora which can unite around a common platform. [Karabakh Committee member] Vano Siradekhyan explained that it is obviously impossible to try to put the Karabakh movement into a mold, but that it was difficult for it continue in its existing state. He said that the Committee was tired of rallies and that this is not a rally but a congress. He said: "We want to give form to this movement." Siradekhyan accused some writers of distorting history and said: "Mr [Lentrush] Khurshutyan [of the Hay Dat organization] is one of those writers."

The striking miners of Porkuta had sent a telegram of greetings.

At 4:00 pm after a brief intermission, Babgen Araktsyan took over as session chairman, and revisions and corrections to the proposed bylaws were discussed. It was disclosed that a total of 1,011 delegates were attending (13 had not come) of whom 998 could vote and that this session was attended by 907 delegates. These figures were noted for voting purposes.

There was some argument about one point. The resulting loss of time and the complaints expressed against the session chairman prompted Araktsyan to step down and to pass the session chairmanship over to Ashot Manucharyan. A protester from the hall charged that the Congress was wasting time over trivial issues at a time when Armenia was at war. The bylaws were eventually approved with minor revisions. [passage omitted]

The last session of the day began at 6:30 pm and was chaired by Levon Ter Petrosyan. The agenda of this session consisted of the election of an Executive Council by secret balloting. No limits were imposed on the number of candidates. It was decided that the Council should have 45 members (the middle point of the range 40 to 50 that the organizers of the Congress had originally agreed on), and the registration of candidates began. The 11 members of the Karabakh Committee plus the 7 individuals who had replaced them during their imprisonment were elected to the Council automatically. It is obvious that Armenia is experiencing a period of training in democracy, and the fear that any move can be viewed as "undemocratic" leads to exaggerations. One such exaggeration was the failure to limit the number of candidates that could be nominated. As a result, a deafening cacophony ensued with every delegate nominating a different candidate. It became impossible to form candidate lists, and the session ended without

any lists. In order to resolve this impasse, it was agreed that the chairmanship of the Congress prepare a list of candidates from all the nominations and submit it to the Monday session of Congress. The only one restriction that was imposed (and was not strictly enforced) was that all candidates must be delegates.

Last Day of Congress

46050006A Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 14 Nov 89 pp 1, 4

[Report by Arpik Misakian from the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement in Yerevan on 6 November]

[Excerpts] In our November 8 edition, we reported the conclusion of the APM [Armenian Pannational Movement] Founding Congress and the election of a 36-member Executive Council (instead of the originally determined 45). But it is essential to focus on this third day of the Congress (November 6) which was supposed to examine the bylaws of the APM with the proposed revisions, to read the resolutions that were submitted and to elect an Executive Council. However, an unexpected event led to unpleasant circumstances. [passage omitted]

The Prime Minister of Armenia, V. Margaryantz, accompanied by two of his deputies, V. Movsisyan and Levon Sahakyan, arrived in the congress hall at 1:20 pm. The session was being chaired by Ashot Manucharyan. The officials sat on the first row while Ambartsum Galstyan read the list of candidates for the Executive Council. The list consisted of 72 names of which only one, Bella Arutyunyan, was a woman. After the reading of the names, Margaryantz rose to the podium and addressed his people in Russian because he does not speak Armenian. His speech was translated into Armenian paragraph by paragraph. Margaryantz had prepared a long report, and his speech was frequently interrupted by the delegates who expressed skepticism about the Prime Minister's account of the assistance given to Artsakh. Margaryantz spoke of an extraordinary and complex situation and said that efforts to resolve the issue of supplies are being blocked. He emphasized that there have been improvements in the last 4 days and added: "I cannot deceive you. You can verify my words." He read a lengthy list of supplies sent to Artsakh, including canned fish from Kamchatka, television equipment, soap, beans, coffee, etcetera. In mentioning the difficulties, he noted that the Soviet Union has only six 20-tonne cargo planes. He charged that sometimes arms are being shipped instead of food. He said that he had made contact with the NKAO [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and that according to the reports he received the situation was returning to normal and that food supplies were getting through. As for the lack of air service into the region, Magaryantz said that no transport planes were flying in the Soviet Union during those 2 days and that the problem is not confined to Armenia alone. As he spoke pieces of paper were being passed to

him, and the session chairmanship decided to summarize the questions put to him. Margaryantz said that he performed his work in Moscow well and that, when he was assigned to Armenia in September 1988, he tried to familiarize himself with the people's problems and to report what was missing. He said that he would not be afraid to come to Armenia if he was 35 years old, but that at his age he hesitated. Levon Ter Petrosyan asked two questions in Armenian which were translated into Russian. He asked: a) You were appointed during the martial law period, and we consider all decision taken during that period invalid; and b) Have you ever worked with Gorbachev?

This is where an unpleasant atmosphere developed. The Prime Minister of Armenia was trying to exonerate himself with a long autobiography. His principal goal was to prove that he is not a man of the past and that he entered politics during the Gorbachev period. He acknowledged that he worked with Gorbachev in Stavropol from 1957 to 1977. Levon Ter Petrosyan thanked him saying that he was pleased to see Margaryantz state that he is Gorbachev's friend.

Let us note parenthetically that the fact that the Prime Minister of Armenia does not speak Armenian left a sad impression. No matter how much responsibility local officials have in the deteriorating situation, it was very distressing to see the chairman of the country's council of ministers so humiliated. The Congress unanimously adopted a resolution which emphasized that the appointment of officials by Moscow is not appropriate. [passage omitted]

Flaws, Promise of APM Congress Examined

*46050006F Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 18-19 Nov 89 p 2*

[Article by editor-in-chief Arpik Misakian: "Reflections on a Congress"]

[Excerpts] It is hard not to reflect on a pannational Armenian congress.

Obviously it is superfluous to overemphasize its singular character. Anyone who is remotely knowledgeable about Armenia's history of the last 70 years realizes that what began in February 1988 resulted in the unprecedented phenomenon of this congress after passing through numerous phases. This event can neither be ignored nor lightly criticized when everything is still in a state of gestation. Therefore, putting aside all the disagreements that one might have with one or more of the Movement's postures, we must take a positive attitude if we wish to be sensible.

Criticism is easy, but it is helpful only if it is constructive. The tirades we observed during the Congress and we heard on our return did not appear to constructive.

Some of the statements made during the Congress had no objective other than disturbing and frustrating an

effort and a program whose purpose is to bring together the entire Armenian nation, to own up the national interests of a people and to undertake their realization step by step. [passage omitted]

Born in Artsakh and raised in Yerevan, the Karabakh Committee took the leadership of a popular uprising after 70 years of tyranny. It won the admiration of international media, managed to maintain exemplary order and inspired an enviable trust among the masses. Obviously, such a situation could not last forever. It was necessary to give the movement a form and a structure. That is what happened, and that movement became pannational. The minor absenteers cannot be used as a pretext to declare the use of that adjective [pannational] illegitimate. Ironically, that adjective has been exploited fairly extensively in much more factionalized situations.

Then came the Founding Congress. Clearly, the Congress had its flaws. First, there was the inexperience with democracy which led the presidency of the Congress to surdemocratic exaggerations—because of an understandable mentality—even as it was accused of not being sufficiently democratic. There were numerous speakers, mostly from Armenia, but also a few from the Diaspora. Among those few were representatives from the Social Democratic Clarion [Hunchak] Party and the Democratic Liberal [Ramgavar] Party, who were represented with special delegations. Their representatives addressed the Congress and delivered their messages. This was the source of a major contradiction. Here were two parties which did not wage any struggle against the Soviet regime in Armenia and which, on the contrary, supported it. In the Diaspora, these parties have not been the greatest supporters of 28 May, the tricolor or Aghpurn Serop [guerrilla fighter in early 20th century], but they had come and were present at the Congress. It appeared that the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] [Dashnak Party] had left the field open to them. But the ARF has been there—not since 1988 but for the last 70 years. It has lived silently in the hearts of the Armenian people, and that day its name was everywhere and emanated from the souls of everyone. A whole nation that swears by its name did not understand its absence. They were all astonished. Everyone spoke about the Dashnak Party, paid tribute to the Dashnak Party and praised the work of the Dashnak Party. The Dashnak Party was on everyone's mind. But where was it?

They could not understand. We could not understand. Our goal here is simply to state the situation. We neither criticize nor condemn, because we are not privy to the fine points of Dashnak Party's new Ostpolitik. But we can say that no explanation can justify such an absence. It may well be that the Dashnak Party does not agree with the APM [Armenian Pannational Movement]. But there, there was the people of Armenia who awaited the Dashnak Party's greetings, which would not have meant endorsement of the APM's program. All that was awaited was a presence by the side of a people which has worked to reinstate the Dashnak Party in Armenia.

The absentees will always be wrong, say the French. We would add, in this case, better late than never. What has happened and what is happening in Armenia is a true revolution whose advance must not be checked.

It is very important for Armenia and the entire Armenian nation that the APM not fail. Otherwise we would once again demonstrate our political immaturity. We would demonstrate that we continue to favor special interests over the interests of the Armenian people.

Such exercises are dangerous for us in these critical days.

Obstacles must not be placed on a path from which Armenia must—is obligated to—emerge triumphantly.

APM Resolutions Call for Closer Ties With Diaspora

Broader Diaspora Participation Sought

46050006E Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 16 Nov 89 p 3

[“Resolutions of the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement”]

[Text] 1. Whereas a considerable portion of the Armenian nation has been dispersed outside the borders of Armenia—namely some of the republics of the Soviet Union as well as various countries of the world—because of historical circumstances, forming the Armenian diaspora;

2. Whereas Armenia is the homeland of all Armenians and has a historic and moral responsibility to help the national preservation and survival of the diaspora Armenians and their destiny;

3. Whereas the overwhelming majority of the diaspora Armenians, as an indivisible part of the Armenian nation, feel a similar responsibility to help the multilateral development and strengthening of the Armenian Republic;

4. Whereas relations between Armenia and the diaspora have in the past 7 decades been based on the principle of so-called “class” because of the policies of the Soviet regime and have not contributed to the unity and cooperation of the Armenian people;

5. Whereas a fateful period of national and political awakening has begun in Armenia and the diaspora thanks to the Artsakh Movement creating truly new opportunities for the cohesion of the two segments;

The Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement believes it is essential:

6. To harness relations between Armenia and the diaspora solely to the goal of resolving pannational problems;

7. To draft a mutually acceptable program for cooperation between Armenia and the diaspora with the participation of all interested circles from both segments;

8. To make the said program contribute to:

a) The just comprehensive solution of the Armenian problem;

b) The formation, development and strengthening of a sovereign Armenian state; and

c) The deepening of the national and political self-consciousness of the diaspora Armenians, the preservation of their cultural identity and the establishment of strong ties between the diaspora and the Motherland.

9. Relations between Armenia and the diaspora must be based on the following principles:

a) Relations between Armenia and diaspora must be based on postideological national unity and cooperation between the two segments around pannational values;

b) All organizations and individuals in both segments must have the right and the means to establish relations with each other regardless of their party, religious, social and other affiliations;

c) No government, party, religious or other organization must have a monopoly in establishing and conducting relations in Armenia and the diaspora;

d) It is the duty of both segments to bring to life a modern infrastructure which contributes to the development of relations between Armenia and the diaspora, which expands travel and tourism, exchanges in science, industry, literature, art, journalism and other areas.

The participation of the diaspora Armenians in the political, economic and social life of the Republic must be taken into account in the drafting of the new Armenian constitution.

Given the aforementioned facts, and the wide geographic distribution and diversity of the diaspora, it is essential to analyze and evaluate relations between Armenia and the diaspora more deeply at a pan-Armenian conference. The APM [Armenian Pannational Movement] will assist in the preparations for such a meeting with all of its means.

The newly elected Executive Council of the APM must focus on relations between the APM and public and political organizations in the diaspora as soon as possible.

The APM will utilize all of its means to establish and to cultivate entirely new relations between Armenia and the diaspora which will be compatible with the national interests of the Armenian people.

Call for Reinstatement of Diaspora Parties

*46050006E Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 18-19 Nov 89 p 3*

[“Resolutions of the Founding Congress of the Armenian Pannational Movement]

[Text] Affirming the oneness and indivisibility of national ideas and acknowledging that all the political parties and organizations of the Armenian nation, bar none, have been and remain the expressors of national ideas;

Given that the aberrant and deplorable estrangement of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF], the Social Democratic Clarion Party [SDCP] and the Democratic Liberal Party [DLP] the political life of their nation has upset and prevented the normal development of political processes not only in Armenia but in the diaspora;

With an eye to restoring the normal development of political processes, the APM resolves:

1. To recognize the great role that the Armenian political parties in the diaspora have played and continue to play in preserving and developing national values and in fighting for the realization of national goals;
2. To demand from the Armenian Supreme Soviet and government to give official recognition to the DLP, SDCP and the ARF; and
3. To demand the establishment of permanent representative offices of the said parties in Armenia.
4. The Founding Congress expresses the hope that all diaspora parties will join forces for the Armenian national rebirth and unity and the realization of national goals.

APM Press Organ Surveyed

*46050006D Paris HARATCH
in Armenian 16 Nov 89 p 2*

[Article by A. Totoyan]

[Excerpt] A new name joined the colorful world of the Armenian press in November. HAYK is the official press organ of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM]. Its position is clear and noticeable. It carries overtones of brisk and wise judgement and unrestrained expression. Its appearance coincides with a stormy but historic moment for our people. The political upheavals in Armenia are obviously far from calming down, but the Founding Congress of the APM is the second most important milestone since the recognition of the Movement. That milestone was announced by HAYK. After publishing various unofficial pamphlets and newsletters, the APM now disseminates its message through HAYK.

The first issue of HAYK gives an unambiguous picture of its chosen course from the first lines of its editorial to the end of its last page. It is the mouthpiece of a people which is aware of its history, its present and its future aspirations, which, after its numerous bitter experiences, cries out loudly that the lessons of history have not been wasted and whose eyes are now fixed on the most vital page of those lessons.

The editorial entitled “The Shore of Our Salvation” on the front page is a small mirror that reflects the first steps of the newest period of our history which was initiated by the persistent firmness of the Armenians of Artsakh and which was written in Yerevan’s Liberty Square before it was recorded in the annals of diplomacy. There “we woke up from our sleep, and that was the first step toward our return to national awareness which rose against the wall of tyranny.”

The HAYK editorial notes also those “who thought that the battle for salvation would be a party and expected easy victories riding on the waves of vigorous popular rebellion without making any sacrifices were deeply disillusioned.” The upheaval and struggle of the past two years are summed up in a single sentence which also expresses the APM’s basic posture: “We have rediscovered our *raison d’être*, our dignity; we have seen that the light of salvation is nowhere but inside us.”

This basic theme is also expressed in subsequent pages. For example, Ktrich Sardaryan’s article entitled “It Is the Hour of Unity” reaches the same conclusion after emphasizing the present need for the unity of the two segments of the Armenian nation. He addresses the Diaspora with a certain amount of reproach and observes certain postures, fears and passivities which stem from an incorrect evaluation of the oppression in Armenia in the past decades. Sardaryan says: “We are grateful for your material assistance. But why do you not contribute to the spiritual awakening of the Motherland? Through their own experience, the people have finally reached the conclusion that the most basic guarantee of the nation’s survival is having a sovereign state. Let no one be intimidated by the ‘ghost’ of independence because even Marxism has no respect for a people which does not wish or aspire to reinstate the independence it has lost.”

Then comes the conclusion of the lesson: “We can no longer permit anyone to auction off ‘Armenian cards.’ The Armenian people must itself decide its relations with its neighbors. This does not mean that the people must forget its history. But it is inadmissible to turn that history into a self-serving historical novel.”

Sardaryan believes that the time is ripe “to remind the Armenian parties of the Diaspora that it is the parties that must serve the people and not the other way round.” He adds that given the bitter experiences of the past it is time to wake up and to put aside trivial interparty disputes.

In an article entitled "Self-determination or Impasse?" Rapayel Papayan focuses on the issue of self-determination. The author is led to express himself on this issue by the well-known decision of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet with regard to the sovereignty and self-determination of that republic. Papayan stresses that no one can dispute a nation's right of self-determination, including that of the Baltic countries and Azerbaijan, provided that that posture is shared by everyone. Papayan writes: "The independence of Azerbaijan from the Soviet Union, whether it is economic or political, is in principle identical with the independence of Artsakh from Azerbaijan. We all agree that the issue of Azerbaijan's independence can be resolved only by a referendum in Azerbaijan. But the Artsakh problem must also be viewed by the same principles."

Papayan finds the requirement that all the republics must agree with any republic's decision for self-determination to be inconsistent with the concept of self-determination. He asks: "Can that be called self-determination?" He continues: "In that case, would not others be deciding for the 'self-determinant?'" Papayan says that this impasse affects the people of Russia as well. He adds: "As long as Russia's attitude toward the people it is exploiting does not change, the Russian people cannot enjoy the fruits of freedom." [passage omitted]

Dashnak Party Declares APM Congress 'Failure'

'Disillusion' Reported

46050006G Paris GAMK in Armenian 15 Nov 89 p 1

[Text] Today, on November 13, we learned that a helicopter sent from Yerevan to Stepanakert landed in the Azeri town of Akhdam near NKAO [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] for mysterious and unknown reasons. Eleven Armenian young men and women traveling in the helicopter were arrested by the Azeris. According to some sources, a certain amount of munitions were found in the cargo the helicopter was carrying.

During a popular rally organized by the Armenian Pan-national Movement [APM] in Yerevan on 10 November, Vano Siradekhyan and Ashot Manucharyan, two of the leaders of the Movement, tried to explain the failures that became evident during their Congress on 4-6 November. The rally was attended by 30,000 people.

We also learn that wide segments of people in Artsakh and Armenia as well as some members of the APM are disillusioned with the failure of the APM Congress.

Individuals and groups which participated in the APM Congress are reviewing their membership in the said movement because the Movement's program does not echo the national aspirations of the Armenian people.

The same day in Ijevan, two Armenians, Abbots Vahan and Ashot, were killed accidentally as they were trying to blow up the monument erected in the city in honor of the

11th Red Army. It was the 11th Red Army which entered Armenia in 1920 to sovietize it by brute force.

'Pannational' Character Disputed

46050006G Paris GAMK in Armenian 16 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by M. Ishkhalian: "A State of Fumbling"]

[Text] In sociology and particularly political life, words and pretenses generally have special meanings, even if they are used knowingly or unknowingly for other motives.

We must be very careful about the pretenses we take on particularly in this stage of our national life. It is true that the Artsakh movement began in Artsakh with the decision of the oblast committee in February 1988, but it quickly became a universal Armenian movement because it flowed from the general and universal interests of the Armenian nation.

Justifiably, the Armenians of the Motherland made it their struggle, and the Diaspora responded to that struggle by making it its own and supporting it the best it could.

More recently, the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] was created in Armenia, and it held its founding congress on 4-6 November.

The idea of the creation of an Armenian pannational movement was obviously received with great enthusiasm, national pride and satisfaction in the Diaspora.

We will have other occasions to express our views with regard to the APM. We continue to support the creation of a true Armenian pannational movement which embodies the Armenian people with all of its segments, aspirations and wishes and which pursues its fundamental goals. It is only then that the pretense of "Armenian Pannational Movement" would be appropriate and justifiable in a sociological sense.

However, according to the information we have received the movement that has been created in Yerevan unfortunately does not have a pannational character.

We say "unfortunately" because with its present structure and the goals it is pursuing this movement cannot embody the entire Armenian nation.

We cannot imagine an Armenian pannational movement which, especially at this juncture in time, not only ignores the Artsakh crisis but in which Artsakh has no place. Ironically, this is a movement which was born out of the Artsakh demands. Moreover, during the said Congress, the Artsakh crisis was mentioned only in passing.

We do not wish to be misunderstood. The February 1988 decision of Artsakh gave new impetus to the struggle that was being waged against pollution. The pre-Artsakh national currents would most probably go in another direction [without the Karabakh movement]. Look into

the hearts of every Armenian whether he is in Artsakh, Leninakan, Kirovakan, Beirut, Los Angeles or Paris, and you will find that Artsakh is written there in capital letters and has turned into emotion.

When an entire group of people, the Artsakh Armenians, do not have the place they deserves in this Movement, it is obvious—and we say this with deep conviction—that this Movement cannot be called "pannational." It may be called the "Armenian National Party," since it is pursuing certain national goals.

According to our information, the said movement apparently wants to strengthen Armenia, to consolidate the democratic regime there and to resolve problems related to the reconstruction work in the disaster zone.

We still do not know how it will be able to succeed in this national mission, when reports from Yerevan confirm that many regions in Armenia, including regions in the disaster zone, have no representatives on the newly-elected 37-member [as published] Executive Council.

We believe that at this time the APM is in a state of fumbling and is inclined toward centralization.

Dashnak Party Calls for 'True Unity'

46050006H Paris GAMK in Armenian 20-21 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Kh. D. K: "Call for True Unity"]

[Text] The Dashnak press published the "Declaration" of the Conference of Dashnak Press Representatives. The assessments contained in that declaration echo the concerns which the Dashnak family and the mouthpiece of that family, the Dashnak press, are experiencing.

The stormy events in Artsakh and Armenia since February 1988 have, on the one hand, expressed the pannational aspirations, goals and ideals of the Armenian people and, on the other, demonstrated its latent capabilities and the strength of its willpower with its positive and negative aspects.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF], which constitutes the condensed expression of the national, political and socioeconomic objectives of the Armenian people, could not remain indifferent to these developments and could not be a mere spectator watching the struggle of our people in Armenia from a distance. In keeping with its traditions, the ARF did not remain indifferent to the developments taking place in Armenia, and with its postures, stated positions, comments and proposals, tried to keep the national liberation struggle of the Armenian people on a pannational course and to contribute to the creation of a pannational and general front so that the efforts of the Armenian masses could be focused and condensed around a single axis and so that they would not be wasted in unpleasant and grim quarrels.

Unfortunately, as the declaration of the Conference of Dashnak Press Representatives states, "the hopes of the

entire Armenian nation, but particularly our people in Armenia, since February 1988 to crown the national liberation struggle of the Armenian people with a pannational program and pannational movement have not yet resulted in the formation of a collective force because neither the party and government officials nor the popular movements in Armenia have yet truly fulfilled the hopes that were placed on them. The dream to build a government for all Armenians did not become a reality during the initial days of the Artsakh movement. At the same time, factionalism and intolerance began to become evident among certain elements which aspired to lead the popular movements." Thus the desired unity could not be achieved although attempts are under way to create the illusion in the minds of naive observers that the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] embodies the idea of pannational unity. One wishes that the factionalist and intolerant circles would not block the process which was aimed at the creation of a pannational general front.

A pannational front, movement, will or force could not be created simply because certain circles, particularly certain members of the "Soviet Armenian Committee of the Karabakh Movement [Karabakh Committee]," tried, out of unknown motives, to sidestep the feelings of the Armenian people stemming from their long history and, rejecting some of the most sacred elements of that history, they skilfully decorated a crooked political course and objective with ambiguous statements thus giving rise to deep discontent.

The truth is that the groups and organizations operating in Armenia and the Diaspora remain committed to the idea of creating a united pannational front because they consider it the assurance of the triumph of the demand movement of the Armenian people. These groups are trying to distance themselves from the disillusion created by the APM program and its political goals and course.

All these organizations aspire for a pannational unity which will lead the demand movement of the Armenian people. This aspiration can become a reality only with the initiative of an authoritative force, which the APM is not especially after its founding congress.

This authoritative force is the ARF as the stance of the delegates at the APM's founding congress and the spontaneous outpouring of sympathy in the Motherland have demonstrated. Such support empowers the representatives of the Dashnak press, which constitutes the mouthpiece of the Party, to call "on all Armenian people in Armenia and the diaspora, the groups, forces and organizations that are affiliated with the Artsakh demand movement, the Conference of the Intelligentsia, the APM and finally the rational elements of the Soviet Armenian official leadership" to unite on a truly pannational front, to coordinate their efforts, to turn the capabilities of the Armenian people into a single force, to become the condensed expression of the collective will of the Armenian people and to push forward the national liberation struggle which will lead to "the unification of

Armenia and Armenians" and "whose first fruit will be the reunification of Artsakh with Armenia."

Let us take note of this call for unity by the Conference of the Dashnak Press Representatives and let us march toward the creation of a genuine and strong pannational front.

Dashnak Party Sees 'Reunification' as Only Solution

46050007 Paris GAMK in Armenian 15 Nov 89 p 2

[Editorial originally published in the 8 November 1989 issue of Athens DROSHAK, official press organ of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation: "We Await Unification"]

[Text] Even if the Azeri blockade imposed on the Armenians of the Motherland is completely lifted, the struggle for the demands of our people has no right to rest as long as the Kremlin continues to leave in abeyance the complete resolution of our just demand for the reunification of Artsakh with Armenia.

We followed the negotiations and bargaining in the anterooms of the Kremlin with incredulity and reservation because since September 1989 the central authorities frequently retreated before the pan-Turkish threats of the Azeris. In Baku, the communist authorities in power and the so-called "popular" opposition representatives are clearly in collusion when they openly "threaten" the Kremlin with leaving the "Soviet family" and asking for help from their kinsmen in Turkey if Artsakh is reunified with Armenia.

The Soviet leadership has so far not taken an official posture with regard to this "threatening" stances and decisions, which means that it may yield at any time under such pressures.

This is the first factor that makes it essential for the entire Armenian nation, but particularly our forces which have been entrusted with the task of raising the Armenian demands at official levels in Moscow, to remain resolute, alert and vigilant on their watch until

justice is done and Artsakh is returned to its rightful place, Armenia and the Armenian people.

Even if the crisis appears to be over and the chain strangling the Armenians of the Motherland is removed, no one in the Kremlin should entertain any vain thoughts that the price of those positive steps can be charged to the lands of the Armenian people and that Artsakh's fate can be returned to Azerbaijan. The demanding Armenian nation is prepared to accept only one answer from the Kremlin. That expectation is inspired by the hope of justice brought about by the wave of restructuring and will be fulfilled by the reunification of Artsakh with Armenia.

What happened in the last 2 months leaves no room to doubt that Armenia and the Armenians do not have sufficiently solid safeguards even within the Soviet Union against the continuing onslaught of pan-Turkism and its threatening appetite. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan are waiting for the opportune moment to overrun the undevastated small part of Armenia that remains between them and to merge. Meanwhile, those in the Kremlin who do not wish to learn lessons from Lenin's bitter experiences and wish to persist with the strategic illusion that they can turn pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism into a potent weapon against the West are simply playing with fire. They should remember the results of Kemalism and, more recently, Afghanistan.

As long as pan-Turkism continues to be heard in Soviet Azerbaijan and as long the Kremlin is run by short-sighted forces which are willing to play this dangerous game, the Armenian nation cannot be satisfied with half-measures whether it remains subject to a blockade or it receives help to overcome that critical situation. In this sense, our people continues to endure difficult times. It is evident that the tense situation remains unchanged for the Armenians of Artsakh. Meanwhile, in Armenia our nation is only recovering from the blow it has received to assess what courses remain open before it.

These are once again difficult days of waiting, but with the difference that the expectations of the Armenian nation are no longer focused on uncertain horizons. Our waiting will end only when Artsakh is reunified with Armenia.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

GCC Economy Council Meetings Concluded

90OL0129E Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 20 Oct 89 p 1

[Dispatch from Riyadh: "GCC Committee on Fiscal and Economic Cooperation Concludes Meeting and Submits Recommendations to the Muscat Summit"]

[Text] The Arab Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) Committee on Fiscal and Economic Cooperation concluded its 23rd session in Riyadh yesterday morning. The sultanate's delegation to the session was headed by His Excellency Muhammad Bin-'Ali Bin-Nasir al-'Alawi, secretary general of the legislative bureau in the office of his highness, the deputy prime minister for legal affairs.

The session lasted 2 days, during which the ministers of finance and economy discussed a number of economic issues to be submitted to the Supreme Council's 10th summit in Muscat.

The issues deal with the continued implementation of the Supreme Council's economic resolutions on the Uniform Economic Agreement and the startup budget for the joint GCC delegation's office to the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. The ministers also reviewed the progress of a study on incentives to the industrial sector in GCC states, as well as the progress of negotiations with countries and international economic organizations and the institution of controls on exceptions to customs exemptions to industrial output of national origin.

The GCC ministers of finance and national economy also discussed the feasibility of allowing citizens of member countries to engage in new activities and professions, in addition to those previously identified, and the means of arriving at a uniform customs tariff that initially calls for all [members] to commit to a minimum duty of 4 percent on foreign goods, agree on lists of possible exemptions, prepare lists of the first luxury goods to be subject to the new uniform tariff, and determine a deadline for agreement on a uniform tariff on the remaining goods.

His Excellency Muhammad Bin-'Ali Bin-Nasir al-'Alawi, secretary general of the legislative bureau in the office of his highness, the deputy prime minister for legislative affairs, returned to the country yesterday noon from Riyadh where he headed the sultanate's delegation to the meetings of the GCC Committee on Fiscal and Economic Cooperation which concluded there yesterday morning.

GCC Military Coordination Discussed

90OL0129B London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 10 Nov 89 p 11

[Article: "Gulf Defense Ministers Recommend Augmenting Military Cooperation; Prince Sultan: The Gulf Has No Need for Foreign Protection"]

[Text] Defense ministers of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states held their 8th meeting in Riyadh in order to prepare the defense portfolio needed for the 10th Gulf summit to be held in Muscat in mid-December.

The issue of military industrialization headed the list of important topics discussed by the ministers, in view of a summit resolution to seek self-sufficiency now that the GCC states have succeeded in diversifying their arms resources. Military industrialization to provide needed armament is a strategic objective of [GCC] heads of state who emphasized that it must be accomplished gradually and in line with available means.

The ministers, in two closed-door sessions attended only by them, deliberated for 14 hours before resolving to return the plans to the chiefs of staff for more study and for implementation of the necessary contacts and procedures.

Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah, Kuwaiti minister of defense, told AL-HAWADITH that the ministers' recommendations to the 10th summit will help propel military cooperation forward gradually but steadily and maintain the course of cooperation and commitment to the principle underlying the common will to confront threats.

The objective of the ministers' meeting was [to work for] military and security coordination among member states and not to challenge anybody. All we want is to protect our Gulf home from within.

Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, Saudi minister of aviation and defense, emphasized that the Gulf does not need foreign protection from either the East or the West and that the strong sense of the leaders and peoples of GCC states is that the time has come to emerge in the form of an Islamic Arab state that meets in six countries unified by Islam and the Arabic language. All of us are members of the League of Arab States, subscribe to its charter, and adhere to its resolutions. We also back Islamic summit resolutions and support Islamic solidarity. A defense plan by GCC states will never be aimed against anyone. Rather, the objective is to safeguard sacred Islamic precepts, defend GCC members, and repulse threats to the security of the region.

GCC states are doing all they can to diversify their sources of armament. Steps for weapons development do not necessarily mean that the armaments are for immediate use. Rather, those steps help shore-up justice and the power of international diplomacy. It is common knowledge that the GCC states maintain a joint military force called the al-Jazirah Shield which conducts joint desert exercises against enemy attacks, beach landings, and air raids on various locations in member states. This familiarizes all participating Shield forces of the six states with the region's topography.

GCC Officials' Suggestions for Summit Proposed

90OL0129A London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 10 Nov 89 p 24

[Article: "GCC Interior Ministers: Confronting Terrorism and Developing Services for Citizens"]

[Text] Interior ministers of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states met in Riyadh last week to prepare the security dossier for the Gulf summit scheduled for the Sultanate of Oman this upcoming December. The upcoming summit has been dubbed the summit for evaluation and planning and is expected to evaluate the present state of the council as a whole, including common security strategies and various avenues of cooperation in that field.

Terrorism and how it can be collectively confronted by countries of the region was the main topic of discussion at the ministers' Riyadh meeting. They also made extensive recommendations on immigration, passports, civil defense, traffic, drug enforcement, interrogations, and criminal investigations.

Prince Nayif Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, Saudi Arabian minister of the interior, warned against attempts to undermine holy land security in general and emphasized that the security of Saudi Arabia is the security of GCC states. He called for safeguarding Gulf security by standing united against terrorism and terrorists.

Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Khalifa Al Khalifa, Bahraini minister of the interior and chairman of the current session of the Gulf Security Cooperation Committee which encompass interior ministers, said that the GCC experience is a successful Arab role model worthy of admiration and emulation not only in the Arab World but also by all international and regional alliances.

He attributed the success of Gulf cooperation to "the intellectual and scientific foundations laid by the Council and to the practical applications and accomplishments attained through the course of action pursued by the Council throughout its short history". Those accomplishments, he said, were and still are based on continual and constant support of security cooperation among GCC states. The ministers have instituted security bulwarks ever since their first meeting in 1982 in Riyadh.

'Abdalla Bishara, GCC secretary-general, said that the interior ministers' meeting came at a special time of mixed blessings and misfortunes. The Gulf region is sometimes tranquil and sometimes tumultuous. Many factors have contributed to the region's serenity and improved climate since the cease-fire between neighboring Iraq and Iran. The cessation of hostilities has resulted in dense contacts and increased awareness of security. Security considerations are getting the priority they deserve. The Council has been successful in sowing the seed for overall moderation, reason, and negotiation.

Bishara emphasized that the terrorism must be confronted with awareness and alertness especially that it has become an international phenomenon that vexes most countries of the world.

It has been the consensus of the various countries of the world to fight and uproot terrorism. Experience proved that confrontation and collective action are the best way to contain such terrorism.

Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Khalifa emphasized that terrorism in its various forms has polarized the attention of international society and its members, organizations, and specialized agencies. It has become a serious threat to the security and stability of nations and individuals alike.

While on the subject, the ministers discussed procedures to protect Gulf diplomats overseas.

Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Khalifa said that it might be easy in theory to bring security systems and agencies in the various Gulf states within the framework of a uniform strategy. As a practical matter, however, constant diligence is needed to institute comprehensive security frameworks that transcend the borders of GCC countries.

In response to a question by AL-HAWADITH on the significance of the ministers' resolutions, he said, "They reiterate the resolve for augmented cooperation on security. Previous meetings have accomplished a lot in terms of joint security action and coordination, especially among public security agencies of the various interior ministries. Specialized security committees, operating in an atmosphere of cooperation and solidarity, have arrived at a number of recommendations to coordinate among security agencies and standardize certain measures and procedures. [These measures] are likely to gain the favor of citizens in their dealings and travel. The recommendations are in harmony with official measures and procedures employed by various GCC members. We are proud of this success which drives us to provide even more diverse security services to citizens and to be ever-alert to constantly and permanently safeguard the security and stability enjoyed by GCC states and cherished by their leaders."

The ministers focused in their meetings and working committees on a uniform security strategy described by Prince Nayif Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz as a body of principles representing a general framework that displays the fundamentals and identifies a path for joint security action by GCC members.

Has this strategy become an alternative to the proposed GCC security agreement?

Prince Nayif Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz says that the agreement would be the basic tool or venue for translating strategic principles into everyday joint working programs within a systematic legal framework based on Islamic Shari'a as

well as common interests and values. The strategy is but the general principles based on solid foundations that include:

- Common religion, values, and social ties.
- Common history and shared destiny.
- Common interests and objectives.
- Eminence of geographical location.
- The presence of valuable natural wealth.
- Similarity of population configuration as well as of political, social, and economic systems.
- Commitment to agreements and joint plans and programs.
- Relevance of the private sector to national economic development.
- Constant exposure to intellectual and physical invasion

The strategy comprises a number of executive tools and procedures, including the comprehensive security agreement scheduled to be concluded shortly, as well as the development of security agencies, training, and maintaining closer ties with various crime-fighting agencies in the world. This coordination of security has major objectives which the strategy seeks to implement in all countries of the region. The objectives include:

- Safeguarding the national interests of GCC members.
- The conviction that security and stability form the foundation for prosperity, for economic and social development, and for accomplishing GCC objectives.
- The security policy is tied to the course of education, the strategies of economic and social progress, and the defense plan.
- The decisive factor is the GCC members' need for it. This factor can not be influenced by considerations that are not consistent with the paramount interests of member countries.
- Awareness of danger sources.
- Bolstering cooperation and coordination among security agencies.
- Developing security agencies.
- Achieving security integration.
- Defining and explaining the private sector's role in attaining strategy objectives in order to ensure the sector's sympathetic response

Prince Nayif Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz emphasizes that the political and social makeup of GCC countries mandates commitment to the gradual course of development that introduces social, economic, and political progress and keeps pace with the times without undermining tradition, values, or principles. GCC members are mindful of their heritage, seek development, and refrain from interfering in the affairs of others. They resist the "export" of ideologies antithetic to their religion, philosophy, and political orientation, and therefore stand steadfast against attempts to change conditions in the region by use of force.

GCC members, because of their beliefs, strategic location, natural resources, and moderate politics, have

positioned themselves in a manner that ensures security cooperation and allows them to challenge unlawful change that would undermine their fundamental principles.

World Demand for Gulf Oil To Increase

90OL0129C Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 21 Oct 89 p 1

[Dispatch from London: "OPEC Committee of Experts To Study Prices and Supply; World To Be More Dependent on Gulf Oil in the Nineties; al-Shalabi: OPEC Does Not Intend To Raise Its Target Price"]

[Text] A high OPEC minister said yesterday (Friday) that the world may find itself dependent on only five Arab Gulf countries for most of its supplementary oil needs in the nineties.

Iraqi minister of petroleum 'Isam 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shalabi said that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], and Iran are the only OPEC members whose oil reserves are large enough to allow them to substantially increase production.

He added that even Iran may not be capable of a substantial increase in production.

Speaking at the 10th annual Finance and Petroleum Conference sponsored by the OIL DAILY and HERALD TRIBUNE newspapers, al-Shalabi said that it will be the responsibility of Arab Gulf countries to supply the world's increasing demand for OPEC oil.

Al-Shalabi's remarks were corroborated by a high western petroleum official who also spoke at the conference.

Ludvic van Vashim [as published], executive director of Royal Dutch Foundation (Shell is the second largest oil company in the world), said that 5 Gulf members of OPEC account for two thirds of world reserves and for more than three quarters of surplus production capacity.

Al-Shalabi pointed out that Gulf countries will not use their power to raise prices. All they ask, he added, is a fair and comfortable price that is not so high as to drive consumers to alternate fuels.

Saudi Minister of Petroleum Hisham Nazir had previously told the conference that the nineties will be good for the oil industry and that a stiff rise in prices is merely the prelude to a sharp decline.

He said the expected the level of prices in the next few years to be in the \$10 to \$20 range.

Al-Shalabi, responding to a reporter's question on whether OPEC intends to raise its target price, said: This will not happen at the upcoming meeting.

In another development, OPEC's committee of experts resumed its meeting in Vienna yesterday to discuss world market supply and demand and price developments as it prepared specialized studies and reports to be

submitted to OPEC's upcoming ministerial conference by the secretariat of the eight-man ministerial committee charged with overseeing production and pricing.

The ministerial committee is composed of the ministers of petroleum and energy in each of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela. Its last meeting was held in Geneva on 23 September when it resolved to raise OPEC's production ceiling from 19.5 million to 20.5 million barrels per day.

Food Imports Cause Rise in Arab Debts

90OL0129D Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 21 Oct p 6

[Dispatch from Damascus: "Food Imports Add to Arab Debt"]

[Text] Arab countries are burdened with debt because of increased food imports, according to a government bulletin issued last week by the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture on the occasion of International Food Day.

The publication explained that Arab food imports amounted to \$30 billion last year alone, which inflicted heavy damage on the Arab national economy.

The bulletin said that Syria, despite difficult conditions and a heavy defense burden, was able to increase its gross domestic product [GDP] by 21.8 million Syrian liras in the years 1987 and 1988. Per capita share of GDP rose from 11,517 liras to 12,326 liras.

The Arab 6-member ministerial subcommittee on Arab food security—a subcommittee of the ministerial council of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development—had met recently in Damascus and issued new guidelines for joint action to ensure Arab food security. It also recommended the development of a joint Arab agricultural effort, since Arab wheat imports alone exceed \$5 billion and since the level of self-sufficiency has dropped to below 48 percent in the past 5 years. The food gap in Arab countries widened to \$1.4 billion dollars according to statistics for the two years 1985/87.

Libyan Sentenced for Selling Fraudulent Work Contracts

45000045 Casablanca MAROC SOIR
in French 21 Nov 89 p 9

[Text] A Libyan national and three of his Moroccan accomplices have been sentenced to a 3-year prison term.

In our Tuesday, 14 November 1989 editions, we announced the arrest of a Libyan national and his Moroccan accomplices, in connection with a case of false contracts.

The man concerned is Ali Naji Lawâna [name as published], born in 1949 in Sabha (Libya), a farmer who had formed a front company named the "Oumou El Koura

Enterprise," which he planned to use for offering "his services" to those seeking employment in Libya.

Ali Naji acted in complicity with some intermediaries to whom he sold false work contracts for 5,000 dirhams each.

The intermediaries resold the contracts for between 7,000 and 9,000 dirhams each to applicants seeking work in Libya.

Even when the victims hadn't received a letter of confirmation from Libya, they were able to use these false contracts to obtain passports.

The Ben M'Sik-Sidi Othmane criminal investigative police, who were tasked with the investigation, put an end to the activities of Ali Naji and his accomplices, and succeeded in identifying dozens of victims.

The principals were turned over to the Public Prosecutor's Office at the court of first instance (Ben M'Sik-Sidi Othmane) and were committed to prison.

In its Thursday session, the court sentenced Ali Naji and three of his accomplices to a 3-year prison term and a 5,000-dirham fine.

Three other middlemen received 3-month suspended sentences and a 2,000-dirham fine.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

West Bank Leader Abu-'Ayyash Profiled

90OL0124A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 6 Oct 89 pp 2-3

[Article by 'Uzi Mahanaymi: "Ready To Bet on Rabin"]

[Text] Radwan Abu-'Ayyash is one of the members of the Palestinian "delegation of 12," which, it was published this week, Mubarak proposed for talks with Israel. Even if this is only a fictitious list, which was distributed by extremist Palestinian elements with the aim of torpedoing yesterday's cabinet deliberations, it can be assumed that Abu-'Ayyash will appear in any official list that will be drawn up. In the eyes of most of the one-half million residents of the refugee camps in the territories—as in the PLO headquarters in Tunis—he is considered to be a faithful and authentic representative.

But the charismatic youth, who today heads the Palestinian Journalists Society, has also acquired enemies over the years. These are mainly among the Palestinian bourgeoisie, the residents of the big cities and the scions of the prominent families of Jerusalem and Ramallah. "Who is this child, from the refugee camp, who will suddenly be our leader," a well known figure in the West Bank said recently.

And, indeed, Abu-'Ayyash is not the son of a wealthy, prominent family. He is seen as someone who grew out

of the people to reach the front rank of Palestinian leaders by virtue of his abilities.

When the 6-Day War ended, Abu-'Ayyash, a resident of the Askar refugee camp near Nablus, took his elderly parents and went to visit the prestigious Bavli neighborhood in North Tel Aviv. The old man in his kufiyah, his young son, and his wife walked around and around in the streets of the beautiful neighborhood, accompanied by the neighbors' amazed stares. They searched for the house from which they had fled 20 years earlier, during the War of Independence.

They didn't find the old house. In its place there remained in the center of the modern neighborhood the remains of the village of Jamsin al-Sharqiyah, where the parents were born. Radwan was born 2 years after the war, in the refugee camp near Nablus.

This week, relaxed, on an autumn morning in Jerusalem, Abu-'Ayyash is revealed as someone whose thoughts of return to his parents' old home are long gone. For him, the village is sad history, a tragic detail in the biography of his family and his people. His struggle is for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Refugee status is his calling card. He is not upset by the assertions of his enemies, who hold this against him. "The people cannot be misled," says Abu-'Ayyash. "West Bank residents know well who dared to jump into the fire, who sat for long months in prison, and who, in contrast, only appeared dressed in a suit and tie at press conferences in East Jerusalem."

Despite the rivalry, Abu-'Ayyash regards all the other leaders in the West Bank—city- or town-dwellers—as colleagues. He does not worry that someone will succeed in taking from him the support of the residents of the refugee camps.

Radwan Abu-'Ayyash did not have a rich father. He completed his matriculation exams in Nablus, one year after the 6-Day War. Afterwards, he went to study at the Teachers' Seminar in Ramallah. He taught 6 years in a school in Silwad, and studied English literature at Bi'r-Zayt University.

In 1980 he participated in the founding of the Palestinian Journalists Society, and was given a weekly column in the newspaper AL-SHA'B. Then he began to be a nuisance for the SHABAK [General Security Service]. He was arrested for the first time in '82. He has been arrested more times since then. The last occasion—the day before the outbreak of the intifadah, on the charge of membership and activity in the PLO. Pressure from friends—including Israeli journalists—resulted in his release after 6 months.

The Journalists Society that he heads, and the traditional backing that he receives from the people of the refugee camps, are the real power base of Abu-'Ayyash. His office in East Jerusalem is a lodestone and a mecca for

residents of the West Bank who want to know from the source what is happening, and where the intifadah is taking them.

According to Abu-'Ayyash, he belongs to the Palestinian mainstream, those who support two states—Israel and Palestine—side-by-side. This is a cautious means of expression, which represents a calling card whose significance is the PLO, the Fatah organization.

Since the beginning of the intifadah, Abu-'Ayyash has often been abroad. Five-star hotels in Europe and the United States are nothing new for the refugee from Askar.

Aside from trips and the political struggle, he also finds time for spiritual matters: He has written four books and has translated others into Arabic, including one by Moshe Dayan.

As one who has been mentioned as one of the leaders of the intifadah, he has a clear political platform: Give us back the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, let us establish an independent state, and the cruel conflict will be behind us. This is a formula inspired by the school of 'Arafat.

If Abu-'Ayyash's dream of being an independent citizen in a state of his own comes true, the Journalists Society will not be the last public position of the refugee from Jamsin.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Radwan Abu-'Ayyash, what is your political calling card?

[Abu-'Ayyash] I am close to the moderate mainstream in the PLO, the pragmatic trend. We draw our strength and inspiration from Yasir 'Arafat. However, I do not regard myself as part of any organization.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The Prime Minister of Israel is ready to sit down and talk with a Palestinian such as yourself. Why don't you take the rest of your comrades in the leadership of the West Bank and begin negotiations with the Government of Israel, without the PLO?

[Abu-'Ayyash] The Palestinian problem is not a local problem of only the 2 million Palestinians who live in the territories. There are in addition more than 3 million Palestinians living throughout the world. The identity card of the Palestinian people is the insistence that the PLO is the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people. I can perhaps speak on my own behalf, but who will speak on behalf of the Palestinians outside of the West Bank? The PLO represents the entire Palestinian people, and only with it must there be talks.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you think of giving the Palestinians outside of the territories the "right of return?"

[Abu-'Ayyash] The Palestinians outside of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have the right to return to the Palestinian state.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The "right of return" to the Palestinian state or to Israel?

[Abu-'Ayyash] To the Palestinian state. As for the refugees of 1948, there will be an agreement with the Government of Israel. It may be that the matter will be solved by granting reparations. It may be that the Government of Israel will agree to the return of a symbolic number of Palestinians to Israel. Everything will be open to negotiation. In any event, my aspiration is for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The Israeli public does not trust you. How would you reply to those who assert that Jordan is, in fact, Palestine: Most of its residents are Palestinians.

[Abu-'Ayyash] First of all, I do not think that the Palestinians in Jordan will want to live in the Palestinian state that will arise in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Beyond that, the talk about Jordan as Palestine is not serious. Transjordan was never Palestine. A sovereign and recognized state exists to the east of the Jordan river, and we do not want it.

However, it is clear that the Palestinian state that will arise cannot be walled in by Israel and Jordan. In that case, it would not be a state, it would be a prison. A solution of confederation with Jordan is a logical solution, and the PLO already accepted it in principle in '85. However, the basic condition is first and foremost the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] There are those who argue that you are really waiting to see who will fall first, Israel or Jordan, and that in any event, you assume that in the future all the territory, from the sea to the river and the mountains, will be one great Palestine.

[Abu-'Ayyash] I don't accept that. Those are not serious assertions. It is much more important now to be concerned that there will be equality, that the Palestinian people will have an identity and a state, and then it will be possible to speak as equals and to achieve prosperity in the region.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Who will be the Palestinians who will be included in the Palestinian delegation for negotiations with Israel?

[Abu-'Ayyash] The delegation will include only those representatives who will be acceptable to the PLO. It can be estimated that they will be mainly residents of the territories, with a few representative from the outside. That will be an excellent beginning for a solution to the conflict.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] And what about representatives of the Islamic Movement? They also have "divisions" in the territories.

[Abu-'Ayyash] In my opinion, the representatives of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] will not request

representation. If they do, it will be something that the PLO leadership will have to discuss.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is the best formula that you can propose for an immediate solution to the conflict?

[Abu-'Ayyash] There is no avoiding direct negotiations between the Government of Israel and the PLO. There will not be a Palestinian delegation without the PLO. Whoever thinks that there will be one is deluding himself. Who is Radwan Abu-'Ayyash without the connection to the PLO? The PLO is our government and our leadership.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] It seems that the residents of the refugee camps are sacrificing themselves for the intifadah more than the rich city-dwellers and the town-dwellers.

[Abu-'Ayyash] Indeed, the residents of the refugee camps are bearing the main burden of the intifadah. But the residents of the cities and the towns are, of course, also making their sacrifices. Israel's pressure on the residents brings, in the end, an appropriate response from the residents. Whoever is pressed more, responds more strongly.

It is true that there is a difference in the degree of sacrifice by the residents, but we do not now have the time to deal with that question. There are those who believe that their intifadah is to study in the universities and to prepare for the Palestinian state. Our task is now to complete the conquest. I have no complaints about anyone. Everyone gives and invests to the best of his ability. We are now in a war for liberation. I have no complaints about the Palestinian bourgeoisie. They are defending their interests. That is nothing to scoff at.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Is Israel conducting indirect negotiations with the PLO?

[Abu-'Ayyash] Several Israeli personalities, members of Knesset, and foreign delegations acted to transmit Israeli views and outlooks to the PLO. More than one member of Knesset has done this. In my opinion, there have for some time been indirect negotiations between the PLO and Israel.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What is your opinion of Rabin's diplomatic initiative, as it was expressed in his meeting with President Mubarak?

[Abu-'Ayyash] I believe that the political positions (not the military measures) that Rabin is taking are different from Rabin's previous positions. Rabin now understands that only diplomatic negotiations will bring about a peaceful solution. The coming days will prove whether Rabin will be one of the leaders in the Israeli Government who will bring a conclusion to the conflict in the region.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] What positive points do you find in Shamir's plan?

[Abu-'Ayyash] Shamir's plan speaks only of elections, without even clarifications about the techniques of these elections. Therefore, many questions must be answered in connection with it. If a declaration of intent will be added to it, such as: land for peace, the right of self-determination, security for all the peoples of the region, it might be a good beginning for a comprehensive settlement.

ALGERIA

Harassment of Citizens by Cairo Authority Reported

*90OA0219D Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 11 Dec 89 p 24*

[Article: "Arbitrary Deportation of Mr Sayf-al-Islam From Cairo"]

[Text] On Saturday, the evening daily AL-MASA, quoting a family source, reported that Cairo airport authorities had detained Mr Sayf-al-Islam, director of the Arabic Studies and Information Center, from Wednesday to Friday evening, and finally deported him to Syria.

Yet, Mr Zubayr Sayf-al-Islam holds an Algerian diplomatic passport and resides in Cairo.

Cairo airport authorities also prevented the first secretary of the Algerian Embassy in Cairo from contacting Mr Zubayr Sayf-al-Islam.

As is known, Mr Sayf-al-Islam, 60 and handicapped, was coming back to Cairo after attending the FLN [National Liberation Front] extraordinary congress.

On this occasion, AL-MASA learned that Algerians residing in Cairo (students and others) are subject to harassment by Cairo security authorities.

RCD Holds Southern Conference Preparatory to Congress

*90OA0219E Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 15-16 Dec p 5*

[Article: "Southern Region Regional Conference"]

[Text] The regional conference of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) for the southern region of the country was held on Friday at the El Djanoub hotel in Ghardaia. Some 120 delegates had come from the governorates of Illizi, Ouargla, Laghouat, and Ghardaia (the delegates from Tamanrasset and Adrar were unable to attend) to take part in the regional conference that took place in an atmosphere of openness, in the presence of Dr Saadi Said, RCD general secretary.

The regional conference, held in preparation for the first national congress of the RCD, to be placed under the motto "authenticity, modernity, equality," was marked by reports from delegates from the governorates, dealing

with the general policy draft sent to the rank and file three months ago and with other matters.

In a statement to the APS, Dr Saadi, RCD general secretary, said that his party had not yet received any aid from the State. The conference was made possible only through party members' sacrifices; he added: "It is important that the state should know that the more credible political formations there are, the more political partners enjoying credibility with the population the State will find, at a time when the essential part of national life is at stake."

Dr Saadi also told the APS journalist that "the RCD national congress to be held at the Nations Palace in Algiers will gather some 1,000 delegates representing 22,000 organized party members."

Giving his opinion on the results of the extraordinary congress of the National Liberation Front [FLN], the RCD general secretary stated that he "did not understand why the FLN continues to behave as it does, as if were still the only party on the national scene."

RCD Congress Elects Executive Committee

*90OA0217B Algiers EL MOUDJAHID
in French 28 Dec 89 p 24*

[Article from APS: "End of First Congress of the RCD [Rally for Culture and Democracy]"]

[Text] The first congress of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) opened Friday morning at the Nations Palace in Algiers for two days and closed late Saturday night in the traditional manner, i.e., with the adoption of a platform and the election of a board of directors.

The platform adopted is based on reports presented by the 5 regions comprising the 46 governorates in which the RCD is established (it has 22,700 members), on the orientation report of the general secretary, Dr Said Saadi, and on contributions made by the 1,000 participants to the congress—including 100 women—during the plenary sessions.

The platform, prepared by five commissions that had been working nonstop behind closed doors since Friday evening (general, economic, social, cultural, education, and organic policies) confirms and expands on the RCD foundations as enunciated when it was created on 9-10 February 1989.

The RCD wants to be a "social-democratic" party fully integrated in the constitutional system created by the Constitution of 23 February 1989. For the RCD, the democratic system implies the respect of personal freedom and human rights, equality between the sexes and the creation of a climate of tolerance and conviviality, sound political competition in the midst of democracy and openness, and consolidation of the state based on the rule of law.

The RCD's originality resides in its clear-cut and daring approach to the fundamental issues that are challenging society as a whole.

The RCD openly declares itself nonreligious but, according to its own definition, in a way that aims to strengthen religion. For the RCD, separating Islam from politics is the only way to preserve the country's undeniably Islamic character from the temptations of party politics.

Based on the principles of personal freedom and equality between the sexes, the RCD is campaigning for the implementation of equality between the sexes and has, therefore, included work on the family code in its platform.

Quite sensitive to matters of identity and culture, the RCD claims that the "Amazigh" character of Algerian society is one of its historical foundations, just as much as its Islamic and Arab character. In this context, it campaigns for the recognition of the tamazight language as a national language, next to Arabic, which remains the "official language."

As a result of these postulates, the RCD approach to education and vocational training consists in proposing a complete overhaul of the school system in order to raise its level and open it to what is universal, through multilingualism and the promotion of a modern, competitive, and secular curriculum.

As far as economic and social issues are concerned, the RCD, which wants to comply with social-democratic canons, advocates a free enterprise economy in which the State and the private sector play complementary parts in promoting progress with social justice and material well-being for all while protecting the environment. The state is supposed to provide legal bases for the market and to regulate it through economic laws and strict controls.

The RCD, whose first congress was placed under the motto "casting anchor in the universe," is calling for economic openness through the creation of mixed corporations and recourse to foreign capital, although strategic sectors in the national economy should remain under State control.

[Box, p 24]

Dr Said Saadi Reelected General Secretary

Dr Said Saadi was reelected general secretary of the Rally for Culture and Democracy by the 120 members of the national council who had themselves been elected shortly before by the participants at the congress.

The national council also elected the executive committee, consisting of 19 national secretaries taken among members of the national council.

The voting system used to elect the national council, the members of which are representatives elected in the

governorates in proportion to the number of party members, was left to the appreciation of governorate and regional delegates; they voted either according to the consensus or, failing a consensus, by secret ballot.

The Executive Committee

The executive committee issued from the national council of the Rally for Culture and Democracy and elected at the end of the congress, consists of 19 members.

Tasks within the committee are distributed as follows:

- General secretary: Said Saadi
- Secretary to organic issues: Bacha Mustapha
- Secretary to information: Ziani Hassan
- Secretary to women's condition: Chitour Yasmine
- Secretary to education: Laib Mohamed
- Secretary to culture: Mehenni Ferhat
- Secretary to the universities: Quarich Hassan
- Secretary to the environment: Yamini Elisa
- Secretary to vocational training: Belkater Tayeb
- Secretary to social affairs: Kaci Moussa
- Secretary to agriculture: Nouh Akmoune
- Secretary to infrastructures and resources: Hammouche Mustapha
- Secretary to the economy: Ait Chellouche Youcef
- Secretary to emigration: Hamani Areski
- Secretary to tourism: Talbi Abdelkader
- Secretary to human rights: Baraka Malika
- General administrative secretary: Hamoudi Abdelkader
- Youth secretary: Mahiou Fares
- Secretary in charge of relations with parties and State institutions: Ait Larbi Mokrane.

Prospects for Change in FLN Discussed

Bouhara on Military, Openness

*90OA0191A London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 5 Dec 89 pp 28-29*

[Interview with Abderrezak Bouhara, member of Executive Secretariat of Central Committee of FLN: "Majority of Extraordinary Conference Will Reject Open Door Policy"; Algiers, date not given; first three paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction]

[Text] The extraordinary general conference of the Algerian National Liberation Front Party [FLN] is now being held in Algiers amid reports and information about sharp disagreements between two main wings. The reports also speak of a possible split that will turn the ruling party into two parties. On the eve of this important conference, AL-MAJALLAH met with two of the most important figures of the two main currents to clarify the facts of the crisis from which the FLN is suffering. The first was Abderrezak Bouhara, a member of the Executive Secretariat of the Central Committee of the FLN; the second was former Minister of Industry and Energy, Abdesslam Belaid, who is considered to

have been one of the architects of the policy of former Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, and who was removed from his posts and from membership in the Political Bureau about 10 years ago.

Bouhara asserts that ideological unity within the FLN has been lost and that a split may occur at any moment; Belaid hints that a multiparty system will end the FLN's role as a leading party.

The following conversation took place with Abderrezak Bouhara:

[AL-MAJALLAH] The extraordinary conference that the FLN is going to hold is being described as highly critical. What is the agenda that the conference will discuss?

[Bouhara] The sixth conference made a decision to restructure the FLN so that the party would include within its framework all opinions and tendencies and would come to express the various political and social currents in the country. This decision was never implemented, because a few months later the Algerian people approved the new constitution, which provided for a multiparty system. Thus, our party was no longer alone in the arena. This led the Central Committee to hold an extraordinary session to study the new situation. The result was a decision to hold an extraordinary general conference. The main task of this conference will be to establish a plan for operating in the new situation.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Questions are now being raised about the scope of the FLN's relation to power. After all these developments, do you consider your party to be the ruling party?

[Bouhara] The FLN was the sole party in the country from independence in 1962 until approval of the recent constitution, which provided for a multiparty system. The FLN played a leadership role. I do not think that the leadership throughout this period made any important decisions outside the FLN. The FLN had a prominent role in all decisions affecting the country and in all treaties. However, I say in all frankness that only in the first years of independence did the FLN as a political organization play the role it was supposed to play. It played an effective leadership role only in the years immediately before 1965. After that date, for reasons I think have been accepted, precedence was given to the government and to building up its agencies and institutions at the expense of the party. However, after a certain time—specifically, in the years 1972 and 1973—the late Boumedienne began to raise the need to obtain popular support and began to emphasize that continuity was not possible by administrative and military agencies alone.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is it true that the FLN ruled only a few months after independence—that power left its hands, and that it remained only a legal cover for government actions, as some say?

[Bouhara] That is true. However, after the fourth conference—i.e., after 1979—sincere attempts were made, and decisions came to be made on the basis of FLN directives. However, decisionmaking power, even regarding the FLN's internal affairs, remained in the hand of government agencies. This is a weak point to be recorded against the front and its internal situation. For the front to exercise a leadership role in fact requires that it enter a political battle even within the regime's agencies. The front as a political organization ought to have embarked upon a battle to impose its positions and ideas on other agencies. One must call attention to the fact that political decisions were made in the name of the front and its agreement and support, even if the front was not exercising power as a political organization.

The choices the country was following, particularly during the Boumedienne administration, expressed the people's aspirations. At that time, they were correct choices to win the battle of development and defend national independence. I think the people's choice rejected any "liberal" direction. When our party was the only party, everything was satisfactory. Now, however, with constitutional backing for a multiparty system, we must end the previous kind of relationship between the party and government.

[AL-MAJALLAH] This opinion of yours seems to be at variance with many viewpoints, even within the FLN. Some believe that the FLN has played its role and ought to dissolve itself and be transformed into many parties, according to the ideas and directions within it.

[Bouhara] I have heard these ideas. Some say that the FLN's historical role has ended. Some say that the FLN should divide into parties. Words are one thing; what will actually happen is something else, for within the FLN there are men, an organization, charters, and policy. There are those who say that the FLN lost its legitimacy on 5 October 1988. We, however, say that this is not true: there may be a rejection of FLN actions, but there is no rejection of the FLN as a single party in the country. There is criticism of the political system generally and of the actions of this system, and there are strong and harsh criticisms of actions carried out by government agencies and by some officials in these agencies in the name of the FLN or in the name of a regime that claimed to be the FLN's regime. Citizens do not care whether there is a single party or several parties. What they care about is participation in governance, that elections be free, that they be able to speak without restrictions, and that they have some kind of surveillance over the agencies of the government. The practice of democracy does not depend on the question of a single party or a multiparty system. It is as possible to practice democracy in a one-party system as it is in a multiparty system. There are countries with a multiparty system, but where there is no democracy.

Revolution Devoured Its Own Children

[AL-MAJALLAH] There is an old saying that the revolution is like a cat that devours its own kittens. Some

people think the Algerian revolution has devoured its own children—that its best leaders and officials have come to be outside the framework, watching events from a distance, while the revolution has not been able to win the new generations. What is your opinion?

[Bouhara] This is true. Large purges indeed took place at various times. Nevertheless, despite all the losses that emerged, especially at the leadership level, the important thing is that there has been continuity at all levels. In 1965 there was a great change: Ben Bella was removed from power and Boumedienne came. But the line remained the same: for this experiment is not the property of Ben Bella, or of Boumedienne, or of Chedli; it is a people's experiment in the full sense of the word. It has roots. Those who intend to change it have not and will not be able. They will be forced to go along with the general and historic direction in Algeria.

There is a weak point in the FLN. We admit it. The front led the generations until immediately after independence, but was unable to reach the new generations to transmit the message to them. We admit that our political performance in subsequent periods was weak, particularly in the universities.

[AL-MAJALLAH] At the party's last gathering, you addressed an invitation to some major personalities who have long remained on the sidelines watching events from outside—Mohamed Saleh Yahyaoui, Abdesslam Belaid, and Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Have these and others been invited to this conference?

[Bouhara] At the Central Committee's recent meetings, we decided to send an invitation to attend the conference not only to those who participated in the gathering you mentioned, but to all leadership members who played roles in the FLN from 1954 to the present.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Including Ahmed Ben Bella and Ait Ahmed [Hocine]?

[Bouhara] There was one condition to this invitation. It would not be extended to those who had left the FLN framework and formed their own parties; for it is not possible for a person not belonging to the FLN to attend the party conference.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did the former head of the Algerian provisional government, Benkhedda, attend the previous gathering?

[Bouhara] No, he did not attend. I think he has formed his own party.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Current talk on the Algerian scene about the conference indicates the existence of two blocs. The first, led by Yahyaoui, rejects the open door and the new policy. The other is moderate and insists upon the open door policy and pluralism. Do you expect a clash between these two blocs?

[Bouhara] The overall composition of the conference is varied. I can state that the prevailing tendency is the

traditional one of the front. This means that the conference will hold to the National Charter, the socialist option, and continuation of the experiment. It will utterly reject any rupture with the past. It will decisively reject any "liberal" direction. The open-door tendency and the call for "liberalism" will be present, but it is a weak tendency and will not have the majority. This tendency proclaims the need for us to be realistic. It says that socialism has not achieved success, that the National Charter has failed as an official charter and as content, and that we must now move toward what they call "social justice." However, the holders of this opinion have not clarified what this social justice is. Socialism and capitalism are well-known political concepts, but "social justice" is not well understood. I think what they mean by this expression is the open door policy.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is it an open door policy that employs the same method that former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat followed?

[Bouhara] Yes, that is exactly what they want. It is an open-door current. It advocates opening the doors to foreign capital and its influence and dealing with the IMF without restriction or condition. They are ready to accept all the conditions of the World Bank.

[AL-MAJALLAH] If the strict tendency prevails, will there be a change of ministry? Will a new government be formed from the same tendency?

[Bouhara] I cannot say as of now what decisions the conference will make. However, I think the period after the conference will need a strong, credible leadership.

[AL-MAJALLAH] At the government level, or at the front level?

[Bouhara] I am talking about the front. It needs a strong, credible leadership able to impose its political line on all the executive agencies and on the government.

Parliament and Open Door Policy

[AL-MAJALLAH] If that is the case, may there not be a confrontation between the front and parliament, especially since a majority of its members are for the open door policy?

[Bouhara] This is something new to me. I do not believe that the majority in parliament are for "liberalism."

[AL-MAJALLAH] Some political party and FLN circles say that the majority in parliament are for the open door policy.

[Bouhara] That is not true. The majority of National Assembly members are committed to the FLN line and opposed to the open door policy.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What about the demand that the president of the republic be for all political parties and forces, and not a monopoly of the FLN?

[Bouhara] Since under the new constitution there will be a number of candidates for the post of president, we as a party will name our own candidate for the presidency.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Will this president remain head of the party, or will he be for all Algerians and all parties?

[Bouhara] The debate in the conference will concentrate on this question. There are leadership posts and positions in the party. There is the general secretary, the Political Bureau, and the Central Committee. Therefore, the question will be whether it is necessary for the party to have a president or not. If the answer is yes, we will discuss the body that will elect the president: Is it to be the convention, the Central Committee, or the Political Bureau? Afterwards, it will be necessary to define the powers of this president. We believe that in the new stage a conflict of responsibilities and powers must be avoided.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Will the president, regardless of names, be responsible to the FLN, parliament, or to the people who elected him?

[Bouhara] I personally am against coupling the leadership position in the front and responsibility for the position of head of state.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you mean that you are against having the president of the republic remain president of the front?

[Bouhara] Yes. We think that from now on the president of the republic must not have executive responsibilities within the front.

[AL-MAJALLAH] You say that the Algerian army is the army of liberation and an arm of the FLN. On the other hand, the new constitution forbids military men from engaging in politics and entering political parties. How do you reconcile these things?

[Bouhara] We believe that correct thought, be it political or otherwise, is capable of reaching any place and any person. Thus, if the front's policy is sound, it will certainly reach officers and soldiers.

[AL-MAJALLAH] You are a former officer in the liberation army. Do you agree that an officer should be tried if he is caught attending an FLN meeting or distributing an FLN communique?

[Bouhara] This matter depends on the law that the National Assembly approves. If the National Assembly approves this, everyone must obey.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Doesn't this mean that the front has lost its most important organ, the army?

[Bouhara] That is correct. However, all army cadres are composed of officers affiliated with the front, and this is a great guarantee. This applies to the administration and security departments. The new constitution imposes this formula upon us. If it allowed the FLN to work within

these sensitive bodies, it would have to give the other parties the same right, and this would be very dangerous.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Supposing that the minority in the conference does not abide by the decisions of the majority, is there a fear that the front may divide into two parties, as is being rumored?

[Bouhara] We hope that we shall not arrive at a division. There cannot be an FLN party and also the FLN—either there is an FLN party, or there is the FLN. If the minority refuses to fall in line with the opinion of the majority, it ought to depart once and for all, because the FLN has an inheritance and a past. We are making strenuous efforts to avoid a split. That is why we have decided to give the minority an opportunity to remain within the structures of the front and to express its opinions about all matters within these structures. In the past, the minority used to leave the leadership bodies. From now on, the minority, whatever its orientation and opinion, will remain present in all leadership structures. We will entrench political pluralism and the coexistence of ideas within the FLN.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Normally, when political parties confront a crisis like the one the FLN is facing, they turn to mutual adjustments and concessions. Will you turn to the same thing in your conference?

[Bouhara] I think every political action demands this. The period makes it incumbent upon us to preserve the unity of the front, because we are facing big problems on the political, economic, and social level. We must therefore exert all our efforts for consensus and harmonizing all opinions. Then, if we reach a dead end, and separation becomes unavoidable, we must separate by mutual consent. I am revealing no secret when I say that there is no ideological unity within the front and that political unity has been lost. Therefore, the most we can reach is agreement on a temporary program of action around which everyone can rally on the ground that the various forces and tendencies have the right to organize themselves within the front.

Ideological and political unity exist at the base level, but they do not exist at the leadership level. The disagreement is limited to the leadership level.

Belaïd Discusses Party System

900A0191B London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 5 Dec 89 pp 30-31

[Interview with Abdesslam Belaid, former minister of industry and power, by Salih Qallab in Algiers: "Multi-party System Aims To Convince Algerians To Withdraw From FLN"; date not given; first two paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction]

[Text] Abdesslam Belaid is one of the main figures of the so-called Boumedienne period that lasted some 12 years. He was the real architect of economic policy in Algeria during that period. He held the posts of minister of

industry and power and minister of light industry, in addition to membership in the Political Bureau of the FLN [National Liberation Front]. Now he is one of the main old leaders who have come to attend the extraordinary general convention and who are defending the front's role and rejecting the open door policy. They have great reservations about a multiparty system.

Belaïd said many things during the conversation with him. He defended the period of former Algerian President Houari Boumedienne. The following is the text of the conversation:

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you consider yourself in the opposition or in the government?

[Belaïd] In brief, I am a member of the FLN.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But the FLN is the ruling party.

[Belaïd] It is indeed the ruling party, but even within the ruling party there are normally some opposing views.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Does that mean that we can consider you a wing that is not in control of power?

[Belaïd] I am not a wing in power, even though I am a member of the FLN.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Then you are a wing in the FLN?

[Belaïd] Yes, a wing in the FLN, or, rather, a militant individual in the FLN. I do not agree with many things that for a time have been happening in the front.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Your attendance, along with Mohamed Saleh Yahiyaoui and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, at the recent cadres' meeting raised many questions. Can one say that the figures of the vanguard have returned to the FLN after a long interruption?

[Belaïd] That, in any case, is merely an interpretation. What really happened is that we received invitations to attend the meeting and responded. Then we spoke, and people viewed the matter as they wished.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Would you have attended had an invitation been extended to you previously?

[Belaïd] Naturally. This is the first time since I left my positions that I have been invited to attend a meeting. I was a member of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. I was removed from these posts, but I remained a member of the base. I remained silent and refrained from speaking, until a situation came in which it was possible to speak.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Some people link the invitation to you with the events of October, the removal of Mohamed Cherif Mesaadia from the party leadership, and the new open door policy. Is this linkage correct?

[Belaïd] I do not think so. The one link is that our invitation came as a result of what happened in October. Certainly, however, it has no connection with personalities.

Abolition of the Front

[AL-MAJALLAH] Some believe that attempts are being made to end the FLN's role and abolish the front; others say that the current attempts are to strengthen the front's role and reinvigorate it, as indicated by the fact that you and the other leaders whose careers span several generations have been invited to attend the extraordinary conference. What is your opinion?

[Belaïd] Many things are being said. For us, the FLN is the general national current that paved the way for the revolution, led the revolution, and achieved independence. For others, it is the official ruling structure. We believe there is a difference between the front's official leadership and its base, which is a nationalist base and broadly on the side of the people's interests. We believe that since the death of Boumedienne—since the eighties, that is to say—there has been a deviation from the front's overall course, which was realizing social justice and abolishing the disparities between persons not according to the Marxist or communist method, but according to our own experiment. Personally, I believe that the problems the country is now experiencing are a result of this deviation.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Our specific question is whether your invitation to attend the extraordinary conference means an attempt to revive the role of the FLN.

[Belaïd] I cannot explain decisions I did not participate in making. I have no contacts with the brothers in the leadership. I therefore do not know exactly what were the real reasons that led them to extend these invitations. What I hear is that some officials in the front are trying to unify the front and to invite the officials who were removed from their posts years ago, while other officials are against this approach. I believe that President Chedli Bendjedid, as became evident in his interview with the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, is not very enthusiastic about this. On the basis of certain phenomena and evidence, I believe there are attempts to abolish the FLN as a political movement. Among these phenomena are some steps that have been taken to abolish what the front has done, steps such as repealing the 1976 National Charter and abandoning socialist principles. Some people advocate considering Algeria to be an ordinary country, the Algerian revolution notwithstanding.

[AL-MAJALLAH] In your opinion, would it be easy to abolish the role of the front?

[Belaïd] The front has been held responsible for all the problems that now exist. There are attempts to persuade citizens that this front is the cause of the current crises. I believe the aim of establishing the multiparty principle is to convince Algerians to withdraw from the front and move in other directions.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But all indications are that the front has lost its previous reputation. Isn't that so?

[Belaïd] One must not forget that popular circles believe that the government is the front. We must admit the existence of a gap between the upper echelons and popular circles. The main problem that now faces the country is that the popular base lacks confidence and faith in the leadership. In any case, while this leadership exists in the name of the front, we do not think it really is so. We believe that the front consists of those popular militants who represent old values and an old tendency.

Base Displeased

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are you for separating the presidency of the republic from the front, in the sense that the president would not rule in the name of the FLN?

[Belaïd] The president now rules in the name of the front, and he entered the presidential election in its name. The demonstrations that took place in October and at other times therefore held the front responsible on the assumption that the government was the front's government. Here I must say that the position of the FLN's popular base is the position of the people themselves. It is a base that is displeased with everything taking place in its name.

[AL-MAJALLAH] As representing a certain direction, what are the steps you are considering taking to improve the state of the FLN and return it to its old positions?

[Belaïd] There are attempts—I am speaking in my own name—but there is no definite program. Personally, I have no contact with any other group. I think the base must appoint all officials democratically. I think a return to the 1976 charter is needed, making the required changes to it so that it fits the new developments. In general, I think the front should announce its separation from the current government, so as to regain public confidence and its former role.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you mean that the front should enter parliamentary elections on its own and without regard to its being the ruling party?

[Belaïd] What I mean is that in its conferences and meetings the front must take positions through which it makes clear that it is a front that opposes the present government.

[AL-MAJALLAH] As one of the old leaders, do you think it possible for a body to rule in Algeria without relying on the FLN?

[Belaïd] If free elections take place at this time, while the front is passing through a period of lethargy, I believe it could be banished from the government.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What do you think of the view that the emergence of new, youthful parties has frightened the

old FLN leaders and has led them to pretend to forget their former differences and unite to face the new danger?

[Belaïd] On the contrary, we believe that the ideas we are defending are in step with the aspirations of the Algerian people. Abandoning these ideas has brought the front into its present situation. Furthermore, I am not a party in any grouping.

[AL-MAJALLAH] However, some information has spoken about a division of roles among you, Yahiaoui, and Bouteflika at the last meeting.

[Belaïd] As I said, we have been outside the government for a long time. The government has put us into the position of opposition figures and has considered us more opposed than those who revolted against the FLN.

Multiparty System

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are you for a multiparty system?

[Belaïd] Yes.

[AL-MAJALLAH] All parties, left and right?

[Belaïd] Yes, all parties. The FLN has been a general framework uniting many parties. There were many tendencies and ideas. Now I think matters have changed. Those who have ideas other than those of the front ought to take them to the people so that a clear choice can be made and so that the best will remain.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Since you are for a multiparty system, why did you not implement it previously while you were in power? Why have you waited all this time to say now that you are for a multiparty system?

[Belaïd] The FLN was a small revolutionary organization established by a small group that launched the revolution and led the people behind it and its aims. In the beginning, these aims were confined to independence, and afterwards to rebuilding the country. That period required mobilizing the energies of the Algerian people with all its groups in one direction. It was a historical period that required this mode. The one condition for joining the FLN was readiness for self-sacrifice to save the homeland. But we had the conviction that this period would end some day and that the periods of firmness would be replaced by an ordinary life requiring openness and a plurality of ideas. Therefore, when we proposed the 1976 charter to the people, we did not talk about the idea of a single party. We intentionally spoke about the party's role and responsibilities, without implying that the FLN was the sole party. This led to an outcry in the country. Some people asked whether we were paving the way for a period of many parties and for the FLN not to remain the only party in Algeria. In any case, some groups were able to impose their existence. They changed the direction of the FLN without consulting the opinion of the base. I am not convinced that Algerians are pleased about the multiparty system as it now exists. What we fear is that these parties will some

day reach a stage of struggle, anarchy, and fomenting unrest, thus leading the people to hate democracy.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is it true that the Islamic Salvation Front has formed its own militias?

[Belaid] I do not think matters have gone so far as that, but there has been some disorderliness.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Ten years after leaving the government, are you satisfied with the previous period, bearing in mind that some people describe your period as having been one of liquidations, prisons, and detention camps, and say that it bequeathed to Algeria the debts from which it is now suffering?

[Belaid] In the previous period, the army never went out to strike against the people. In Algeria, from independence until 1979, there never occurred problems like the recent ones. When Boumedienne died, the prisons were free of political prisoners.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But didn't some liquidations take place abroad?

[Belaid] What is the number of those who were liquidated abroad? Who says that the previous regime ordered their liquidation? If the late Mohamed Khider is meant, everyone knows that he left the country during the Ben Bella administration and that those who killed him were his companions. The same holds for Krim Belkacem. There are many things I do not know, but surely these people were involved in certain operations. As for repression, Algeria in the past period has been excellent compared with some Arab countries. Nevertheless, we admit that our country was not the desired oasis of freedom; it did, however, enjoy stability and tranquility.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is your reply to those who say that you in the previous administration led Algeria into isolation on the regional and Arab level?

[Belaid] As an official in the previous administration, I think that Algeria had a position; it certainly was not isolated. Nothing happened on the Arab scene at the time but that Algeria's presence was asked. Nothing happened regarding the subject of the Middle East and the Palestinian problem without Algeria's attendance. There were problems with neighbors, problems inherited from the colonial period, but Algeria was not isolated.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Some people accuse Boumedienne of having created the Sahara problem.

[Belaid] I lived through that period. Briefly, I can say that on our borders there was a problem related to territory. Some people tried to solve this problem behind Algeria's back and without its knowledge.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you believe a solution of this problem is at hand?

[Belaid] I do not believe so. The problem is more complicated than some people think.

BAHRAIN

New Jobs in Private Sector Reported

44000177 Manama GULF DAILY NEWS
in English 1 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by Soman Baby]

[Text] Jobs have been found for 2,470 Bahrainis in the private sector in the first nine months of this year under a Labor Ministry campaign to slash unemployment.

A further 800 registered unemployed have been promised jobs, said Labor Director 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Zayyani.

The number of companies earmarked to provide jobs for 20,000 Bahrainis over the next five years has been increased from 400 to 574, under the Labor Ministry's Bahrainization plan.

Mr al-Zayyani said his Directorate was able to find jobs for 2,470 registered unemployed Bahrainis from January to September this year.

"Some 88.7 percent of them were males, and the majority of them were skilled craftsmen recruited by industries, construction companies, hotels, trade and service sectors," he said.

"We are happy at the cooperation extended by the island's private sector to our programme to find an average 4,000 jobs for Bahrainis every year."

It is estimated that there will be 24,000 Bahrainis, including secondary school leavers and university graduates, looking for jobs over the next five years.

Mr al-Zayyani said the total number of unemployed Bahrainis registered with his Directorate now was 2,400, but about one third of them had already been offered jobs by many companies.

Expatriates

Under the Labor Ministry campaign, each company is being told to recruit a certain number of Bahrainis to selected positions every year.

"The companies thus identified have increased from 400 to 574, and more establishments will be added to the list shortly," said Mr al-Zayyani.

The plan does not envisage that expatriates occupying certain positions should necessarily be replaced, but the agreed number of Bahrainis must be absorbed.

"Our doors are open to companies who want to discuss problems, if any, in implementing the programme according to our schedule," said Mr al-Zayyani.

- Gulf countries will need at least 500,000 foreign workers to implement their development programmes by the end of this century, said a study presented at the seventh Arab Gulf Conference on the Management of Human Resources in Fujairah, UAE [United Arab Emirates].

The Gulf will take at least 28 years to replace foreigners with national workers, it said.

EGYPT

Parliamentary Opposition Decries U.S. Grant Management

900A0226B Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 26 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by Fayiz Zayid and 'Abd-al-Fattah Zayid: "Alliance Deputies Warn of Dangers of Foreign Agreements; U.S. Experts Seize \$23 Million Out of Grant Funds"]

[Excerpts] In last week's final session, the People's Assembly hall witnessed heated arguments during the debate on a number of agreements connected with the Kuwaiti Development Fund loans and with the U.S. grants. The atmosphere under the People's Assembly dome became tense when the alliance deputies exposed the scandal of the U.S. and Egyptian experts' unjustifiable seizure of \$23 million out of the U.S. grants to Egypt, and when they revealed that birth-control pills and injections cause cancer to the Egyptian citizen. [passage omitted]

In last Monday morning's session, the assembly debated the third amendment on the agricultural production and credit agreement concluded between the Egyptian and U.S. governments. The alliance deputies exposed the serious role played by the U.S. grants. They also exposed the U.S. experts seizure of \$23 million out of the Egyptian farmer's blood. [passage omitted]

Dr. 'Isam al-'Aryan, an alliance deputy, launched a severe attack on this grant which incorporates conditions that constitute intervention in Egypt's affairs. Moreover, the manipulation of this grant has reduced the chances of the farmer's benefiting from the grant funds, especially since we see that the expenses of the U.S. and Egyptian experts have amounted to \$23 million and that vast sums are spent on rewards and means of transportation. This means that these experts are pampering themselves at the expense of the Egyptian farmer and of Egyptian agriculture. Only the influential have benefited from this grant's funds.

Dr. Yusuf Wali, the minister of agriculture, said in response that this bank's loans [as published] are what saved the agricultural crops.

Family Planning

The assembly then proceeded to discuss the U.S. grant for family planning. At this point, the atmosphere under the assembly's dome became charged and the deputies

"applauded with consent" when Dr. Fu'ad 'Abd-al-Majid, an alliance deputy, launched a severe attack on the family-planning project and on those in charge of the project, and when he asked: Where have the \$25 million allotted by the United States for family planning and obtained by the Future Family Association, which is the subject of suspicions, gone? Regrettably, esteemed deputies, this association, which is supposed to provide birth control means free of charge, is selling these means for large sums of money. We have also seen 10 million pounds spent on advertising and "rewards." This means that the "whole process is pure manipulation."

Dr. Hasan al-Husayni, another alliance deputy, raised the heat of the session when he said: We cannot skip over this U.S. agreement without examining these international agreements and what political objectives lie behind them. The United States is intervening politically in an attempt to curtail birth in Egypt! We must devote great attention to these issues in order to find out the secrets behind these agreements which are not given to us for God's sake.

The atmosphere under the assembly dome became charged when Deputy Dr. Hasan al-Husayni declared that this U.S. grant makes conditional it that birth-control injections, which are not licensed in the United States itself, and whose use has not yet been approved by the WHO, be included as a birth-control means. These pills and injections cause cancer, gentlemen! Is Egypt an experimental field for these drugs which are dangerous to the citizen's health?

Despite the serious gaps which the deputies exposed in these suspect agreements, some deputies approved them.

Government Party Member Voices Dissent on Emergency Law

900A0108B Cairo LIWA' AL-ISLAM in Arabic Oct 89 pp 12-13

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] In summary, the government's steps are faltering, both at the economic level and in the area of human rights, and the reason is that the present era is adopting many mistaken ideas upon which it bases its practices, and these ideas need to be radically changed, and in fact to be ultimately abandoned.

Dr. Hamdi al-Sayyid, former head of the doctors' union and member of the People's Assembly from East Cairo, is a man who stands out in the ranks of the ruling party, for he refuses to jump on the bandwagon, or cheer with everyone else, or say "aye" to every decree, for he has his own independent and brave positions. For example, he stated in his interview with LIWA' AL-ISLAM that he opposes the emergency law, and this position of his is completely contrary to that of the government's party. The respectable doctor stated that he hopes that the day will soon come in which the authorities will drop the idea that the only way Egypt can be properly governed is

through use of the emergency law. That is an erroneous delusion which results in many tragedies.

Dr. Hamdi al-Sayyid rejects this terrorist law and the justifications for it, saying, "A state of emergency must be a temporary situation, justified by exceptional circumstances, but unfortunately this law has become the basis, and the value of the other laws dwindled beside it, after it was transformed into a permanent law."

The member of the ruling party rejects the justification given by the Interior Ministry and the government that the ordinary laws have loopholes and that they are inadequate for countering serious crimes such as the drug trade and terrorism. Regarding that Dr. Hamdi al-Sayyid said: "I demand that these loopholes existing in any law be closed, instead of it being pushed completely aside and replaced by the emergency law." He added: "Many European states, such as America [as published], England, and Germany, adapted their laws to counter the drug trade, and they did not use an emergency law in the war against the trade in poisons. The ordinary laws that they had permit the complete confiscation of drug dealers' property, on condition that a portion of what is confiscated be used in treating the destructive effects of this toxic trade, such as building drug rehabilitation centers. The same goes for countering terrorism through normal legislative means. A number of European states undertook to change their ordinary laws to make them harsh against terrorism, and not one of them resorted to an emergency law, in spite of the seriousness of the events that occurred in them, such as in England, Italy, and Germany."

Another mistaken idea which Dr. Hamdi demands that the regime abandon, is embodied in the use of force essentially in dealing with Islamic groups. Concerning that he says, "The Islamic current has the right to have its legal and legitimate pulpits, and to operate freely, for thought is countered only by thought. I demand freedom for the various organizations and groups in society, and I urge that they be given the opportunity to work through legitimate channels. The only thing to be rejected is a group imposing its views on society by force; except for that freedom is for everybody, and it is a crime to use the emergency law to subdue thought and combat the religious. I say to those who fight them: Take you hands off of them, and invite them to operate openly in the light." [passage omitted]

Torture, Arrests

The state's position on freedoms needs to be reviewed, as is affirmed by counselor Ma'mun al-Hudaybi. It is clear that they have receded, while the influence of the currents that call for a return to an absolute, arbitrary system has strengthened. The system of arrests on a broad scale has already returned, and up to 17,000 have been arrested in only the last 3 years since the tenure of the present interior minister began. In the prisons people are deprived of their dignity and sanctity through the perpetration of the ugliest kinds of atrocities, as

everyone now knows. The policy of collective punishment has spread to intimidate the citizens, and the police have been freed of all constitutional and legal restraints [passage omitted].

Dr. Ibrahim Dasuqi Abazah, one of the illustrious leaders of the Wafd, is certain that the state's failure to bring about economic reform, despite President Mubarak having concentrated his efforts on it, is attributable to the fact that this reform is taking place far from its twin, namely political reform, for the authorities consider that needed political reforms are a secondary issue! What is important from their point of view is concentrating on economic circumstances alone. That is a big mistake in thinking which has led to both economic and political failure.

He explains his point of view, saying: "Individual rule selects only those people it trusts, not those who are reform-minded and competent, and those are the ones who alone are capable of reform, for reform needs reformers first of all, who have popular support to counter corruption and the corrupt, and carry out difficult, needed reforms. As for those who are corrupt, and who kowtow to every ruler, they can never be reform leaders of Egypt!"

Influence of the Supporters of an Absolute System

The state's position towards the public sector needs to be reviewed to eliminate losing measures and to get rid of the companies which operate in secondary fields. Dr. Ibrahim al-Dasuqi Abazah said: "Those who support the absolute system still have power over our country, and the proof of that is that they are always succeeding in blocking any reform of the public sector aimed at stopping its hemorrhages and its losses. The regime views the public sector as a mainstay of the government, not as a mainstay of development, for it is an inseparable part of the absolute system, used to concentrate political power and control over the livelihood of the ruled, to reward followers, and as an inexhaustible source to spend on the fancies, elections, and glory of the government. [passage omitted]

Industry Ministry To Liquidate Debt-Ridden SIFCA Company

900A0116B Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH
in Arabic 7 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Hani Salih]

[Text] It was decided to implement an amicable liquidation of the SIFCA company [as published] after it had had losses of 112 million pounds. The feasibility study will be modified, and the rights of the workers will not be touched. Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry, confirmed that the banks owed money by SIFCA company, one of the joint companies in the chemical industries authority, will perform an amicable liquidation and cancel the debt without touching the rights of the workers.

The minister said that he does not object to the sale of the land leased to the SIFCA company from Narubin, if the company owning the land gets the full value of the land.

The board of directors of the Chemical Industries Authority discussed a memo from the president of SIFCA at an earlier meeting in Alexandria.

The memo dealt with a proposal to straighten out the situation in the company, namely for the banks to forego interest, valued at 80 million pounds, until the end of December 1980 [as published], to stop charging new interest, to increase the capital of the new company to 55 million pounds, and to do a new economic feasibility study.

The transfer of ownership of the land to the Franco-Egyptian Rubber company instead of leasing it to the company faces opposition from the partners representing the public industrial sector because they are convinced of the feasibility of reforming the company in the future.

Assessing the Company's Assets Before Liquidation

Engineer Hilmi 'Umar, head of the public sector authority of chemical industries, stated that Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, the minister of industry, had decided to form a committee to assess the assets of the company before starting to implement the principle of amicable liquidation.

SIFCA's Losses: 112 Million Pounds

SIFAC's total losses, according to the latest budget, are estimated at 112 million pounds, and it has not made a profit since it was established in 1981. The company's losses in the end of the approved budget were up to 47.5 million pounds, after adjustment, and its debts to the banks and its financial obligations that must be paid are about 130 million pounds. If they are compared to the rights of the shareholders in the company, which are 17 million pounds, then the net rights of the shareholders are negative, and the deficit is in the amount of 94.9 million pounds. This means that the new company must bear this burden from the beginning.

Also according to law, it is acceptable to look into the liquidation of the company if losses exceed half the capital.

Why the Losses?

The value of production in the company is around 9 million pounds, which is no more than 25 percent of productive capacity. The value of the stock of finished products and raw materials is also estimated.

Requirements are about 5 million pounds, even though the company is unable to meet its financial obligations, valued at 130 million pounds.

Industry Ministry sources confirm that the ledger value of the company's net assets are 24 million pounds, but if they were to be reassessed at their market value, under the best of circumstances they would not exceed the financial obligations that have to be paid to others.

Because the company had continuous losses, reorganization by appointing representatives of the public property in the boards of directors of the joint companies if the company has losses for two consecutive years.

The report of Dr Ahmad Shawqi, chartered accountant of the joint company, indicated in its response to the budget, that the stock had been inventoried and assessed with the knowledge of the company and under its responsibility, which casts doubt on the health and soundness of the stock. Responsible sources explained that projects in the industrial public sector had been involved in the latest increase in capital and had covered its costs for 2 years, even though they had not obtained the approval of the investment authority for the new agreement, while the banks contributing to the capital were reluctant to pay the share allotted to each, as was indicated by the chartered accountant in his remarks on the company's budget.

Ahmad Dasuqi Khalil, member of the board of directors of the chemical authority, said that the economic feasibility study of SIFCA was worthless, and that previously more than one technical party in the Narubin company, as well as representatives of the workers and union committees, had opposed setting up the project during the study phase.

In spite of that, it was agreed to set up the project which specialized in the production of categories whose manufacture would be completed in the Narubin company in the public industrial sector.

It would have been better and in the interest of the national economy to have fully developed the public sector company instead of setting up a new company. He believes that in order to remedy the company's situation, the joint company must be amicably liquidated without any prior conditions in order to preserve the rights of the workers, along the lines of what was agreed to in the international shoe project, wherein the Suez Canal Bank offered to forgive debts of 30 million pounds.

He said that the French partner in SIFCA had withdrawn earlier after the company had suffered losses for 4 years.

Court-supervised Liquidation of the Joint Company

Muhammad Ahmad 'Afifi, chairman of the union committee of workers in the Narubin company, said that he does not agree to the amicable liquidation, and he called for a court-supervised liquidation which would preserve the rights of the workers, return them to the public sector company, and put them on the same level as their colleagues.

He believes that one of the two companies will face losses, but the public sector company Narubin has begun to make a profit now, and has rid itself of losses. Moreover, the joint company does not have the wherewithal to continue in the markets because of the weakness of its marketing apparatus and the rise in administrative costs and workers' wages. The average wage of a worker is 400 pounds a month, and proxy membership of the board of directors is 500 pounds per member, which are large costs and burdens for a losing company.

Who Are the Participants?

Participating in SIFCA are Narubin, Idyal, transport, engineering, painting, the National Bank, and the Arab International Bank.

How Can the Company Continue?

If the Narubin Company continues to produce products which are produced in the public sector company, that would mean continuing losses because of rising production costs and the heavy administrative burdens imposed on it.

Therefore in order to remedy the company's situation, the administrative system must be reviewed to reduce administrative costs and reduce proxy representation in the board of directors. Representatives of the public sector must be reviewed, and the company must turn to exporting its product in full according to the economic feasibility study, in face of the determination of the representatives of the joint company along with the request to buy new assets for it.

Article Lists Reasons for Nasirist Boycott of Opposition Conference

90OA0180A Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 26 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hukm]

[Text] Opposition sources revealed to AL-SIYASI the real reasons behind the Nasirist boycott of the conference which was held by the heads of the opposition the week before last at the headquarters of the New Wafd Party on the occasion of the party's celebration of Jihad Day.

The first reason for the Nasirist boycott of the conference were the pressures brought to bear by the Muslim Brotherhood through its constant threats to boycott the conference.

These pressures came to a head in the week preceding the conference, in spite of the agreement made between the heads of the opposition parties and representatives of other currents, in which it was agreed that Farid 'Abdal-Karim, head of the Nasirite Arab Socialist Party being founded, would represent the Nasirists, and that Counsellor Ma'mun al-Hudaybi would attend as the representative of the Brotherhood. Moreover, some of the Brethren warned of the definite possibility that there would be a violent confrontation between the two sides

that might spoil the conference and lead to serious developments that would threaten what is called the unity of the opposition.

The second reason, which is no less important than the first, according to what these sources say, was the lack of any incentive for the Nasirists, indeed their strong aversion to and their basic rejection of, attending a conference arranged for and organized by the Wafd Party, which they consider to be their mortal enemy. They do not accept being guests at a table set by their enemy, at a time when the Wafd does not refrain from attacking the July Revolution and the Nasirists on every occasion. In fact, the Nasirists were sure that the conference would turn into an arena for a trial of the July revolution by the forces of the right represented by the Wafd, the Brotherhood, the Labor Party, and the Liberals. That is something that the Nasirists do not accept, and in fact consider it a direct attack upon them.

On the other hand, satisfaction reigned among the Wafd Party and the Brotherhood when the Nasirists boycotted the conference, which is what helped to a great extent—so they claimed—to make the conference a success. However, the head of the NPUG [National Progressive Unionist Grouping] was overcome by great despair, for he had seen in the conference a real chance to bring about an alliance of the forces of the Left, which he had been trying to form for 3 years. But the boycott of the conference by the Nasirists had weakened to a great extent, as some of the NPUG leadership affirmed, the strength of the front of the Left in confronting the forces of the Right.

Article Notes 'Fictitious Organizations' Since 1987

90OA0108A Cairo LIWA' AL-ISLAM
in Arabic Oct 89 pp 16-17

[Article by Qutb al-'Arabi]

[Excerpts] The latest organization against which the Interior Ministry has made allegations is an organization of children, whom the Interior Ministry claimed intended to overthrow the system of government. The announcement about this organization surprised all the citizens and was the butt of their jokes.

The current minister and his security outfits are trying to prove to the political leadership that they are not asleep and that nothing is hidden from them, but it seems that their great zeal to give this impression is forcing them for the most part to make allegations about fictitious organizations, which upon investigation are quickly shown not to exist. The state security prosecutor's office usually drops the inquiry into these cases; moreover, in many of the cases which are brought to trial, the verdict is innocent.

To show that what we are saying is true, we will give some examples in which the Interior Ministry announced that it had arrested members of extremist

organizations that intended to overthrow the system of government, only to have it shown after investigation that the charges were not true.

Under the name "reforming the Jihad organization," the Interior Ministry announced the arrest of [the members of] dozens of organizations throughout Egypt, but all of these cases were dropped after investigation either by the investigators or by the state security prosecutor [passage omitted].

In August of the same year [1987] the Interior Ministry announced that it had uncovered an extremist organization in Upper Egypt that aimed to overthrow the system of government. It was called the "Organization of Upper Egypt." [passage omitted]

Turning to the organizations that were accused of collusion with a foreign state, we see there are three Islamic organizations that were accused of collusion with Iran, the first of which was the Jihad organization, in Case Number 401 of 1987.

At that time the prosecutor also investigated a number of writers and journalists on the charge of collusion with a foreign state, namely Iran, and all investigations into the case were dropped.

The second case was that of the Shi'ite organization last year, which included Egyptian citizens and Arabs studying or residing in Egypt. They were all accused of conspiring to overthrow the government in Egypt, and of conspiring with a foreign state, namely Iran, to this end. The investigations ended with the case being dropped, and with the departure of the Arab citizens to their countries.

The third case is that with which the state security prosecutor is now dealing. The accused are Egyptians and certain citizens of Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. A decision on it has not yet been reached.

When we try to discover why these cases were dropped by the office of the state security prosecutor, it is clear that the reason is the absence of material proof of the charges in the documents, or insufficient evidence, and the lack of confidence of the prosecutor's office in the police interrogations, in which the accused were always under the pain of torture.

In all the cases in which the courts ruled that the accused were innocent, the verdict was based on the torture which was inflicted on the accused in order to obtain evidence in their confessions. Other factors were the court's lack of confidence in the evidence which was presented in the case, or insufficient evidence.

Leaving aside the cases and the fictional organizations, there are hundreds of trumped up cases of distributing leaflets. All were dropped, but only after arrest, torture, and flight.

The cases and organizations we have mentioned are only examples, not a complete list, for the organizations against which the Interior Ministry has made allegations are innumerable!

And now, what do the men of the legal profession think of these things? [passage omitted]

As for Dr. Muhammad 'Asfur (attorney) and member of the supreme council of the Wafd Party, he casts blame for all these things on the secular laws under which the country has lived since 1981, for under the emergency law the interior minister does whatever he likes, and he knows that he will not have to account for his acts because the emergency law protects him, and he punishes his political rivals and he contrives charges and cases against them.

Dr. Muhammad 'Asfur believes that the treatment received by the people, young or old, whom the interior minister has accused of forming religious organizations, only to have those accusations proved wrong later after they have received various kinds of torture, will generate in them bitterness and hatred against all policemen and all the officials in the country, and perhaps that it will lead them to armed action and revenge against those who actually tortured them.

Judge 'Ali Jurayshah said: [passage omitted] "From the political point of view, repeated allegations of fictional organizations hurt the regime very much, because they give the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the regime is unstable and that the people are dissatisfied with it. Moreover they have an impact on the regime's standing, politically and with respect to security. On the other hand, it seems to me that they would incite the daring to form organizations so that they would exist in fact instead of being fictional."

"In fact, I might be excused for one mistake over 2 or 3 years, but for a mistake to be repeated in one year, that destroys the standing and credibility of the security apparatus, and makes the people believe it is lying, even when it is telling the truth!"

Mukhtar Nuh (attorney) and member of the People's Assembly, believes that the Interior Ministry's announcement that it has uncovered an extremist religious group has become the object of ridicule and derision among the people, because the people no longer believe the claims of the Interior Ministry, since it has been effectively proven that most of these organizations against which the Interior Ministry made allegations were in fact fabrications of the investigators of state security alone [passage omitted].

Weapons Dealer Details Smuggling in Southern Region

90OA0158A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 30 Oct 89 pp 30-32

[Article by Usama Salama: "A Most Fascinating Trip to the Secret World of Weapons Trade in Upper Egypt"]

[Excerpts] Law enforcement agencies seized 8,500 pieces of unlicensed weapons during campaigns and raids in the governorates of Upper Egypt in 1987. Their catch increased the following year to 12,500 pieces of arms!

There is every expectation that the figures will continue to escalate this year. A few weeks ago, a one-day campaign netted 100,000 pieces of arms in the governorate of Asyut alone.

All this proves that trade in unlicensed weapons in the country has been very active of late, especially in Upper Egypt, despite pursuit by law enforcement agencies!

How can this be? Who are the weapons dealers? How do they carry out their illegal operations? Where do they procure the weapons in which they trade?

ROSE AL-YUSUF, in search of answers to the above questions, took a trip to the secret world of arms dealers in Upper Egypt. Its guide was himself a dealer:

It was no easy matter, of course. Certain good Samaritans had to intercede on our behalf before the man would agree to take us on this fascinating trip.

The man is 50 years old, dresses in expensive country clothes, and is inseparable from his worry beads. When he started talking, he did not stop for 2 full hours.

Wholesale and Retail!

He said that the weapons market, like any other market, has big merchants that monopolize trade and price setting. They are few in number and are basically found in Cairo and sometimes in Alexandria. They maintain constant touch with desert bedouins as the weapons are brought across the borders. They also have high contacts at ports and border points. They allow nobody to join their ranks except on certain conditions.

Next in ranking is a larger group of merchants (semiwholesalers) spread throughout the governorates of the republic. They buy weapons from the big dealers and sell them to retailers who deal directly with the public. [passage omitted]

The Nile Is Preferred!

How does one carry the weapons [from Alexandria] to Upper Egypt? There is more than one way. When I was a small dealer, I used to disassemble the weapon and carry it in a regular suitcase. I would use public transportation, trains, and buses, and put the suitcase on a shelf under my watchful eye but far from my seat. That way ownership would be difficult to prove should the rare inspection take place.

Larger quantities are transported by Nile on barges and larger ships. The weapons are disassembled and placed within other cargo on the barge in areas difficult to reach in case of a raid.

On arrival at the agreed destination, the weapons are taken to their caches by special automobiles.

It is also possible to transport the weapons in cars over the Country Highway, but only small shipments are handled in this fashion for fear of detection.

How are large quantities hidden? Caves in the mountain to the east of the Nile are used to store weapons since they are difficult for the police to locate. They are available only to those dealers who can post guards at all times.

Other dealers store weapons in specially-prepared hiding places in their homes or barns. Weapons may be stored, for instance, in hollowed-out *mastabas* [stone or masonry benches], or in places on top of which ovens are then built.

Some dealers prefer to keep the caches away from home in locations that they do not own in order to avoid indictment in case of discovery.

Retailers hide the weapons between layers of bamboo on their roofs or in piles of straw inside their homes. Owners [of unlicensed weapons] do the same thing.

List of Prices

Arms popular in Upper Egypt are repeaters, automatic weapons (machine guns), and semi-automatic 56s. The Russian-made repeater is the most popular and commands up to 4,000 pounds, followed by the Egyptian-made 73 repeater which brings 3,000 pounds. Semi-automatics go for 2,500 pounds a piece. Used weapons are of course cheaper.

Automatic weapons, machine guns, "Port Sa'idis" and "Israelis" are also common in Upper Egypt and cost 500 pounds a piece. Machine guns with tripods command as much as 5,000 pounds but are only in demand by important families with enemies that are also important.

Older weapons in circulation are mostly rifles of 7.92 gauge known as German rifles and British-made Lee Enfield known as Indian rifles. Their fetch as high as 2,500 pounds.

Also in use are hand guns of assorted domestic and imported varieties, especially those with automatic clips with capacities of more than 10 bullets. They go for up to 2,000 pounds.

Adulterated Weapons

Weapons are also locally manufactured by iron smiths, machine shops, and gun repairers and are as cheap as 100 pounds a piece. Incidentally, buyers of such weapons are sometimes cheated. Worthless pistols are presently being offered.

The market is offering inferior weapons, same as it did under the king! Many were cheated into buying substandard weapons!

Major sources of our weapons, especially repeaters and automatics, are war remnants, arms depots abandoned

by the army in the 1967 war, and some arms left by Israeli forces as they withdrew from front positions in the 1973 war.

The bedouins in Sinai seize war remnants and sell them to dealers in Cairo.

But aren't the quantities of such weapons exhausted by now? The bedouins are still stumbling upon arms depots.

Other arms sources? Weapons from the southern Sudan are smuggled across the borders via mountain passes known to smugglers who sneak through them by camel caravan. Once across the border, the weapons are handed over to dealers who handle their transport to Cairo. Weapons are also smuggled by ships and huge boats.

Israel is currently a major source of arms smuggled by bedouins who know the routes and can identify weak checkpoints.

Traditional arms are also smuggled in by faking import documents and similar techniques in which case the dealer must have pawns at the ports of entry and in customs.

AL-SHA'B Counters Sidqi Economic Policy Statement

*900A0226A Cairo AL-SHA'B
in Arabic 26 Dec 89 pp 1-2*

[Adil Husayn Editorial: "Abortive Statement at Beginning of 1990's"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] We notice that at the outset of his very lengthy statement, Dr. 'Atif said in no more than two or three lines that he doesn't think that the government needs to reaffirm its democratic thinking and the need to provide security and safety to every citizen. This, according to Dr. 'Atif, is evident in all of the government's policies and statements! [passage omitted]

However, we will discuss 'Atif Sidqi's statement within the narrow framework within which he has squeezed himself and with which he has contented himself. We ask seriously: What does this lengthy statement seek to say in the economic area? We have heard him speak about the economic policies in a short paragraph. [passage omitted]

The statement, which alleges to be focusing on the economy, does not define the conditions or objectives of Egypt's development specifically or of its Arab Islamic dimension.

Besides the absence of a national objective from the economic activity, what does this boring recount of the list of accomplishments and investments mean? The question, sir, is not a question of whether the government has accomplished some things. It is in the nature of things for governments to make some accomplishments.

The question is: Why has the government failed to solve all the problems? Rather, why are the problems worsening despite the list of accomplishments with which you have familiarized us? We will assume that you have done a lot and invested a lot. But if what you have done has not achieved the desired results, does not this mean that you are following a wrong path? An accountant or a contractor devotes all his attention to the spending volume in every project. But the economist is required, moreover, to examine the general policies and the economic policies that hamper accomplishment and obstruct the desired results.

The statement talks, for example, about unemployment, which is the concern preoccupying every home and every youth. It offers a list of what has been accomplished to solve the problem. But haven't you, sir, acknowledged that the final harvest of your accomplishment is a worsening of the unemployment problem and an increased number of unemployed? [passage omitted]

The truth is that the crisis is not in the lack of resources needed to employ the citizens, but in the method with which these resources are exploited, i.e. in the economic policies. Every country can, within the limits of its resources, select the project structure which guarantees work for whoever seeks it.

Unemployment in Egypt is not fateful or inevitable but a result of subservient economic and technological policies.

The development programs rely in an exaggerated manner on foreign loans (both governmental and non-governmental). These loans force us to purchase machinery and technology from international firms. These firms are familiar only with the investment patterns followed in their countries, i.e. the capital-intensive patterns which employ only a small number of citizens. So how can the unemployment problem be solved in such a case?

Numerous successful developmental experiments have been able to mobilize all their workforces to build their countries. These countries did this when they were poor. When their resources were enhanced, they provided work opportunities for all. The means of achieving full employment varied from phase to phase, but employing the capable continued to be a constant, and possible, objective in all phases because the people in charge of these societies were the ones who planned for developing their societies, and they were the ones who determined the pattern of the needed and suitable technology. They did not leave it up to international firms and to their middlemen, the people who collect commissions, to determine this matter. If you want examples, we will mention Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. [passage omitted]

To begin, I say that it is a shame that Dr. 'Atif Sidqi falsifies, that he confines the declared figure to the civilian debt only, and that, consequently, he says that the foreign debt does not exceed \$29.7 billion. I say that Dr. 'Atif falsifies in presenting Egypt's obligations to its

creditors. He has no right to use the excuse that the military debt figure is confidential. This figure is published in all international papers and studies. Even if this figure is confidential, then why does the statement omit from its estimates the short-term civilian debts? [passage omitted]

There remains the final type of borrowing which is used for investment financing purposes, according to the response in 'Atif Sidqi's statement. This borrowing consists of debts obtained to acquire the foreign component needed for the replacement and renovation projects, to finance the expansion and completion projects, and to set up new projects. The question raised here is: Have we considered coupling these investment debts with plans to increase exports from the already existing or developed projects? Of course not.

But what is more serious is that foreign creditors resort to a strange method. They finance a certain percentage of these projects (80 percent, for example) and then halt their financing before the projects are completed and before they reach the production phase. This means that the repayment date arrives while we shoulder the burden of servicing debts for projects which the creditors have decided to keep as cement blocks and lifeless machines. [passage omitted]

Dr. Kamal Abu-al-Majd has correctly pointed out that Egypt is experiencing some sort of civil disobedience. There is nobody who wants to work at full capacity. To me, a solution is impossible without comprehensive contractual political reform. Without such reform, the civil disobedience will not end and the wheel of production (economic and noneconomic) will not turn. We are not surprised that Dr. 'Atif's statement has come from a world other than the world we know. Till when will the country live without a responsible prime minister and without a Council of Ministers?

Only God can clear this up.

Businessman on Capitalism, Investment, Projects
900A0165A London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 28 Nov 89 p 53

[Dispatch from AL-MAJALLAH Cairo Bureau: "Touristic and Industrial Projects Have Proven Profitable in Egypt"]

[Text] Engineer Husayn Sabbur was born in Cairo in 1936. Upon graduation from Cairo University in 1957 with a BA in engineering, he opened an engineering office in partnership with two earlier graduates. His partners, however, emigrated from Egypt in 1959 and 1962, successively, leaving him with sole responsibility for the practice which grew and expanded operations in Egypt and abroad. The business turned into a consulting firm with several partners. It employs some 1,000 engineers, economists, agriculturists, administrators, etc. Capitalized at 1 million Egyptian pounds, the firm is considered one of the largest investment companies in

Egypt, with activities running the gamut of reconstruction and development projects. It is in constant touch with principals of major projects, especially in Egypt, be they government and public sector officials or investors and private sector companies.

With the introduction of the economic open-door policy in Egypt in 1974, Sabbur, in partnership with international consulting firms, founded affiliates to the mother firm. Three specialized companies were created. One is in the transport, communications, and ports sector. Another specializes in buildings with complicated design and precise requirements, such as hospitals and hotels. The third is involved in land reclamation and food production.

We asked Eng. Sabbur about the most significant undertakings of the four-firm group. He said they could be summarized as follows:

- The Semiramis Intercontinental; one of Egypt's major hotels, it has Saudi capital invested in it.
- Al-Yamamah commercial and office complex is one of the most luxurious centers in Cairo. Its capital is fully Saudi.
- The tunnel Metro [subway] is the first of its kind in the Arab region and Africa.
- Al-Sadat and 6 October cities.
- The Luxor Hilton Hotel in which Gulf capital participates.
- The Tibah 2000 project in which Kuwaiti capital is invested.
- A palm oil processing factory in which Gulf capital is invested.
- Al-Burdi paper mill in which Jordanian capital participates.
- The Ultra elevator facility in which Spanish capital is invested.

The group is also involved in other major touristic, agricultural, and industrial projects.

Eng. Sabbur has investments in various Egyptian firms including Al-Muhandis for Insurance, Al-Muhandis for Starches, the Salmi Hotel in Cairo, the Nuwaybi' Hotel in Sinai, Misr Real Estate, and others. This affords him an opportunity for involvement with Egyptian, Arab, and foreign investments, especially since he is a member of the Egyptian Businessmen's Association and is chairman of its subcommittee on construction. He is chairman of the Egyptian-U.S. Business Council interested in trade and economic cooperation between America and Egypt, and especially the private sector. He is also president of the Center for the Promotion of U.S. Investments in Egypt and vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Association of Islamic Country Consultants which is based in Istanbul, Turkey. This association aims at protecting the interests of consultants throughout the Islamic world, raising their professional standard, and encouraging them to get acquainted and to cooperate with their peers.

We asked him: How do you view investment in Egypt?

Eng. Sabbur says that investment in Egypt has begun to grow after attracting it became one of the stated objectives of Egyptian policy since 1974. Many businessmen, mostly Egyptian, have entered the field. The Arabs are second in ranking, followed by the Americans. They are encouraged by the Egyptian government to undertake projects that serve the national economy while attracting investors by being profitable enough to induce investment in Egypt. Egypt has had limited success so far because certain government agencies still work to create some unintended obstacles. This has recently prompted the government to decree a new investment law intended to remove the minuses that surfaced since the 1974 law was implemented.

The most important feature of the new law is the designation of the Investment Authority as the sole government agency with which the investor deals. Its role is no longer limited to mere approval of projects. It is now the agency which acts on behalf of the investor to secure all necessary endorsements by other state agencies.

Eng. Sabbur adds: The new law allows investment companies to expand by investing part of their funds in secondary projects outside the framework of the law. It also allows entry by Arab and foreign investors into fields that were previously limited to Egyptians, such as land reclamation, building new industrial cities and zones, etc.

Eng. Sabbur concludes: Generally speaking, past experience has proven that all fields of investment are successful in Egypt. Tourism, in my opinion, is in the lead, but one should not overlook the success of industrial projects, and especially those that feed on domestic raw materials such as food processing and spinning and weaving; and those that substitute for imports in meeting domestic demand, such as automotive spare parts. Projects that satisfy mass shortages—such as housing, advanced commercial centers, and high-output state-of-the-art food processing—also provide a high return on investment and are supported by the state. I must not forget to mention that Egypt, because of its ample supply of trained manpower, is capable of playing a major role in producing goods suitable for export to Africa, the Arab region, Europe, and even to far-away markets that demand good quality at a small price. Certain Egyptian products, such as carpeting and others, are already beginning to appear on American markets.

Investigator: Al-Rayyan Holdings Cover Depositor Payments

900A0167A London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 5 Dec 89 p 15

[Interview with Councillor Hasan al-Sharbini, attorney general for financial and commercial affairs who heads the al-Rayyan investigation; in Cairo by Siham 'Abd-al-'Al; date not given.]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

[AL-MAJALLAH] Those who were implicated by Ahmad al-Rayyan and Rabi' al-Sa'dawi are currently being interrogated. Who are they?

[al-Sharbini]: First, Rabi' al-Sa'dawi is an undersecretary of local government who works for al-Rayyan companies as private secretary to Fathi al-Rayyan. He talked during questioning about a number of people including 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan, former governor of al-Jizah; General Muhammad Tawfiq Isma'il, former minister of the interior, and his son Mahmud; Tahir al-Asmar, secretary general of al-Jizah governorate; Mahmud 'Awni, chairman of the General Transport Authority (deceased); Kamal Rida, first undersecretary of agriculture; Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad, member of parliament; and a number of Petroleum Authority employees. When confronted with those names, Ahmad al-Rayyan did not deny the facts alleged to them. Consequently, the Supreme State Security prosecutor has begun to investigate. The general prosecutor for finance is questioning the member of parliament, Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad. The findings of investigators will be announced shortly.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are the expropriated funds sufficient to cover the deposits to be remitted?

[al-Sharbini]: The depositors were 188,000 families conned by high interest rates and by slogans of dealing according to the precepts of Islamic *shari'a* [Islamic code of law]. They have been finessed out of funds worth 1.715 billion Egyptian pounds at the time of the receivership but are now worth 1.884 billion pounds. When the inventory committees acted to seize the funds and assets of the al-Rayyan family and of the others mentioned in the prosecutor's receivership decree on November of last year, they found that all of the bank accounts of al-Rayyan companies had a zero balance. Their branches only had 520,000 Egyptian pounds and \$30,000; having withdrawn depositor funds. The inventory committees were able nonetheless to seize real estate, palaces, farms, and assets owned by al-Rayyan family. When sold, the proceeds of those assets would be sufficient to cover depositor funds. No such action will be taken, however, except by order of the court now trying this case, since it would be the one to determine the manner in which the deposits would be remitted. There is no way to determine the actual value of those assets because prices fluctuate. The liquid funds currently under receivership are not sufficient to cover depositor funds. Furthermore, intelligence reports indicate that once a court verdict is reached in the case, it would be possible to approach the foreign countries where al-Rayyan has bank accounts (Switzerland, England, the United States, and West Germany).

I would like to assure all depositors that the prosecutor is very diligent in safeguarding their rights and that the Receivership Administration at the general prosecutor's office is careful to manage al-Rayyan enterprises successfully in order to realize a profit for the depositors.

[AL-MAJALLAH] In one of the lengthiest general prosecutor investigations ever, it took a year to question Ahmad al-Rayyan, chairman of the al-Rayyan Group of Companies, about the violations committed by his companies. What are his most consequential admissions?

[al-Sharbini]: He confessed during questioning that the company lost \$600 million in speculation in metals overseas. He later amended that to \$700 million. He admitted to speculating in gold, silver, and grains. He was confronted with transfers to banks in Switzerland, England, Western Germany, and the United States of America. Those, as confirmed by Swiss intelligence reports, are as follows: The sum of \$37.5 million was transferred in the period from 7 May 86 to 9 November 87, in addition to \$6.6 million transferred from banks abroad. The sum of \$78,142 million plus 10 million German marks were transferred to West German banks in the period from 9 April 85 to June 87. The sum of \$131,39 million plus 717,000 Sterling pounds was transferred to banks in England during the period from 25 February 85 to 21 January 88. The sum of \$161.46 million was transferred to U.S. banks in the period from 5 April 84 to 27 November 87. Al-Rayyan adamantly denied those transfers during questioning by the general prosecutor, but later admitted to them, claiming that they were completed prior to Law 146 of 1988 that governs the acceptance of funds. He also acknowledged the number of depositors and the volume of their deposits, saying that interest was distributed to depositors in the form of loans guaranteed by their deposits, and that the distributions were not real profits as the companies led the citizens to believe.

He also confessed to the names of certain of his collaborators who were culled from among state and the public sector officials in order to facilitate [al-Rayyan] affairs in return for large sums released to them in the form of loans, or as profits and salaries. A large number of those collaborators have submitted to the prosecutor proof of those loans and expressed readiness to repay them. The loans, amounting to 150 million pounds for companies and 43 million pounds for individuals, are currently being collected to the account of depositors. [passage omitted]

Local Journalism Conference Disputes Press Laws
*90OA0180C Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI
in Arabic 12 Dec 89 p 8*

[Article by Layla 'Abd-al-Majid]

[Text] One of the issues that was raised in the regional journalism conference in Egypt, which was organized by the Supreme Council for Journalism from 4 to 6 December 1989, was the demand by workers in regional newspapers for membership in the journalists union as one of the basic guarantees of their practice of the profession.

The journalists' union law number 76 of 1970 includes a clause that no individual can work in journalism if he is not registered in the union's roster (paragraph 65).

It rejected a criminal penalty for violating this rule which would fall on anyone who worked in journalism without his name being registered in the union's roster. The fact is that this is a professional issue representing a situation that must be carefully studied.

Several issues are linked to this:

First, that the exigencies of organizing the profession and maintaining its standing and reputation require that the placing of those who practice sending the word through the press in all the governorates of Egypt be regulated to ensure that excesses do not occur that would touch the profession and harm its performance of its social responsibilities.

Second, that the need to protect local journalists also requires in one way or another that the union undertake to arrange adequate guarantees and immunities for them to practice.

Third, that the current situation by all standards is one that in one way or another goes against the law of our long-established union.

The fact is that what concerns me is that this provocative issue points to the need to review the current law of the union for several reasons and justifications:

First, that it has become necessary to develop the union and amend its law in light of the developments pertaining to the reorganization of the press according to the press authority law number 148 of 1980.

Second, that this law was formulated and issued about 20 years ago under different economic, social, and political circumstances embodied in a society based on one political system, which was reflected in its stipulations. Obviously, these circumstances have changed, and Egyptian society has embarked on another social experiment based on multiplicity. This is sufficient justification for reviewing this law which regulates—along with others laws pertaining to the press—journalistic activity.

This matter had been brought up before when there was talk about the need for a new law for the press at the end of the seventies. A committee, known as press regulatory committee, was formed on August 19, 1979, to study the circumstances of the organizations that perform journalistic work, and the regulation thereof. Its work was completed on November 12 of the same year with a statement that covered several aspects, including what pertained to reviewing the union law with the goal of ensuring its role as an organization that specializes in the affairs of journalists from the professional aspect. However, because of the circumstances of that period the plan was neglected, and a special committee formed by the People's Assembly at the time prepared a complete plan for the press, which was issued under the name "the press authority law."

Article Details Cotton Usage, Possible Company Merger

900A0180B Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 6 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by Faraj Abu-al-'Izz]

[Text] The total cotton yield this year was 5.9 million qintars. The Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade has decided to export 850,000 qintars to foreign world markets, and to allocate 4,900,000 qintars to cover the needs of the spinning and textile plants of the Ministry of Industry, and 500,000 qintars for private sector plants.

Dr. Yusri Mustafa, the minister of economy, held a meeting yesterday which was attended by Ahmad Shuman, the chairman of the cotton arbitration board, to discuss merging the cotton export and ginning companies, which now number 12, so as to enable the companies to increase production and revamp their funding structures while keeping the present labor force.

AL-AKHBAR has learned that Dr. Yusri Mustafa sent a memo to the Supreme Policy Committee that included proposals to reform the funding structure of the cotton export companies so that they would turn from losses to profits. The memo explained that the cotton export companies carry heavy losses because they have been delivering cotton to the spinning companies at subsidized prices, in spite of the increase in costs of getting the cotton from the farmers. The companies also bear losses because cotton export revenues in foreign currency have so far been calculated at 70 piasters to the dollar.

IRAQ**Al-Zubayr Oil Field To Expand Production**

44000136 Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 6 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by Sabah Y. Younan: "Zubayr Oil Field To Expand Production"]

[Text] Baghdad, Nov 5—The newly expanded al-Zubayr Oil Field project is expected to yield an increased production capacity by 150,000 barrels per day, according to the Ministry of Oil.

The expansion project of al-Zubayr Oil Field was inaugurated by Minister of Oil, Mr Issam Abdul Rahim al-Chalabi on Thursday.

The project will increase the production capacity of the field from 3.5 million tons annually to 11 million tons. This will result in production increase of 150,000 barrels per day with the possibility of raising the capacity even more depending on progress of work on the reservoir.

The project was executed by the state Oil Projects Department in cooperation with local and foreign contractors, while the drilling and preparation of wells were carried out by the South Oil Company.

Work on the project comprised the drilling of about 90 wells of which 50 are for producing oil and 40 wells for water injection to maintain reservoir pressure.

The project also included expansion work on four degassing stations and constructing one more degassing station. Two new water injection stations and expansion of supporting services and systems, namely; power, water, telecommunications and roads were also set up.

The Zubayr Oil Field is located in the southern province of Basra.

The field was discovered about 40 years ago and the first well was drilled in 1948. Oil was found in commercial quantities in 1949 at a depth of about 3,350 metres and in several zones, the most important and biggest zone being the third reservoir.

The thickness of the oil bearing zone is about 55 metres. Oil in place in this reservoir is about 1,000 million metric tons.

Production started in early fifties from a limited number of wells and two degassing stations. The average annual production capacity was around three million tons.

In a recent statement by Iraq's Oil Minister, he said that Iraq's crude oil production capacity will soon reach 4.5 million barrels per day (bpd) to become the second largest country of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in this regard.

An increase of more than 50 percent in terms of crude oil production was recorded over the last two years.

As a result of vast expansion in exploration operations, Iraq's oil reserves totalled, by recent estimates, some 100 billion barrels. Oil reserves are expected to increase further, making Iraq world's second largest country in this respect.

Iraq has large quantities of natural gas reserves as well. Although this resource is important for fuel as well as for chemical industries, the foreign oil companies in the past neglected and flared natural gas.

Iraq is now gaining world interest since it owns such enormous quantities of crude oil reserves and natural gas.

The Iraqi government has drawn up a comprehensive plan to exploit natural gas which is obtained during oil operations. Consequently, a number of projects were implemented including the North Gas and South Gas projects besides a scheme to export liquid gas.

ISRAEL**Israel Allegedly Viable Without U.S. Aid**

44230055C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 14 Nov 89 p 11

[Article by Prof 'Ezra Zohar]

[Text] Many maintain that the economy of Israel is managing to stay afloat only by dint of U.S. financial support. The first source of this support, about \$1.8 billion, is a "military grant," and the second, about \$1.2 billion, is "economic aid."

In the mid-1970s, the United States began "military sales to foreign countries" for which payment was to be made with loans. Because weapons do not yield profits, a financial complication developed. Israel, for example, accumulated a debt of about \$10 billion. The Americans understood that loans of this type would ultimately impoverish their allies, and they converted them into a grant.

The "economic aid," if that is the case, is not aid, nor is it economic. It serves only to correct an injustice done in the past. If the "economic aid" stops for any reason, the debt return would also stop, because the United States has, in principle, accepted the impossibility of bearing this debt.

Hence, it emerges that the only grant which we receive from the Americans is a defense grant of \$1.8 billion. This is not a negligible sum. However, in no way should it be viewed as critical to our existence, because it is only about 5 percent of the government's budget. Let us not forget that Israel receives the grant because it is actually the only U.S. ally in the Middle East, not because of its pretty eyes. The United States maintains an expensive army, costing it tens of billions of dollars, to defend and support such countries as Japan and Korea in the East, and Germany in the West. Israel, as a reliable ally, saves the United States many expenditures in the form of weapons trials under combat conditions, the supply of information about Russian weaponry, and the participation of the United States in Israeli inventions.

Most of the grant is designated for the purchase of equipment in the United States. Thus, Israel actually supports American industry. The grant cannot be used to procure less expensive products in other countries, and only a small part of it is exchangeable into shekels for production in Israel. Therefore, statements about the cessation of aid are baseless threats. In reality, if aid to Israel is stopped, the United States would have to increase its defense expenditures significantly.

Moreover, tens of billions which the United States spends on the defense of foreign countries, including some of the richest in the world, are hidden in the American defense budget. No one speaks about "foreign aid" to Germany, the NATO countries, Japan, or Korea. Only aid to Israel, which is given on inferior terms, is presented as philanthropy.

And what would happen if, nonetheless, the aid were suspended? Israel's government budget would be \$1.8 billion thinner, and the government would then attempt to increase taxes. Even fossilized socialists understand the unfeasibility of such a solution, because a tax increase would cause the economy to collapse. The only logical solution is to cut the government budget. This is really the only way to eliminate the sectorial crisis of the Israeli

economy. Such a cut is likely to be the turning point toward economic growth, provided that the government acts wisely, for example, by transferring different economic enterprises, such as energy, minerals, or construction to the private sector, which is necessarily more efficient. It is estimated that the citizens of Israel are sitting on tens of billions of dollars in foreign currency (tucked away under mattresses, in banks abroad, etc.). If suitable conditions are created, they will invest this money in Israel.

Hence, there is no basis for the view that Israel's economy is dependent on American support and would collapse without it—perhaps the opposite.

Shamir Accused of Excessive Concessions

44230053B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 10 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by Ge'ulah Cohen: "National Unity—for Surrender?"]

[Text] The sea is still the same sea; the Arabs are still the same Arabs; and even Shamir is still the same Shamir: the same Shamir who continues to lead us astray.

In his appearance this week at the Likud congress to calm the spirits and dull the senses that were upset at the Cabinet's surrender to the Baker plan, Shamir said: "Compromises at home are better than concessions abroad to the enemy...the main thing is national unity."

What brazen, shameless deception, as if Alignment had compromised at all on anything substantive and as if the "compromise" with Alignment doesn't mean just one thing: concessions abroad, concessions to the enemy.

To say that in the name of "national unity" is absolute profanity.

National unity? National unity is needed to hold together, to resist pressure together—but to surrender? To surrender we need national unity? To retreat, to capitulate—that Likud can do by itself. Alignment would not get in the way. Alignment, of course, did not get in Menahem Begin's way when he retreated from Sinai and uprooted the settlements of Yamit.

The sea is still the same sea and Shamir is still the same Shamir: So is the promise he made today to his colleagues, that he, Shamir, would stand like a rock behind the "guarantees" he is demanding from the United States, and that if the United States should say to him, "no," then he, Shamir, would say without any hesitation: "Then, no...then we don't have a deal"—that promise, too, I suggest we hang in the museum where hang all the other agreements and promises that Shamir not only promised but also signed.

This time we won't have long to wait: The ink is not yet dry on the Cabinet decision—Bush already said his piece: There will be no more meeting in Washington until there is a further retreat in Jerusalem.

Sharp and smooth: The concessions in the Cabinet resolution don't satisfy him. He wants more. Not just concessions, but real concessions.

Sharp and smooth and hair-raising: Bush doesn't want Shamir to fly from Jerusalem to Washington, he wants him to crawl—on all fours! And from now on, mark my words, if there is finally a meeting in Washington, it will be because there was yet another concession in Jerusalem, or maybe—let me just keep my words straight—from Jerusalem; i.e., the beginning of a retreat from the promise of "Never" that Likud gave regarding the participation of East Jerusalem Arabs in the negotiating delegation and in the elections.

Where will Shamir, who didn't have the strength to say "No" today, get the strength to say "No" tomorrow, after he weakened and hung himself over the inconsequential "guarantees" that the United States didn't promise and which even now Alignment says do not constitute a precondition?

But most disgusting of all, perhaps, is the sophisticated excuse accompanying this surrender that says, in the final analysis, it is only a tactical consideration since there is no doubt that the PLO will not agree to the Baker plan—and it is better that we should say, "Yes" and the PLO, "No."

That might just be tragic, were it not also comic since the only result of the PLO's saying "No" will be that immediately all arrows will be directed at us and on us—and not at them or on them—all the pressures for additional concessions. And if we don't agree, the only result will be that we and not the PLO will again be condemned by all the "enlightened" world abroad and by the unenlightened at home as rejectionists and murderers of peace. Then, then what always happens will happen again, we will give in a little more and a little more.

Is it any wonder then that within that spiral of concessions, we stand today in exactly the same place we stood yesterday, only one step lower down?

Doesn't Shamir see the danger? He sees it. More than that, he repeatedly warns us of it at every opportunity. Doesn't Shamir want a "complete" Land of Israel? He does want it, and even more than that, he continues to swear with his right hand that he will never forget it. But at the very same time, with his left foot, Shamir is drawn after the Alignment. Such national unity! But in so doing, not only does Likud free Alignment from responsibility for the deterioration, it also makes itself, Likud, into a superfluous party on the political map.

Strikes Against PLFP-GC Bases 'Effective'

*90OL0143B Tel Aviv BAMAHANE
in Hebrew 29 Nov 89 p 8*

[Article by Sharon Sade: "Raids on the Syrian Hinterland"]

[Text] This week the Air Force carried out two attacks on headquarters of the terrorist organization of Ahmad

Jibril. According to the head of the air squadron, Brigadier General A., the assaults, which were carried out a full 2 years since the night of the glider, dealt a significant blow to the morale of the organization. A senior official was even killed. Despite the closeness to the Syrians, a clash was avoided, and Syrian missiles were not dispatched.

The targets bombed in the attacks last week by the Air Force in Sultan Ya'aqov, on Mount Elias in the Lebanon Valley, served Ahmad Jibril's organization as headquarters and as a base for organizing strikes against Israel on various levels," says Brig Gen A., head of the Air Force squadron.

The two attacks carried out on Thursday and Saturday, were organized 2 years after the murderous attack on the NAHAL [Fighting Pioneer Youth] camp "Gibor" near Qiryat Shemona. As you remember, a terrorist from Jibril's organization penetrated the camp with the help of a motorized glider and killed six soldiers.

"One must remember," Brig Gen A. pointed out, "that every successful raid deals a significant blow to the morale of the terrorist organization. Considering the fact that, according to the foreign press, a senior official in the organization was hit, the damage to Jibril's pride is multiplied."

The raids were carried out near Syrian lines which are defended by batteries of surface-to-air missiles. As things turned out, the Syrians, despite their declared policy of hitting Air Force planes, were stopped from sending the missiles against the Israeli planes at the time of the attacks.

The decision to launch attacks on terrorist targets, Brig Gen A. explains, is agreed upon after sufficient intelligence information is gathered regarding organizing for terrorist operations. The air force, Brig Gen A. emphasizes, picks the right time to carry out the attacks, day or night, according to its own criteria. It is worth mentioning that this is the 15th Air Force attack this year and the sixth against Ahmad Jibril's terrorists.

On the Sabbath, a pair of Phantom planes started out, according to foreign sources, around 10:45 for the attack on Sultan Ya'aqov. Lieutenant Colonel A., commander of the squadron of Phantoms, took part in the attack as formation leader. "Weather conditions were excellent, and there was no antiaircraft fire from the terrorists or the Syrians. We attacked the targets that we had bombed a day and a half earlier. The earlier hits, whose effects were felt a lot in the area, made it hard for the first few seconds to identify the exact target. We launched a single sudden bombing attack which lasted for a few minutes and we used regular combat means. The bombs were released cleanly and right on target."

According to foreign reports, the planes launched six missiles on the headquarters and buildings of Jibril. "When we left the area of the attack on our way back to

Israel," A. adds, "we were met with relatively light antiaircraft fire. We passed it and landed safely."

According to Lt Col A., the recent raids prove that substantial investment pays off. The head of the air squadron, Brig Gen A., praises the pilots for the way they carried out their mission despite the fact that the area under attack is defended by Syrian antiaircraft missiles.

Northern Border Activities Reviewed

90OL0143A Tel Aviv BAMAHA
in Hebrew 29 Nov 89 p 10

[BAMAHA Interview with Brigadier General D., assistant commander of the Galilee detachment: "The Northern Border: The Hottest Years"; date, place not given; first paragraph is introduction]

"From the perspective of the number of attempts at penetrating the border, the last 2 years have been one of the toughest periods that the state of Israel has known." So says Brigadier General D., assistant commander of the Galilee detachment and responsible for the area of the Lebanese border. "Since 1948, no northern border or any other border of Israel has experienced dozens of penetration attempts in a year. Despite their intensiveness, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has succeeded, since the night of the glider, to prevent any breaks in the border fence. Most of the incidents, therefore, took place in the security zone," D. points out. According to Brig Gen D., there is a clear connection between the intensive operations of the saboteurs in the north and the intifadah in the occupied territories. "The upheavals have brought the Palestinian subject to regular public attention in Israel and throughout the world, and the terrorist organizations which interpreted the uprising as an Israeli weakness have intensified the attempts at penetration of the security zone." He explains. "At one time, there were fewer attempts at penetration, but the percent of successes was high. It is clear that now the situation has changed. Fortunately, the best of the IDF units are in the north, and the fact is that disasters like those that took place in Ma'ilot, Avivim, and Kfar-Yovel and Shamir have not been repeated."

[BAMAHA] Is there also a change in the nature of the terrorist activities this year?

[Brig Gen D.] The types of terrorist activities have not changed noticeably over the years. There are still small groups, usually composed of three to five terrorists who try to get through the fence under cover of darkness. The units are not looking for confrontation with the IDF and are not trying to hurt soldiers. Their main goal is damage to the masses in the settlements, especially women and children. From our point of view, therefore, any run-ins with the IDF or the Army of South Lebanon is considered a success.

[BAMAHA] Have their combat methods improved?

[Brig Gen D.] This year there has been a noticeable improvement in the terrorists' means of combat. They now have methods for seeing in the dark, antimissile weapons, and improved submachine guns. In my opinion, this has happened as a result of the open arms market in the world today. Nowadays, you can buy any kind of light arms with money. An additional reason for the improvement in their combat means stems from the disintegration of the Lebanese Army.

[BAMAHA] Do you think that there are many groups which succeed in hiding?

[Brig Gen D.] The security zone is not completely free of terrorists. The border between northern Lebanon and the south is not fenced in a way that will keep the terrorists out. Training of terrorist groups is carried out deep in Lebanon, in Palestinian refugee camps or in Syria, Iran, or Libya. By means of guides or supporters, the terrorists get through and hide in the security zone. In general, in areas with dense foliage, there are incidents whereby residents of the region hide the terrorists for money.

[BAMAHA] How does the IDF adapt its operations to these changes?

[Brig Gen D.] At present, the IDF has more assault missions than in the past. You must remember that the deeper the IDF's assault is, the more the planned activities will be frustrated and the terrorists' morale will be attacked at home.

Firearms Used in Gaza Ambush

44230055D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Nov 89 p 1

[Article by Ze'ev Shiff]

[Text] The ambush of a military car in Gaza and the use of firearms are not a turning point in the intifadah. Rather, they are the continuation of the line and activity pursued by members of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] and the Islamic Jihad. These groups are seeking to escalate the tension and the attacks, and to pull in their wake other Palestinian organizations still content with an uprising without firearms.

Islamic Jihad members are also responsible for the murder of two IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers, Sasportas and Sa'dun, who were picked up hitchhiking on highways in the south. Their murderers came from the strip and returned to it after carrying out the act. The car in which Sa'dun was murdered was found stuck in an orchard on the strip's border. Therefore, these two acts of murder must be seen as part of the Islamic Jihad's activity in the strip. Use of this operational method began several months before the intifadah erupted, when Islamic Jihad members murdered Captain Ron Tal in the heart of Gaza in broad daylight. Therefore, this is not a new method, nor is it linked at all to decisions made in the PLO leadership.

The ambush of the car in Gaza is a serious incident, but it should not surprise anyone. Therefore, we can refute the explanation that the ambush of the car proves that leaders of the intifadah are now turning to operations with firearms, because of their failure to organize the masses for large demonstrations.

It is more likely that the ambush organizers sought to say to the IDF and the General Security Service that despite the indictments submitted against the organizers of the murder of soldiers Sasportas and Sa'dun, and despite the arrest of the leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, their organizations have not been broken, and they continue to engage in activity and pose a challenge to Israel. The operational significance is that, despite the blows absorbed by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and the arrest of many of their members and leaders, there are activists who are willing to endanger themselves and continue terror activity. It is not impossible that these activists are receiving orders from the prisons and jails where leaders of the two organizations are incarcerated.

In the IDF, it is said that this is the first incidence of the use of firearms and the murder of a soldier in the Gaza Strip since the intifadah began. However, a number of soldiers have been killed in the West Bank, three of them by gunfire. In recent weeks in the West Bank, there were two cases of hand grenades which were thrown but did not explode, and one case of gunfire aimed at an IDF observation post in Nablus.

These cases testify that, even though the PLO leadership is presently continuing to advocate an uprising without firearms, there is a debate inside the organization over whether to change tactics and shift to the use of firearms. Or, it could be that there are enough armed people in the field who do not at all take into account what is decided by the PLO command in Tunisia in the same way that they decide on the number and identity of people to be killed on suspicion of collaboration with Israel.

Jews Reportedly Leaving Jerusalem Area

44230055E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Nov 89 p 11

[Article by Nadav Shargay]

[Text] More than 10,000 persons left Jerusalem in 1988, the first negative migration balance recorded since 1985. Since 1980, about 75,000 persons have left the capital. A new study points to a housing shortage and employment as the main causes. Local factors, such as a scarcity of entertainment on the Sabbath eve, or Jewish-Arab relations, have a negligible effect on migration from Jerusalem.

Jerusalem has recorded a long, extended minus in its current account for 7 consecutive years. According to the registers, 62,340 Jews left Jerusalem between 1979-85, and 55,490 Jews moved to it. In demographic terms, this means a negative migration balance of 6,850 Jews.

In 1986 and 1987, the picture changed, and the migration balance indicates a plus of about 600 persons per year. New, recently obtained data for 1988 indicate a renewed drop: 8,914 persons moved to Jerusalem, but 10,017 left, i.e., an immigration balance of minus 1,103 persons.

The data of the Central Statistics Bureau indicate that almost one-fourth of those who left (2,376 persons) moved to Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1,041 moved within the Jerusalem District inside the green line, 1,652 moved to the Central District (comprising the subdistricts of Sharon, Petah-Tiqwa, Ramla, and Rehovot), 2,167 moved to the Tel Aviv District, and 1,345 moved to the Southern District. Only several hundred moved to the Northern District or to the Haifa District.

The most popular excuses so far enlisted to explain the departure from Jerusalem point to, among other things, the closing down of Jerusalem on the Sabbath eve, the lack of entertainment in the city, and bitterness over the increasingly ultra-Orthodox character of many of its neighborhoods. Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek has become accustomed every several months to protesting against the continued development of satellite settlements around the capital, claiming that they are stealing residents.

Who is truly leaving Jerusalem and why? The answers, it emerges, are not necessarily those offered by Jerusalem politicians, each according to his views.

Three researchers at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Yisra'el Kimhi, Maya Teshen, and Sarit 'Uzi'eli, examined the characteristics of those who left and their reasons for leaving. Their full conclusions are being published in a new publication of the Jerusalem Institute, "Jerusalem Day By Day" (city and area, 19-20).

The data were collected using a mailed questionnaire. The population of the study included all persons registered as leaving the city in the report on those who left Jerusalem between 1983-86, which is the Jerusalem part of a compilation of changes in the population register. According to this report, 37,870 persons left Jerusalem in the 4 years under discussion. Those who left moved to 700 settlements. The researchers removed those who moved to rural settlements from the study population, assuming that they made such moves to effect an essential lifestyle change and are obviously not a target group of recommendations for action to prevent migration from Jerusalem.

Therefore, the total sample of the study's population is derived from 71 urban target settlements, to which 83 percent of those who left Jerusalem during 1983-86 migrated.

Six possible reasons for leaving Jerusalem were presented to interviewees: Housing, employment, family reasons, tension between the Orthodox and the secular populations, Jewish-Arab relations, and a dearth of

entertainment places (the survey was conducted before the intifadah erupted). Each interviewee was asked to indicate his/her three main reasons for leaving in the order of their importance as considerations in making the decision to leave.

Ninety-seven percent indicated a main reason for leaving Jerusalem, 58 percent indicated a second reason, and only 37 percent indicated a third reason. Housing was the main reason for leaving Jerusalem, with 42 percent of the interviewees reporting it as the most important factor. This reason was predominant among those who moved to Jerusalem satellite communities, and much less important among those who moved to other parts of the country.

On the scale of frequencies of the most important reason for leaving, employment was indicated in second place. A fifth of those who left indicated employment as the most important reason. However, compared to housing, employment mainly motivated those who moved to settlements far from Jerusalem (37 percent).

This was no surprise, because 81 percent of those who moved to the Jerusalem region continue to work in Jerusalem after leaving.

Family factors were ranked in third place, with 14 percent of the respondents indicating them as their main reason for leaving. Only 4 percent indicated local factors particular to Jerusalem, which have made the headlines in recent years, as the most important reason for their leaving. Among these local factors were religious-secular relations, which was the factor most frequently cited by those who moved to distant settlements, and was the only factor cited by those who moved to Jerusalem suburbs.

Meager entertainment possibilities contributed to the leaving of 2 percent of those who moved to distant settlements, whereas Jewish-Arab relations had the smallest influence (1 percent).

Another way to examine the causes for leaving Jerusalem was to categorize all the respondents according to their destination and reasons for leaving.

The table prepared by the researchers shows that those who left Jerusalem referred to housing more than any other factor in their considerations, with close to 60 percent of them indicating housing as their reason for leaving the city. This factor was predominant among those who moved to the Jerusalem region, of whom 91 percent indicated housing as their reason for leaving the city; 43 percent of them desired to attain larger housing at an affordable price, and 37 percent moved because relocation to the city's suburbs permitted the acquisition of a detached dwelling.

Characteristics of Those Who Left

Employment was the second most important reason for leaving, with 45 percent of those who left Jerusalem

reporting it as one of the three primary reasons for leaving. This factor was predominant among those who moved to settlements distant from Jerusalem, and was much less important among those who moved to the Jerusalem region. Sixty-three percent of those who left Jerusalem in favor of distant settlements indicated employment as their reason for moving. Of them, 38 percent left because of prospects for professional advancement and a higher income in the target settlement.

The findings show that those who left Jerusalem are characteristically young, 88 percent being less than 45. The group with the most pronounced tendency to leave the city is the 30-35 age bracket. Most of those who left are married (83 percent). About two-thirds of those who left were born in Israel. Of those born abroad, 65 percent were born in Europe and America and 35 percent were born in Asia and Africa. Most of those who left were not born in the city (65 percent). Those born in Jerusalem tended more than the others not to go far from the city, moving to the region surrounding it.

Those who left Jerusalem characteristically have higher education, with 70 percent of them having a post-secondary education. About one-fourth of them have a high-school education, and only 3 percent have only a primary education. Eighty percent of those who left belonged to the labor force; 92 percent of them were salaried employees. Regarding housing, only 40 percent of those who left owned an apartment in the city, whose average size was three rooms.

Those who left Jerusalem mainly for employment are characteristically older than 30, have an advanced education, are engaged in occupations ranked high on the occupation appraisal scale, and are owners of apartments in general, and large apartments in particular.

Those who left Jerusalem mainly because of housing are young people (18-29) from very large households (six or more persons), for whom housing is the most important component in their economic considerations.

Many view residents who moved to live around Jerusalem, especially in the settlements of Mevaseret Tziyon, Ma'ale Adumim, and Giv'at Ze'ev, as citizens of Jerusalem for all intents because of their employment connections and the services that they continue to maintain with the mother city. However, from the standpoint of the municipality and the effect of outward migration on the old Jerusalem neighborhoods, and recently, on the new neighborhoods as well, those living around Jerusalem do not differ significantly from those who moved far from Jerusalem. By leaving, both groups, according to the study's authors, undermine the social-demographic balance in the city's old neighborhoods and diminish its Jewish population.

The movement to satellite settlements of Jerusalem is even causing, with time, a gradual weakening of links with the mother city. One effect becoming manifest in this respect is that the offspring of migrants in particular

are becoming less connected to Jerusalem, and tend to remain within its boundaries less so than its residents.

The data on the renewed negative migration balance in 1988, which are being published here for the first time, dovetail neatly with the sharp decline in building starts in the city in recent years from several thousand housing units per year in the early 1980s to several hundred units per year. The meager supply of apartments is causing the prices of apartments in the city to shoot upwards. Demand is rising, but the supply is small. In the past 4 years, Jerusalem apartment prices, in dollar values, have jumped almost 100 percent. The news of the expected wave of immigration to Israel will perhaps cause prices to rise further.

The most interesting finding of the study pertains to housing. There are currently not enough apartments in Jerusalem. The wave of migration from Jerusalem to its periphery and to more distant districts seems to increase as a function of the growth of the housing problem in the capital.

KUWAIT

Reaction to Events in Eastern Europe Discussed

*90OL0144A Kuwait AL-QABAS
in Arabic 15 Nov 89 p 19*

[Article: " 'Abd-al-Karim Abu-al-Nasr Writes About the Birth of a New Era"]

[Text] The world is witnessing the end of an era and the birth of a new era: the end of the Soviet empire or the Communist Bloc as we have known it since its creation after World War II, and the birth of a historic new socialist experiment within the Soviet Union itself, within Eastern Europe, and perhaps within the communist camp entirely. The Arabs are concerned with these great historic changes in Eastern Europe, and they are concerned with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the transformation of this wall from a symbol of the Cold War between the East and the West to a symbol of opening up and dialogue and cooperation between the East and the West.

Should the Arabs feel anxiety and fear, however, because the East is drawing near to the West in swift, giant steps, and because the new era which is currently being fabricated in the heart of the Soviet empire and the Communist Bloc may lead to weakening or diminishing the traditional relations of friendship between us as Arabs and the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe allied to her? Should we necessarily expect as Arabs to gradually lose our Soviet friends and our friends in Eastern Europe the closer these countries grow to the West, whether the West be American or European? And does these countries' drawing close to the West also mean their drawing close to Israel, especially since the Jewish state will try, or has begun trying, to exploit Eastern Europe's new rapprochement with the West to

attempt to weaken Eastern Europe's relations with and support of the Arabs and the support of these countries for the Arab causes? These questions have been posed for more than a year and directed especially to the Soviet leadership, but they are posed now anew in association with the great changes which the whole Soviet empire is witnessing. The historic changes in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe result particularly from these countries' no longer being able, by themselves in the framework of their cooperation within the combined socialist community, to further their economic and social conditions, growth and standard of living, and they can no longer on their own compete with the western and Asian industrial world or keep pace with it. So there was no way but to revolt against the revolution, and this is what the Soviet leadership realized after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Some experts go so far as to say that this goes back to the era of former Soviet leader Andropov, but Gorbachev is the one who in the end led the great development and reform operation within the Soviet Union which is summed up in two words: perestroika and glasnost. Perestroika means rebuilding and glasnost means transparency or opening up.

However, domestic reforms by themselves were not sufficient to develop Soviet society and solve its various problems. Hence Gorbachev's decision to create a new kind of Soviet-American accord which would go beyond the scope of coordination and consultation and reach the point of firm cooperation in various bilateral and multilateral fields—in fact reach the point of creating a firm, regular bond between the two superpowers which would continually grow and deepen and from which it would be impossible to turn back or retreat. The two giants would then look at the problems of the Third World and its struggles from the viewpoint of wanting to cooperate in an organized way and not compete and leave room for other countries to try to play one of them against the other. In the framework of this firm relationship, Gorbachev would profit from the progress of America and the West and American and European experiences and the capabilities of the West to develop Soviet society, raise its standard of living, and keep pace with the modern age in a real, effective way. What the Soviet Union has witnessed since 1985 and what Eastern Europe has begun to witness for some months in the way of great developments and changes all constitutes a consolidation and confirmation of the reform movement which Gorbachev is leading, that is, perestroika.

The big changes which Poland has experienced, which led to the opposition Solidarity organization's assumption of the premiership, the changes which Hungary has seen, which led to the decline in influence of the ruling Communist Party, and the changes which East Germany is now witnessing beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall and ending in the holding of free democratic elections following radical changes in the government, the leadership and the party, as well as the changes which Bulgaria is witnessing and the changes which observers

expect that Czechoslovakia and Romania will witness in the next few weeks all have one common factor, i.e., these countries' need to treat their economic problems and be concerned with furthering their conditions and raising their standards of living during the real opening up to the West and the advanced industrial world preparatory to establishing new cooperation between the East and the West. This will require reducing military expenditures, halting the nuclear and conventional arms race, the adoption of liberalizing and democratic measures in the Eastern Bloc, freedom from the shackles of the one ruling party and its rigid laws, and trying to create a real new democratic political experiment to replace the one which these societies have known for more than 40 years. This movement of big changes in Eastern Europe constitutes an anchor and prop for Gorbachev's reform policy for the following principal reasons:

- These changes show the opponents of the reform movement in the Soviet Union that all of Eastern Europe is changing and turning inside out and that there is consequently no room for turning back from the program which Gorbachev has been pursuing for several years.
 - These changes and the gradual turning of the countries of Eastern Europe toward the West to obtain support and various assistance all come from the Soviet Union tremendous burdens which were the result of the Soviet Union's assuming alone the responsibility of aiding its European allies in the financial, commercial, economic, technical, and other fields. Thus, instead of the Soviet Union alone bearing the burdens of the economic difficulties and problems which the countries of Eastern Europe are facing in general, the West will share in shouldering these burdens while adjusting to Eastern Europe's opening up with it.
 - These changes also show the West that Gorbachev is not maneuvering but is sincere in his reform and glasnost aims and is encouraging and supporting his allies in proceeding on this course, and consequently that Gorbachev deserves full support from the advanced industrial Western world to succeed in this experiment of his. Thus the East is drawing near to the West with awesome speed and the impediments and walls and barriers which the Cold War set up between the two blocs are being abolished. The East is drawing close to the West so that they will become one world, and if this movement of change and development continues its course, the world will see in the coming years the birth of a new bloc, i.e., the European Bloc, which will consist of the countries of Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe, as they are now called.
- Faced with these historic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, should the Arabs feel anxiety and fear? Naturally the Arab world cannot oppose the movement of history and these important changes, but this does not prevent the Arabs from having doubts and
- posing a number of legitimate questions. There are also new realities which accompany these changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the most prominent of which are:
 - The first reality is that it is no longer possible for the Arabs to exploit the intense struggle and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, as was the case in the 1950s, the 1960s, and the beginning of the 1970s, by playing the game of rapprochement and alliance with Russia to pressure America, and vice versa. The Soviet Union and the United States have stopped playing this game, and the Soviet Union no longer wants to risk its new relations with the United States and the West for any ally or friend in the Arab World or the Third World.
 - The second reality is that the view of the Soviet Union toward regional disputes and liberation movements has changed. These disputes and movements are no longer a means to pressure the United States and the West and to strengthen Soviet positions and stands in this area or that, but on the contrary have become justification for cooperation between the two superpowers to eliminate centers of tension here and there. The Soviet Union, under the leadership of Gorbachev, has come to recognize, for example, America's big role in the Middle East and is not placing real obstacles in the way of the growth of this role.
 - The third reality is that the rapprochement of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe with the United States and the West in general is being accompanied by a rapprochement with Israel. This, in any case, is what the Zionist forces in the world are seeking and this is what the American administration and the other western governments are sanctioning. Israel is playing the card of eliminating the obstacles in the American arena to the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe obtaining loans and facilities and support. She is tempting the countries of Eastern Europe with that and in return is demanding new relations with these countries.
 - The fourth reality is that these changes are being accompanied in the Soviet arena and in the countries of Eastern Europe by the emergence of compelling new forces which are affecting decisionmaking, so that the decision is no longer that of one person or a limited group of people, as was the case in the past. The role of various government organizations has grown in these countries, as well as the roles of Parliament, academies of the sciences, the media, groups of Jewish and non-Jewish dissidents, nationalist groups and societies defending human rights. Likewise, the door has been opened to foreign capital to play its role and exercise its influence on the decisions of this state or that.
 - The fifth reality is that the Soviets themselves, as well as some officials in Eastern Europe, are now saying to the Arabs and their friends in the Third World: From now on, we must interact with each other on the basis

of the extent of the traditional friendship which used to govern the relations of the Soviet Union with a large number of the countries the Third World—on the basis, in fact, of recognizing the extent of mutual and reciprocal interests and on the basis of the friends and allies' understanding the need of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe to develop their relations with the United States and the western countries and deepen the bonds of cooperation in various fields.

In the face of these realities and the new changes which are accompanying them, a number of questions are being posed now in Arab political circles, the most salient being:

- What is the political price which the United States and some of the western countries will demand of the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe to assist these countries in reforming and developing their structures and their economic conditions and raise their standards of living?
- Can the Soviet leadership and the new leaderships in the Eastern European countries long withstand American and western pressures and enticements and refuse some of the conditions which the United States and the western countries are imposing in return for offering support to them? The most prominent of these announced or hidden conditions are the emigration of tens of thousands of Soviet Jews to Israel, halting the supply of arms and war materiel to some Arab states, and convincing the Arabs to give up once and for all the idea of military confrontation with Israel and accept making concessions for the sake of achieving peace in the area. This is at a time in which the United States and some of the western countries are continuing their support for Israel so that she will remain the strongest in the Middle East.
- Does the Soviet leadership actually intend to exploit the new policy of detente with the United States to the advantage of the Arabs and their just causes and strengthen the Arab negotiating position, or will the Arabs be deprived of a bargaining card in the scenario between the East and the West?

Will the countries of Eastern Europe maintain their support of Arab causes as in past years, or will this support gradually diminish and will the Arabs lose important diplomatic and political cards in the international arena? These questions reflect Arab concern in the face of the historic changes which the Soviet Empire is experiencing and the changes which may accompany them in the quality and nature of the Arabs' relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. But the real response to these feelings of anxiety is not only in posing questions and raising doubts but in undertaking serious and studied Arab initiatives to adapt to and be in harmony with this new historic stage through which the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe are passing, and to benefit from it so that the Arabs will be in the heart of the movement of history and not on the periphery of history.

MOROCCO

Formation of National Airports Office Approved

*90OA0230B Casablanca MAROC SOIR
in French 14 Dec 89 p 8*

[Text] On 13 December the Chamber of Representatives unanimously approved a law transforming the Casablanca Airports Office into the National Airports Office.

Under the new law the powers of the new organization, called "The National Airports Office," apply to all state-owned civil airports open to general air traffic. However, this does not affect the powers delegated to the military authorities regarding local supervision of air traffic at airports where the military exercise such control, under the provisions in effect concerning civilian air activity.

In the course of a plenary session presided over by Haddou Chiguer, second vice president of the Chamber of Representatives, in the presence of members of the cabinet, Minister of Transport Mohamed Bouamoud emphasized that the establishment of the new organization, which reflects the wishes already expressed by deputies and the Higher Planning Council, is to ensure the balanced development of the various Moroccan airports. This will allow the latter to participate more actively in the encouragement of harmonious and complementary regional development.

In particular, the National Airports Office proposes to manage and operate all airports in the country and the quality of the services provided to travelers, while ensuring the security of civilian air traffic, in addition to respecting international standards concerning airports, the expansion of airport installations, the improvement of their economic condition, and the training of competent and specialized personnel.

The leaders of all parliamentary groups and several other deputies have expressed their full support for the establishment of this office, which is aimed at completing an expanded modernization of this sector.

Those taking part in the parliamentary debate also praised the positive results recorded by the former Casablanca Airports Office in terms of management, investment, and efficiency, which it has demonstrated in every area.

On the other hand the deputies emphasized the need to provide required facilities at certain airports, particularly at the regional level.

Figuig Livestock Raising Receives Support

*90OA0230A Casablanca MAROC SOIR
in French 16 Dec 89 p 5*

[Text] Bouarfa (MAP)—Animal Husbandry is the principle economic occupation of the people of the province of Figuig, where the number of livestock raisers is about 10,000.

Animal husbandry in this area is of the extensive type. That is, caring for the herds of animals is subject to climatic hazards. Water and grazing grounds are two factors limiting the proper care of livestock. These are among the reasons that lead livestock raisers to move periodically in search of better pastures and more water.

Grazing grounds have undergone unprecedented deterioration over the past few years because of the effects of drought. The flow from existing sources of water has declined and even dried up entirely in some cases. This situation has had an unfavorable impact on the livestock sector in general, and this situation has forced a substantial number of herdsmen to move to other provinces, such as Ouarzazate.

The efforts of the state have had some impact in the form of providing subsidized animal feed and organizing access to water to alleviate the effects of the drought and to protect the livestock.

In addition to these efforts the National Agricultural Development Fund has allocated to livestock raisers and to farmers in Figuig province, in the course of the 1988/1989 crop year, funds totaling 28,501,707.50 DH [dirham] to provide relief to 1,365 cases. These funds were broken down as follows:

- For Figuig Province—DH27,069,587, of which DH20,399,800 are for short term loans and the balance for medium-term loans.
- For Beni Tad jit Province—DH1,432,120, of which DH744,900 are for short-term loans and the balance for medium-term loans.

SAUDI ARABIA

Finance Ministry Releases 1989 Economic Figures
44000142 Jeddah ARAB NEWS
in English 19 Nov 89 p 3

[Article: "SR3.4b Surplus Trade Balance"]

[Text] Riyadh, Nov. 18—The foreign trade balance of the Kingdom registered a surplus of SR3.4 billion during the second quarter of 1989 with exports amounting to SR23.4 billion and imports SR20 billion, according to figures released by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy.

The reason behind this improvement in the foreign trade balance was attributed mainly to an increase in the national exports which rose by 10.9 percent (SR2.3 billion) during the same period over that of last year.

Oil exports during the second quarter of this year amounted to SR20 billion and thus accounted for the largest part of the overall value of foreign trade. Oil exports constituted the majority (85.5 percent) of the Kingdom's foreign trade. The increase over oil exports registered during the same period of 1988 was valued at SR1.8 billion, according to the figures made available by

the general statistics department, the data collection and analysing body of the ministry.

Exports from petrochemical and plastic industries made an increase of 18.2 percent over the figures of last year and were valued at SR2.2 billion while exports of other products increased by 0.7 percent and amounted to SR0.8 billion.

Saudi imports, on the other hand, dropped by 17.4 percent or SR1.6 billion during the second quarter of 1989. Among the main imported commodities which registered a decline during this period were:

- Foodstuffs which registered a drop of one percent and amounted to SR2.832 billion compared to SR2.86 billion during the second quarter of 1988.
- Beverages and tobacco with a 14.5 percent drop and imports amounting to SR242 million compared to SR238 million last year.
- Vegetable oils and fats registered a drop of 25 percent and amounted to SR66 million compared to SR61 million last year.
- Chemicals and related products dropped by 25 percent to SR1.385 billion compared to SR1.847 billion last year.
- Classified manufactured goods recorded a drop of 24.9 percent with the Kingdom importing SR4.76 billion in value of these goods compared to SR5.425 billion last year.
- Transport machinery and equipment dropped by 10.9 percent to SR6.498 billion compared to SR7.297 billion last year.

In comparison, the Kingdom's imports from certain raw material goods such as hides, seeds, rubber, fertilizers and minerals increased by 0.9 percent to SR431 million compared to SR427 million during the second quarter of last year. Imports from unclassified products have also registered an increase during this period and totalled SR1.572 billion compared to SR82 million during the same period last year.

Among the Kingdom's trading partners the United States occupied the number one position to become the leading exporter with US exports to Saudi Arabia during the second quarter of 1989 amounting to SR3.596 billion. This figure shows an increase of 18 percent over exports to the Kingdom made during the same period last year. Among the many American exports were navigational equipment, cars and auto spare parts. Japan came second with its exports to the Kingdom amounting to SR2.876 billion with an increase of 14.4 percent over last year. Japanese exports including cars and auto spare parts. Switzerland occupied the third place with its exports amounting to SR1.523 billion with an increase of 7.6 percent. Gold bouillon, drugs and related medical products and watches constituted the main Swiss exports.

Britain occupied the fourth place among the Kingdom's trading partners with its exports to Saudi Arabia during the second quarter of 1989 amounting to SR1.308 billion

with an increase of 6.5 percent over last year. Other countries, respectively, were Italy with exports to the Kingdom amounting to SR1.211 billion with an increase of 6.1 percent, West Germany with exports worth SR1.169 billion and an increase of 5.8 percent and South Korea with exports worth SR817 million and an increase of 4.1 percent.

France recorded exports to the tune of SR797 million and an increase of 4 percent, while Taiwan registered exports worth SR610 million and an increase of 3 percent and the Netherlands achieved SR410 million worth of exports and an increase of two percent.

SUDAN

Ethiopia, Garang Allegedly Agree To Set Up Regime in South

900A0172A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 28 Nov 89 p 8

[Article by Mahmud Bakri: "Ethiopian Agreement With Garang To Establish a Communist State"]

[Text] Arab sources have revealed important information concerning the Ethiopian role in destabilizing Southern Sudan. They referred to an agreement reached between the Ethiopian leadership and Sudanese rebel leader John Garang to establish a state in Southern Sudan, ruled by a communist government along the lines of the Ethiopian regime. This state would be firmly linked to the countries of the socialist camp, in order to counter what the Ethiopian leadership called attempts to apply Islamic law in Sudan, and in light of the current Sudanese government's fundamental opposition to socialism.

The sources added that Ethiopia has offered Garang the possibility of achieving unity between Ethiopia and the new regime, which would be headed by Garang. Ethiopia stated that that would have a hand in strengthening African relations with the socialist camp. In light of the agreement that Ethiopian President Mengistu reached with Garang, the former sent letters to several socialist nations, and Cuba and East Germany responded to those messages. Certain officials from both these countries visited Ethiopia during the past few months, during which they discussed the military requirements of John Garang's forces in their conflict with the Sudanese government. As a result, the rebels have obtained advanced Eastern European weapons. The biggest deals were concluded by the rebel forces in August of this year, and those arms played a part in the rebel seizure of the town of al-Kurmuk.

Information confirms that the direct objective behind this military assistance is the attempt of these communist nations to find areas of strong influence for themselves in those regions of Africa. This attempt could be tantamount to helping themselves in the indirect struggle with the areas of Western influence, which is winning a clear victory in those areas.

Official Denies Reports of Tortured Detainees

900A0204B London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 11 Dec 89 p 4

[Article: "Trials and Accusations of Torture"]

[Text] Brigadier General al-Tijani, the official responsible for the activities of the investigating committees in Sudan's ruling council, announced that reports about the torture of a number of political detainees were false and that Dr. Ma'mun Muhammad Husayn was not dead.

Al-Tijani's denial appeared in a statement which was issued in Khartoum after news was received that Dr. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdallah, member of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and a prominent member of the Physicians' Union, and Dr. Ma'mun Muhammad Husayn, one of the prominent figures in the National Grouping, had been kidnapped by a security agency. The news indicated that the two men had been tortured and that the torture had been life threatening. A later report indicated that Dr. Ma'mun had died.

Brig. Gen. al-Tijani confirmed in his statement that Dr. Ma'mun was taken to the military hospital for treatment from an ordinary illness. Al-Tijani added that a number of physicians had visited the detainees and were assured of their safety.

Several questions were raised, on the other hand, when the public prosecutor issued a bulletin to the investigating committees, asking them not to use any illegal methods against defendants or detainees. Publication of this bulletin coincided with the start of the second week of the physicians' strike. It was announced that four physicians, Dr. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdallah, Dr. Ma'mun Muhammad Husayn, Dr. Ja'far Muhammad Salih, and Dr. Limuf Gordon [name as published], would be put on trial and that their case would be heard by Special Court Number 1. The four physicians are being charged in accordance with Article 35 of the Emergency Law and Articles 96 (K) and 105 of the 1983 Criminal Code, the September laws. If convicted under Article 35 of the Emergency Law, the defendants could receive the death penalty. The trial actually got underway on Monday, the fourth day of this month. The indictment was read; it consisted of testimony from two physicians who are known for their ties with the defunct Islamic National Front. These physicians are Dr. Jamal 'Abdallah and Dr. Babakr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karim. The prosecutor submitted three leaflets about the strike published by the Physicians' Union, and he confirmed that the defendants had legally acknowledged possession of these leaflets.

The court is expected to hear arguments for the defense on Wednesday, the sixth day of this month. AL-DUSTUR has learned that Mr. 'Abdallah al-Hasan, an attorney and president of the Bar Association, and Mr.

Taysir Mudaththir have been appointed defense attorneys, but it is not yet known whether the court will allow them to appear as attorneys [for the defense] or as friends.

Meanwhile, news from Khartoum confirms that many members of the Physicians' Union have been arrested. Dr. John Jindi, an engineer at the central administration; Dr. Murqus, a pharmacist; and Dr. Emile Fawzi, a textile engineer, are among those who were arrested.

With regard to the authority's efforts to fight currency trading operations, an assistant pilot for Sudan Airways was arrested for smuggling currency. His arrest led to the arrest of others. The Revolution's security courts issued death sentences against Majdi Mahjub Muhammad Ahmad and al-Maryud [name as published]. The defendants were sentenced after a speedy trial during which they were not allowed representation by their attorneys, but the court gave them 7 days to appeal their case to the chief justice.

In other matters it was reported that Mr. Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani has been moved from Cooper [Prison] to his home in North Khartoum where he remains under house arrest. It was also reported that he suffers from several illnesses and that he has extremely poor vision.

It was also reported that there was a hostile demonstration in the city of Wad Madani.

RCC Member Rules Out Repealing Islamic Law *90OA0204A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 13 Dec 89 p 1*

[Article: "Delegation of Sudanese Leaders Affirms Islamic Laws Cannot Be Repealed; Leaders Affirm Former U.S. President Carter Did Not Understand the Reality of Islamic Sudan"]

[Text] Sudanese leaders have categorically refused to bargain over the question of Islamic law during talks which were held between a Sudanese delegation and another one representing the southern rebels led by John Garang. These talks, which were held in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, were mediated by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The delegation of Sudanese leaders affirmed that no matter what the reasons were, the rebels' demand that Islamic laws which are in effect in Sudan be repealed was quite unacceptable.

Negotiations between the two parties had reached an impasse because the rebel delegation was determined that Islamic laws in Sudan be repealed. That was a precondition to continuing the peace talks.

Staff Brigadier General Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, member of Sudan's Revolution Command Council [RCC], affirmed that the Sudanese Government would never yield to the demands of southern Sudan's rebels to repeal Islamic laws, which is considered the rebels' principal demand for the sake of achieving a peaceful solution to the southern problem.

Muhammad al-Amin, who chaired the government's delegation in the talks held with the rebels in Nairobi, Kenya, said in statements which were reported by the AL-SUDAN AL-JADIDAH [publication name as published] newspaper that the government will not listen to those who oppose Islamic law. Al-Amin said that former U.S. President Carter, who has been mediating these talks, and the rebels in the south do not understand the fact that Sudan is an Islamic, Arab country.

During the Nairobi talks, which failed recently, Carter had proposed that application of Islamic laws be suspended until the constitutional convention was held. But the Sudanese Government rejected the proposal, which was basically being pushed and demanded by the rebels.

Institute Promotes Goat, Camel To Solve Meat Shortage

90OA0172B Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 20 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Dr. Ibrahim Musa Taban al-Dhu, Khartoum University: "Possible Benefit From Goat, Camel Meat To Solve Meat Shortage in Khartoum"]

[Text] Sudan has approximately 14 million goats, and 2.5 to 3 million camels. These numbers are constantly increasing without any ideal benefit from them. Reports of the Arab Organization for 1983 indicated that surplus goats in Sudan would total approximately 8 million in the year 2000. In current scientific studies, we find that the annual surplus of goats in the northern provinces is about 2.5 million, while camels number about 170,000 annually. About 100,000 tons of meat annually for local consumption and export could be provided by this number of animals.

On the other hand, we find that there are many other factors to aid and encourage the consumption of goat meat particularly, including:

- Scientific studies have proved that goat meat, except for aged male organs, is basically no different from the meat of sheep in sensory physical and chemical properties;
- Goat meat is eaten with pleasure in all regions of Sudan, except for Khartoum;
- More than 50 percent of the residents of Khartoum are originally from the various Sudanese regions, emigrating to Khartoum to find work;
- As a result of economic pressures on the residents of Khartoum, the majority of them, in my opinion, will consume goat meat instead of mutton or beef, if its prices are low;
- Since the ratio of net gain with regard to goats is not less, or rather, might be more than the percentage with regard to sheep and, in light of the fact that the price of live goats is usually considerably less than the price of sheep, it could be expected that the price of goat meat would be cheaper than mutton;
- The goat bears hardships better than sheep and reproduces more under normal circumstances, since it is superior to the sheep in this respect; and,

- The increased number of unprofitable goats would have a deleterious effect on the land, since the goat is noted for wanton grazing, which leads to denuding the land, which in turn helps the process of drought and desertification.

As a result of all these reasons, I would encourage and urge all ways and means that would lead to the consumption of goat meat in Khartoum. This project could be organized as follows:

1. Since more than 55 percent of goats are located in Kurdufan, Darfur and the Central Region, it would be very easy to buy and transport these animals to the capital, especially in the summer.

2. We should begin at once to service the railroad trains belonging to the Cattle and Meat Marketing Institute, in order to ship the livestock in the summer.

3. Allocate large sums of money to the Cattle Marketing Institute for the purchase of goats from those regions, and then butcher and distribute them on Saturday and Wednesday of each week.

4. Encourage the private sector to get into this business, and facilitate all legal, administrative and fiscal measures, in order to eliminate what might possibly be an obstacle to merchants at the present time and in the future.

Since I have accurate information and expertise with regard to most areas of Kordofan and Darfur, I can assure those who wish to enter this business that, God willing, it would be most welcome for the following reasons:

- These animals are owned by herdsmen and farmers, who sell their crops at harvest time, and then spend that money to buy the necessities of life. During the summer months, from March to July, the farmers in Kurdufan and Darfur are in dire need of money and, therefore, we would find that the price of goats would be moderate compared with the harvest season (October to February). The farmers would be ready to sell the largest possible number of goats at that time. This is the difficult time in Khartoum (the season of scarcity) to obtain meat, since the prices rise.
- One could purchase the largest possible number of goats in the summer, at places where they gather daily for water, such as Umm Ruwabah, al-Rahd, Abu Zabd, al-Sanut, al-Suwaqi, Tutu, al-Bayjah, al-Udhiyah, al-Faulah, Mumu, Babanusah, al-Dhu'ayn, Niyala, etc.
- There are main stations on the railroad to load livestock, such as al-Rahad, Abu-Zabd, al-Fulah, Babanusah, al-Dhu'ayn and Niyala. These stations are not very busy now.
- According to the information we now have, the price of goats in those places in the summer is less than half of their price in Khartoum, as for example in the Libyan Market, Shaykh Abu-Zabad, etc.

- There are veterinarian clinics in most of the larger towns, such as al-Rahad, Abu-Zabad, al-Fulah, Babanusah, al-Dhu'ayn and Niyala, and veterinary doctors and technicians could be provided to inoculate and examine the livestock, so that we could be assured of their good health.
- One could easily obtain agricultural waste products, such as sugar cane and bean pods, during the harvest season, and then store it to feed the livestock while they are awaiting shipment and being shipped by train to Khartoum. In addition, there is the possibility of buying sorghum and other feed at harvest time to feed the livestock while in transit to Khartoum. Since they rely on normal grazing in regular circumstances, that is, before confinement and being loaded, it would not cost much to feed them.

We ask for God's aid and blessings on us all, and we pray for prosperity and progress for our beloved nation.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Interior Minister Interviewed on Political Prisoners

*90OL0149A London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 28 Nov 89 pp 18-19*

[Interview with PDRY Minister of Interior Salih Mun-assir al-Siyali by Nura Fakhuri in Aden—date not given]

[Text] The question of political prisoners in any part of the world always attracts attention and is the subject of discussion, scrutiny, and investigation by the press and humanitarian organizations and others. In the mail the AL-MAJALLAH receives weekly, a letter signed by a Yemeni reader arrived accompanied by a list of a large number of prisoners in one of the PDRY's jail who were arrested upon returning to the country following the declaration of general amnesty. Since the letter arrived at a time when it was known that most of the detainees involved in the January 1986 events have already been released following a general amnesty issued in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY], questions are bound to be asked.

AL-MAJALLAH took the list to officials in Aden, and the following report was prepared.

Among the letters AL-MAJALLAH receives weekly, we received a letter from a Yemeni reader from a village called Jibah in Shabwah province of the PDRY. The reader says in his letter that the village in question lost many of its children who fell victims in the bloody January 1968 battles or were executed during the first weeks that followed. Some of them have fled with those who emigrated to the Yemen Arab Republic [YAR]. This is despite the fact that these people took no part in those events. After the proclamation of general amnesty and the Yemeni authorities promised not to harm them, some of these emigrants returned, but the authorities did

not keep their promise and went on to arrest them one by one. In all 28 persons were arrested. The letter writer alleges that the Yemeni authorities have executed two of them, namely Salih Salim 'Awad, in October 1988, whom the authorities said he died of natural causes, and Farid 'Awad Haydarah, who died on 25 June 1989 in 'Ataq central prison and was said to have committed suicide.

The writer enclosed with his letter a list of names of detainees from the Jibah area and its district. The list shows the date of their arrest, their profession, and the date they returned from abroad. He also enclosed a message allegedly sent by Minister of State Security Sa'id Salim to Farid 'Awad Haydarah and his brethren on 10 September 1989 in which the minister of security assured them that they would not be touched and that salaries would be paid to all those who are entitled. The minister stressed that every returnee is a good citizen sincerely serving his country.

AL-MAJALLAH took the reader's letter and all the information it contained and went to Aden. It has put this information before several public and official quarters.

The prime minister said that a copy of this letter was already submitted to him and that the alleged letter from the minister of state security is forged. This is proved by the fact that it bears no reference or authorization. He assured AL-MAJALLAH that following the declaration of amnesty the security authorities arrested only those persons who committed crimes against public security and had nothing to do with the January 1986 events. The executions that were carried out were only five whose cases were dealt with before courts.

In the Ministry of Interior building AL-MAJALLAH met with PDRY Minister of Interior Salih Munassir al-Siyali.

We have put before him the reader's letter with the names of detainees and the information available about them. We asked him about their condition and about the number of detainees who were arrested following their return. He assured us that the number of detainees involved in the January events did not exceed five or six persons and that a large number of detainees has been freed. (AL-MAJALLAH saw some of them at the headquarters of the writers' union, as we have said in an earlier report.) He said that every one of those arrested following his return to the country committed a felony or broke the law—such as stealing, killing, or committing security or sabotage crimes.

With regard to the list of names, the minister called one of those responsible for security in Shabwah area who happened to be at the Ministry of Interior and asked him about the list. The answer was as follows:

1. Salih Salim 'Awad Haydarah died in jail. He was, together with some of those whose names appear in the

list, accused of killing 'Abdallah Salim al-Tal and 'Ali Husayn al-Tal and possessing explosives intended for use for sabotage purposes.

2. Husayn al-Khadr 'Awad Haydarah is in 'Ataq jail accused of killing a man in Shabwah.

3. Salih 'Abdallah Salih 'Awad Haydarah is accused of possessing and detonating mines.

4. Muhammad 'Abdallah Salih is in 'Ataq jail accused of possessing explosives and killing 'Ali Husayn al-Tal.

5. Mubarak 'Awad Musa'id Husayn is in 'Ataq jail charged with possessing explosives and committing a murder crime. He admitted taking part in killing al-Tal. Mus'a'id 'Ali Musa'id Husayn, Husayn 'Awad 'Abdallah, Ahmad 'Abdallah Haydarah, Salim Mubarak 'Awad, Mubarak Musa'id Haydarah, and 'Ali Musa'id did the same. As for 'Awad 'Abdallah Haydarah, Hamad Jubran al-Harrif, Salih Jubran al-Harrif, 'Ali Jubran Mujalba', Salim Faraj, 'Awad Nasir Shaykh, 'Awad Salim, and Ahmad Nasir, they have been released. While 'Ali Ahmad Ballab and al-Shunayn Husayn Imshafwi are in 'Ataq prison on the same aforementioned charge.

Minister Salih Munassir al-Siyali stressed that Farid 'Awad Haydarah committed suicide in jail and Salim 'Awad Haydarah died of natural causes. Their folks can ask for an autopsy by a forensic doctor in order to prove whether there was a crime or homicide or the man died a natural death.

Moving from the case of detainees in 'Ataq prison, AL-MAJALLAH asked the minister of interior about details relating to the case of the arrest of a number of citizens on charge of espionage, including pilot 'Aydarus Muhammad, flight engineer Husayn Dhiban, and Fatimah Muhammadi, former secretary of the minister of finance and wife of former editor of UKTUBAR newspaper who was killed during January events. Before her arrest she was transferred from her job to work in the archives of the Ministry of Finance. This is in addition to four other suspects.

The minister of interior said that he cannot divulge information regarding this case before the trial which he expects to begin shortly. He confirmed that the charge is espionage and jeopardizing the interests of the country. Regarding the actual number of suspects, he said that he "cannot define the number, but it is believed that there are two networks involved in the matter."

With regard to the sentences that would be passed in such cases, the minister of interior said they range between 6 months and 15 years imprisonment at hard labor.

It is worth noting that pilot 'Aydarus and flight engineer Dhiban, who work in civil aviation, were among the elements that refused to obey the orders of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's group during the January 1986 events. Their arrest was a surprise to the social and professional

circles that know them. The Yemeni Council for Creative Skills in the PDRY has asked for the authorities' permission to see the detainees and examine the charges against them. AL-MAJALLAH has learned that a number of council members visit them regularly and inspect their condition after they have been transferred to the central prison in Aden.

On the other hand, Fatimah Muhammadi is the only woman detained on charges of a political and security nature and involved in the aftermath of the January 1986 events. Rumors circulating in Aden said that the security authorities did not allow the appointment of lawyers to defend the new detainees nor allowed their families to visit them. But AL-MAJALLAH has learned that those rumors are false and that a group of lawyers

will defend the new detainees. Some of these lawyers have defended a number of defendants during the initial trials that took place in Aden in December 1986.

Well-informed Yemeni sources told AL-MAJALLAH that some of the accused admitted the charges against them, namely espionage, but discussion of the case is still banned because it has not yet been brought before the court.

The source said that the new detainees are being treated well and are being visited by their families and members of the Yemeni Council of Creative Skills and that the court will look into their case at the first opportunity possible.

INDIA

Selection, Induction of New Chief Ministers Reported

Chautala in Haryana

*46001126 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 3 Dec 89 p 1*

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 2 (PTI)—Mr Om Prakash Chautala, eldest son of the deputy Prime Minister, Mr Devi Lal, was today sworn in as the ninth chief minister of Haryana.

The oath of office and secrecy was administered to him by the Haryana governor, Mr H. A. Berari, at a simple function here. Mr Chautala was a member of the Rajya Sabha and leader of the Janata Dal in Haryana. The governor had specially flown in here for the swearing-in ceremony and also to accept the resignation of Mr Devi Lal as chief minister.

Fifty-four-year-old Mr Chautala, who was wearing a green turban, took the oath in Hindi. Several prominent leaders, including the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] leader, Mr A. B. Vajpayee, were present.

Earlier, Mr Chautala was elected leader of the Haryana legislature party unanimously.

Mr Chautala's name was proposed by Mr Kishan Singh Sanghwal and it was unanimously accepted.

Slogans of "Om Prakash zindabad" and "Devi Lal zindabad" rent the air soon after his election.

Immediately after being elected leader of the Haryana legislature party, Mr Chautala drove to the Prime Minister's office to call on Mr V. P. Singh.

Chandigarh Mr Chautala was born on January 7, 1935, at Chautala.

A dynamic leader in his own right, Mr Chautala entered active politics in 1952. He participated in the struggle for the cause of teachers and farmers and went to jail on several occasions.

He was also detained during the emergency. Mr Chautala actively participated in the Arya Samaj activities under the guidance of Swami Keshwanand.

Mr Chautala was elected to the Haryana vidhan sabha in 197? [year illegible] and to the Rajya Sabha in 1987 after he led the then Lok Dal-BJP alliance to a massive victory in the June assembly elections in Haryana.

He remained the general secretary of the Janata Party and convener of the Lok Dal between 1970 and 1980 and became president of the Haryana Lok Dal, since christened as Janata Dal, succeeding Mr Devi Lal after the latter became chief minister on June 20, 1987.

Joshi in Rajasthan

*46001126 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 5 Dec 89 p 1*

[Text] Jaipur, Dec 4 (PTI)—Mr Harideo Joshi was today sworn in as the chief minister of Rajasthan.

The state governor, Mr Sukhdev Prasad, also administered the oath of office and secrecy to six cabinet and five state ministers at a simple ceremony held at the Raj Bhavan.

Mrs Kamala, Mr Ramdev Singh, Mr Gulab Singh Shak-twat, Mr Ram Singh Vishnoi, Mr Narpat Ram Barbad and Mr Damodar Dasacharya have been inducted as cabinet ministers and Mrs Zakia Inam, Mr Mahendra K. Parmar, Mr Mool Chand, Mr K. C. Vishnoi and Mr Sohan Singh have been made ministers of state.

Mr Joshi was elected the new leader of the Congress legislative party yesterday, following the resignation of the chief minister, Mr Shiv Charan Mathur, taking responsibility for the party's rout in the Lok Sabha elections.

The swearing-in ceremony, scheduled to be held last evening, was cancelled at the last moment when it was found that the notification accepting Mr Joshi's resignation as the Assam governor was yet to be issued.

The ceremony re-scheduled for today, was again delayed today apparently due to uncertainty created by a writ petition filed in the high court by a Janata Dal M.L.A. Mr Yadunath Singh challenging the governor's invitation to Mr Joshi to form the new government.

The petition was, however, dismissed by the court in the post lunch period and the ceremony was finally held at 5.15 p.m.

Two new faces—Mr K. C. Vishnoi and Mr Sohan Singh, have been included in the ministry as ministers of state.

Mr Acharya, who was a minister of state in the Mathur ministry, has been elevated to the cabinet rank.

Mishra in Bihar

*46001126 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 7 Dec 89 p 20*

[Text] Patna, December 6 (UNI & PTI)—The Bihar pradesh Congress president, Mr Jagannath Mishra, was today sworn in as chief minister of Bihar succeeding Mr S. N. Sinha.

The governor, Mr Jagannath Pahadia, administered the oath of office and secrecy to Dr Mishra. Twenty cabinet ministers and 19 ministers of state were also sworn in.

The cabinet ministers sworn in are: Messers Lahtan Choudhury, Ram Lakan Singh Yadav, Md. Hussain Azad, Ram Jaipal Singh Yadav, Ramashray Prasad Singh, Ram Sharan Prasad Singh, H. H. Rehman,

Ramanand Yadav, Mrs Sumitra Devi, Mrs Sushila Kar-ketta, Mrs Uma Pandey, Braj Kishore Singh, Indranath Bhagat, Thakur Muneshwarnath Singh, Bilat Paswan Bihangam, Devendra Nath Champia, Rajjaque Ansari, Dilkeshwar Ram and Vijay Shankar Dubey.

The name of Mr Shiv Chandra Jha, former speaker, was also announced for taking oath, but he was absent.

The AICC [All India Congress Committee] observers, Mr Bhajan Lal and Mr Darbara Singh, thanked the legislators for maintaining unity and agreeing to the leadership's choice.

Chenna Reddi in Andhra Pradesh

*46001126 Madras THE HINDU
in English 4 Dec 89 p 1*

[Text] Hyderabad, Dec. 3—The new Congress(I) Ministry in Andhra Pradesh, headed by Dr. Marri Chenna Reddi, and consisting of 18 Ministers, assumed office today at an impressive function on the Nizam College grounds where a vast gathering braved the midday heat to witness it.

Dr. Chenna Reddi said a new chapter was being written, because the Congress(I) returned to power after seven years of Telugu Desam rule. He took a pledge to work for the uplift of the weaker sections of society, to continue the Rs. 2 a kg rice scheme (for which he got the biggest round of applause), not to be vindictive against any individual (a reference to Mr. N. T. Rama Rao), not to indulge in criticism against the Government of India "day in and day out," and to complete the Telugu Ganga project, "though it has a fancy name in the tradition of cinema dialogue."

The former President, Mr. Neelam Sanjiva Reddi, attended the function as a special invitee while a former Chief Minister, Mr. Bezawada Gopala Reddi, was also present.

The purpose of holding the swearing in ceremony before a vast crowd was lost, because about 100 Congress(I) leaders and dozens of photographers virtually blocked the view. The people became restive and waved to those on the dais to move away, but they mistook it for greetings and waved back.

NTR's Message

On behalf of the Telugu Desam Party, Mr. N. T. Rama Rao sent a message of greetings to the new Chief Minister while the General Secretary of the party, Mr. P. Ashok Gajapathi Raju, attended the function and presented a bouquet. Dr. Chenna Reddi appreciated the gesture and thanked the Telugu Desam.

A group of about 50 people, who came in cars and jeeps from Vijayawada, shouted "Dr. Chenna Reddi down, down," protesting against the exclusion of Ms Van-gaveeti Ratnakumari, the Vijayawada MLA [Member of Legislative Assembly] and the widow of V. M. Ranga

Rao, from the Cabinet. Dr. Chenna Reddi said later that he had to opt for a small cabinet, that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi had asked him to limit the number to 13, and that he would expand the Ministry after the budget session.

Dr. Chenna Reddi's cabinet has no representatives from 11 districts while some districts have two members in it. The portfolios are to be announced tomorrow, after Dr. Reddi first informs the Ministers at a Cabinet meeting scheduled for 5 p.m. tomorrow.

Dr. Chenna Reddi has started off well, by announcing that he would not indulge in mass transfer of officials. He said he would not be vindictive against officers as well, because they only carried out instructions given by the previous Government, but would take action against certain officers who "mixed their political views with official instructions and indulged in excesses." He sought the cooperation of the NGO [Nongovernmental Organization]s, and for the youth, he announced a new self-employment programme.

He said he would concentrate on developing the slums, which have had no facilities like drainage or drinking water or street lights, and would give pattas to those who have put up huts on Government land. He said he would give priority to the irrigation and power sectors.

Holiday for Schools

As Dr. Chenna Reddi was speaking, some people showed their helmets, demanding that the rule of compulsory wearing of helmets be withdrawn, but Dr. Reddi declined to make an announcement without studying the issue. He said the rule was intended to protect the wearer. As he completed his speech and the National Anthem started someone prompted Dr. Chenna Reddi to announce a holiday for schools in twin cities tomorrow. The National Anthem was interrupted as the new Chief Minister announced the holiday.

The Cabinet

The following is the list of the Council of Ministers sworn in on Sunday:

Chief Minister: Dr. M. Chenna Reddi.

Ministers of Cabinet rank: Mr. R. Chenga Reddy (Chittoor district), Mr. J. C. Diwakar Reddy (Anantapur), Mr. V. Hanumantha Rao (Hyderabad), Mr. N. Janardhan Reddy (Nellore), Mr. Mudragada Padmanabham (East Godavari), Mr. Koneru Ranga Rao (Krishna), Mr. Maganti Ravindranath Chowdary (West Godavari), Mr. K. Rosaiah (Prakasam), Mr. D. K. Samara Simha Reddy (Mahabubnagar), Mr. N. Sreenivasul Reddy (Nellore), Mr. G. V. Sudhakara Rao (Adilabad), Mr. Singitam Venkata Reddy (East Godavari).

Ministers of State: Mr. J. Chittaranjan Das (who defeated Mr. N. T. Rama Rao at Kalwakurthy in Mahabubnagar District), Mrs. Geeta Reddy (Medak), Mr. Katari Eswar Kumar (Krishna), Mr. Mohd. Jani

(Guntur), Mrs. Samatakanani (Anantapur), Mr. Mukkapatni Venkateswara Rao (Krishna).

Mulayam Singh in Uttar Pradesh

46001126 Madras THE HINDU
in English 4 Dec 89 p 1

[Text] Lucknow, Dec. 3—At the end of five days of uncertainty and intensive lobbying, both in New Delhi and Lucknow, the State Janata Dal chief, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav, was today declared elected leader of the Legislature Party by the three-member team of Central observers, who sought the individual preference of the elected members. The other candidate, Mr. Ajit Singh, senior general secretary of the Janata Dal, who had thrown in his hat in the ring, lost apparently with the Jan Morcha members owing allegiance to Mr. V. P. Singh supporting Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav.

Lucknow thus witnessed intense political activity, with two erstwhile factions of the Lok Dal led by supporters of Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mr. Ajit Singh vying for the coveted office of the Chief Minister of U.P. [Uttar Pradesh]

The supporters of Mr. Ajit Singh were hamstrung by the defeat of two of their strong contenders, Mr. Rajendra Singh, chief of the State Parliamentary Board, and Mr. Satya Pal Singh Yadav, former Leader of the Opposition in the Assembly, who lost in the recent Assembly elections. Only too keen not to lose the political supremacy to their arch-rival, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav, they pressured Mr. Ajit Singh to stake his claim. Mr. Ajit Singh's mother and widow of former Prime Minister Charan Singh, Mrs. Gayetra Devi, also camped for the past two days in Lucknow to mobilise support for him.

The contention of Mr. Ajit Singh's group was that a Lok Dal(B) man has become Haryana Chief Minister and another Deputy Prime Minister. Therefore, the U.P. Chief Minister's office should go to the former Lok Dal(A) leader. The other side made a counter-claim that a Jat has become the Chief Minister of Haryana, so it is the turn of a Yadava in U.P. Members belonging to the erstwhile Janata Party, Jan Morcha and supporters of Mrs. Menaka Gandhi had little role in this unseemly political tussle in the open, so soon after securing a popular mandate.

The central leadership of the party having apparently failed to make a breakthrough in this vexed issue, decided to leave it to the elected members of the party in U.P. The Political Affairs Committee of the Janata Dal decided to despatch a three-member observer team to Lucknow. The three members were Prof. Madhu Dandavate, Mr. Chiman Bhai Patel and Mohamad Mufti Sayed. The tension touched a feverish pitch today with thousands of followers of the two sides descending in Lucknow.

When the members began arriving at the jam-packed Tilak Hall inside the Secretariat, many apprehended that

violence may break out what with shouting of slogans in the corridor. Thousands had taken positions outside the Secretariat awaiting the outcome of the contest, in a surcharged atmosphere. Police stood guard outside, in strength.

Secret Ballot

Prof. Dandavate told the elected members of the Janata Dal to write their preference for either of the two candidates. After this process was over, counting was taken up and Mr. Dandavate declared that majority preference was in favour of Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav.

At this stage, Mr. Sharda Prasad Rawat moved a resolution proposing the name of Mr. Mulayam Singh, which was promptly seconded by Mr. Reoti Raman Singh. There was no other proposal and this was carried unanimously.

After Mr. Mulayam Singh's election, Mr. Ajit Singh expressed his unqualified support to the new leader who thanked the members for their support.

Mr. Mulayam Singh later called on the Governor, Md. Usman Arif, to press his claim, accompanied by the Central observers. Mr. Singh could not tell immediately when the new ministry will be sworn in.

Probe Into Poll Excesses

Talking to presspersons later in the Secretariat press room, Mr. Yadav announced that all excesses and cases of poll violence would be inquired into. In his characteristic way he also warned that incompetent and corrupt officials in the State would be compulsorily retired.

Further Reportage, Comment on Election Outcome

Losing Ministers Named

46001130 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 2 Dec 89 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 1 (PTI)—Nineteen of the 44 Union ministers who contested the Lok Sabha elections had to bite the dust.

Among the losers, the minister of state for education, Mr L. P. Shahi, had the dubious distinction of being beaten by the highest margin of two and a half lakh votes.

Except Mrs Sumati Oraon all the other four central ministers from Bihar in the fray fell. They were Mr L. P. Shahi (Muzaffarpur), Mrs Krishna Sahi (Begusarai), Mr D. L. Baitha (Arrah) and Mr K. K. Tewary (Buxar).

The other 16 losers included seven from Uttar Pradesh. The ministers who lost in the state were Mrs Mohsina Kidwai (Meerut), Mr Z. R. Ansari (Unnao), Mr H. K. Shastri (Fatehpur), Mr K. Natwar Singh (Mathura), Mrs Sheila Dikshit (Kannauj) and Mr S. L. Yadav (Varanasi).

The result of the Pratapgarh seat, where Mr Dinesh Singh is contesting has been withheld due to tampering of 15 ballot boxes.

The remaining unsuccessful ministers were Mr Buta Singh (Jalore), Mr R. N. Mirdha (Nagaur), Mr Jagdish Tytler (Delhi Sadar), Mr B. K. Gadhvi (Banaskantha), Mr Rajesh Pilot (Bharatpur), Mr Sukh Ram (Mandi), Mr P. R. Dasmunshi (Howrah), Mr P. Namgyal (Ladakh) and Mr R. K. Malaviya (Shahjapur).

The winning members of the cabinet included the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, who beat Mr Rajmohan Gandhi from Amethi by 2.1 lakh votes.

Nine others won from the southern states, most of them by comfortable margins.

The successful ministers from the south were Mr J. Vengal Rao (Khammam), Mr B. Shankaranand (Chikkodi), Mr P. Chidambaram (Sivaganga), Mr C. K. Jaffer Sharief (Bangalore north), Mr Janardhan Poojary (Mangalore), Mr K. R. Narayanan (Ottapalam), Mr Arunachalam (Tenkasi), Mr R. Prabhu (Nilgiris), Mr S. Krishna Kumar (Quilon).

Mr Chidambaram earned the distinction of winning by the highest margin among all the ministers, when he won by nearly 2.2 lakh votes.

The other ministers who made it to the Lok Sabha were Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao (Ramtek), Mr Vasant Sathe (Wardha), Mr Bhajan Lal (Faridabad), Mr Brahm Dutt (Tehri Garhwal), Mr Shivraj Patil (Latur), Mr Madhav Rao Scindia (Gwalior), Mr Giridhar Gomango (Koraput), Mr Ajit Panja (Calcutta north-east), Mr Santosh Mohan Dev (Tripura West), Mr Kalpnath Rai (Ghosi), Mr Mahabir Prasad (Bangsgaon) and Mrs Sumati Oraon (Lohrdaga).

Among the winners Mrs Rajendra Kumari Bajpai won by the lowest margin of 9,000 votes.

Foreign Policy Predicted

*46001130 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 4 Dec 89 p 9*

[Article by Dilip Mukerjee: "No Major Changes Likely in Foreign Policy"]

[Text] New Delhi—In defining his foreign policy, the new Prime Minister had said that improvement of relations with China will have top priority "in my foreign policy agenda." In this, as well as in many other aspects of external relations, the prospect is for continuity rather than change. However, nuances will, no doubt, be different.

In his speech yesterday while accepting the leadership of the National Front, Mr V. P. Singh promised to undo the deterioration that has occurred in relations with neighbours and ensure the effective functioning of SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation].

Taken together with the criticism he has voiced about Mr Gandhi's handling of the dispute with Nepal and the Sri Lanka issue—in a speech at Ahmedabad on October 5—it may seem the incoming government wants to handle regional problems differently.

Whether it will be able to do so remains to be seen. It will be recalled that the Janata government came to office in 1977 with a ringing declaration that it would make fundamental changes in India's relationship with superpowers by going back to genuine non-alignment. But nothing really changed because the compulsions of national interest ruled out a shift.

In any comparison with the Janata regime, two points need to be kept in mind. One is that Mr V. P. Singh does not have strong personal predilections because of which the Janata Prime Minister, Mr Morarji Desai, came close to the reversing India's long-held stand on nuclear non-proliferation. Nor is V.P. likely to make unilateral decisions on his own, as Mr Desai did in agreeing to a separate trade and transit treaty with Nepal even without the courtesy of consulting his foreign minister. Such temperamental aberrations are unlikely because of Mr V. P. Singh's firm preference for adhering to the national consensus.

This came out clearly last August when Mr George Fernandes organised an international convention on Tibet with the support of West Germany's Greens party. On this occasion, the Janata Dal leader had thundered "Tibet has to be liberated from the iron grip of China" and Tibet's independence and neutrality were vital for India's security. Among those who lent implicit support to the convention by their presence were the former president Giani Zail Singh, and the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] president, Mr L. K. Advani. Mr V. P. Singh lost no time, however, in declaring that he regretted the holding of the convention in India. The Janata Dal as a party would have nothing to do with it. "We consider Tibet a region of China," he said, making an unambiguous statement of his position.

Mr V. P. Singh acknowledges that serious problems of a historical nature create difficulties with neighbours. "But I feel the moment we improve our relations with them, our clout will increase everywhere else. I feel they can be persuaded to recognise that together we can all become much stronger."

While this is a refreshing formulation of India's foreign policy goals, the same sentiments have been voiced by predecessor governments over the years.

If one looks, however, for the specific of a new approach in the carefully drafted National Front manifesto it is difficult to find any.

In relation to Sri Lanka, it promises to secure the safety and security of the Tamils and promote lasting peace and amity among all sections of the population. "The pledge is also made to restore friendly relations with Colombo

by withdrawing the Indian peace-keeping force," something which is already well under way.

Nepal has been promised negotiations on all issues of contention to find an amicable solution, "and help is offered to strengthen the economy of Nepal and honour (its) self-respect." As for Pakistan, the manifesto asks for mutual withdrawal of visa restrictions and promotion of bilateral commerce and trade. Both of these ideas are in line with current Indian policy. As one can see, there is little in any of this to suggest any significant departures.

It should also be noted that, even on Sri Lanka, Mr V. P. Singh and Mr M. Karunanidhi, the National Front leaders that matter in this context, made it clear to the outgoing government through private channels that they were in agreement with its refusal to defer to the Sri Lankan president's demand for a precipitate withdrawal of the IPKF [Indian Peacekeeping Force]. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Sri Lankan leadership is not expecting any shift in Indian policies.

Mr Singh's stand on defence spending is that "we should have no illusions that we can slash it down." "While wastage and bribery can be eliminated, we cannot allow our borders to remain undefended." As he puts it, "much of our budget is not made in Delhi, it is in response to the budgets of others. Our foreign policy will be geared towards making friends with those whose high expenditures forces us to spend more money on defence."

This again is a restatement of long-held Indian policies, as is his warning that "we will have no choice but to go nuclear" if Pakistan does so. He acknowledges rather more explicitly than his predecessors in office that going nuclear will impose a very heavy burden on the economy not just in making bombs but also in setting up delivery systems and elaborate safeguards.

His stance would suggest proposing further confidence-building measures, like the ban on any attack on each other's nuclear facilities agreed upon with Pakistan last December. This will be another instance of continuity.

On relations with the superpowers, he has said "Russia is our friend." "This relationship has never come in the way of the country's relations with the West." As for the U.S., he notes a commonality of interest and that it is our largest trade partner. "This leads to the promise to strive to further strengthen the traditional friendship with the Soviet Union while making all efforts to improve friendly relations with the U.S., and other western countries." In this case, even the phraseology remains unchanged from what it has been during the last five years.

Mr V. P. Singh should get credit, however, for the emphasis he places on economic diplomacy. Foreign policy is no longer just a question of showing your military muscle. Economic power is much more important. "We will give a more important role to the trade component of foreign policy." Similar sentiments have been expressed before but not as forcefully.

'Transformational' Politics

46001130 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 4 Dec 89 p 7

[Article by Ajay Kumar: "End of Transformational Politics Starts"]

[Text] New Delhi, Dec. 3—Exactly 32 months after he took the precipitate step of ordering an inquiry into the HDW [Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft] deal, Mr V. P. Singh has replaced the man the order had upset—Mr Rajiv Gandhi. This is a feat to be proud of. But a quick assessment of his report card will show that his problems have only just begun.

First the pluses for Mr Singh. By staying the course, Mr Singh has removed the severe stigma: of being a quitter, a label he acquired after resigning from U.P.[Uttar Pradesh]'s chief ministership after failing to combat the menace of dacoity within the time stipulated by him. That episode had also labelled him as a sentimental softy since he quit after his brother was shot dead by dacoits. Even his family members used to say: "How can you stay with this man when you don't know when he will pick up his paint and brush and go off to the mountains?"

In forging the Janata Dal, keeping it united and presiding over a by and large successful seat adjustment, he has shown that he is not only a visionary but has also the political acumen to be a tactician, like his political mentor, Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri. By his own admission, Mr Singh realised that the people had two expectations from him: That he should emerge as the focus of all anti-Rajiv Gandhi forces and that he should ensure that these same forces should offer a united contest to the Congress.

The first he realised by identifying from the start. Corruption, with Bofors as the symbol, was the one issue that would not only unite the opposition but also crystallise the country's disillusionment with Mr Gandhi, particularly because the perception had spread among the people that Mr Gandhi was involved in the Bofors issue. Whenever the Bofors issue tended to fade from the centre-stage, he yanked it back, one way or another.

In this, he took full advantage of his own incorruptibility. Though conscious of the black sheep with him, he was confident that his own record was so clean that Mr Gandhi would suffer in comparison with him as the main challenger. Notwithstanding all this, he also took every opportunity to reiterate that removing corruption cannot be the most important objective in politics, so that he did not become identified as a one-issue man.

For the second, he took advantage of political realities on the ground to turn a necessity into a virtue. Once it was clear by autumn 1987 that Congressmen would not join him in droves, he realised that his only place was with the opposition. Even at that time it was clear to him that a one-to-one contest had to be ensured. Seat adjustments with the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and the left

parties, he realised, was never going to be a problem with their mutually exclusive influence zones.

But the BJP and the left could only be the flanks. To hold the centre he had to build a party which would unite the two warring Lok Dals, the Mr Ram Dhan-headed Jan Morcha and the remnants of the Janata Party—and all this under this leadership. He did this during 1988, even fighting an unwanted election at Allahabad after it was clear that Mr Amitabh Bachchan would not be the Congress candidate. In the process of creating the Janata Dal he did not hesitate to disappoint those personally loyal to him so as to satisfy the hunger for posts of other factions.

These tactical compromises culminated in the seat distribution, where his own nominees got so few seats that Ms Maneka Gandhi said only half in jest. V. P. Singh and I are the only two who draw crowds all over and while I have not been able to get a seat for a single follower, Mr V. P. Singh has got seats for only two of his. When elections were announced, the mood in Mr Gandhi's camp was euphoric and 300-350 seats were being talked about, but soon the Congress knew it was fighting with its back to the wall as the reality of one-to-one contests electrified the electorate in the north.

In September-October, as events related to the Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid issue moved towards their first climax (the November 9 Shilanyas), Mr Singh took the opportunity to assure the Muslims that he was with them. This was followed soon after by a meeting at the residence of Mufti Mohammed Syed where the Janata Dal's commitment to combating communalism was reiterated. It made a sharp contrast with the Congress as Mr Buta Singh had worked out a deal with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) in Lucknow just a few days earlier.

But Mr Singh's brinkmanship was not without perils or pitfalls. Not only did this upset the BJP but the pragmatists among the Janata Dal, who did not want the BJP upset, exacted their price at the ticket distribution stage, harassing those identified with the meeting at the Mufti's house.

Then came the campaign, with Mr Singh confining himself to U.P. and Bihar on the ground that one should go for the jugular. However, the fact remains that he could scarcely do anything else with the limited time and means at his disposal, and with the Indian Airlines in a mess. Besides, Mr Singh's calculations did not suggest that he would need to go to other areas. While he would bring home the bulky seats in those two states, he expected the National Front to pick up 50-odd seats in the south. Adding the same number from M.P., Orissa, Rajasthan and Gujarat (actually they got 45) and 50-plus from the left, he thought the BJP's support would perhaps not be needed to form a government.

Where did the calculations go wrong? To start with, the Janata Dal's organisational weakness in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra cost it dear. Once Mr Sharad Joshi's Shetkari Sangathan moved away from the Janata Dal—mainly because Mr Joshi felt he could do

business with Mr Sharad Pawar—the Janata Dal was powerless to supersede the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance.

In Madhya Pradesh, its strength justified that it should contest only eight seats, leaving 32 for the BJP, thus leaving the BJP the main beneficiary of the anti-Congress vote. That, plus the opposition sweep in Gujarat and Rajasthan, swelled the BJP total to 86, some 15 more than Mr Singh would have liked. Moreover, the south front collapsed leaving it 50-odd seats short of its calculations.

How to tackle the BJP is the biggest dilemma Mr Singh faces. He realises that majority communalism is the greatest threat to the country and that the BJP is its leading exponent which, having cashed in on the Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid issue, will want to continue along the same path. He realises also that thanks to the ineptness of the Congress, the Muslim vote had swung away from it.

One last issue remains. Was Mr Singh genuine when he told reporters, first privately and then later on record, that he was not interested in becoming the prime minister?

Mr Singh himself and many close to him maintain that he meant every word he said—except to one proviso that he would not refuse if the choice was unanimous. He was, he told this correspondent, not interested in transactional politics. He was going to devote his life to transformational politics. He had identified his priorities—development but with equity, secularism, electoral reforms—and he would like to be a pressure point outside the government. (Read, he wanted to be head of the party, a proposal he reiterated even on Friday.)

To the end, insiders say, he continued to be flexible. There was a strong case for holding elections for the leader's post. (How else are you different from the Congress?) But there was a similarly strong case for not holding them (the cleavage in the party would be out in the open and, besides, didn't the people make it clear who they wanted as the Prime Minister?). Mr Singh was game for elections but not by secret ballot—by an open show of hands. With big money allegedly working against him, an open display of alignments would at least bring things out in the open. Eventually, of course, it was Mr Biju Patnaik who found the correct strategy.

Mr Singh's greatest asset is the ease with which he relates to people. Seeing him campaign in his home territory—around Allahabad and Fatehpur—munching chana and eating bananas to keep going, it would come as a great surprise if this man loses his touch with the people.

Policy Toward U.S.

46001130 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 27 Nov 89 p 12

[Editorial: "Sans Uncle Sam"]

[Text] In a marked departure from past form, the U.S. and its agencies have already figured in the ninth general

election. Mr Subramaniam Swamy only undermined whatever residual credibility he had left when he vainly sought to link Mr V. P. Singh with the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. With the predictable exception of the CPM [Marxist Communist Party], all major parties have stressed that it is as important for India to maintain good relations with the U.S. as with the Soviet Union. This underlines the change that has taken place in the public mood since the last poll in 1984 when Mr Rajiv Gandhi held forth in his campaign speeches about an alleged CIA game plan for India on the basis of post-Indira political scenarios presented by an American academic in a two-year-old book. Once elected, Mr Gandhi lost no time in resuming the tentative effort begun by his mother in 1982 for a rapprochement with Washington. Encouraging results have persuaded both governments to highlight shared interests rather than persisting differences. New Delhi has been able to do this because a maturer public opinion now recognises that India can best safeguard its national interests when these have American acquiescence, not just of the other Super-power. This would be evident from the sympathetic appreciation by both Washington and Moscow of the compulsions underlying India's current role in Sri Lanka and the part it recently played in the Maldives.

Like the change in the tenor of the Indo-U.S. dialogue, option-makers on each side are beginning to see what underlies the other's stance on issues in contention—as for instance the Indian missile programme or U.S. concerns regarding intellectual property rights. This is helping to make the discourse less abrasive and more reasoned, as Secretary of State James Baker implied in a speech marking the nomination of a new U.S. ambassador to India. Mr Baker is quite right in elevating trade to the top of the bilateral agenda. Disenchanted with the autarkic pattern of development, India is now giving foreign trade a much larger role in the national economy. Since the U.S., the world's largest national market, is also India's best customer, disagreements over trade issues should indeed receive priority attention. It is likely that some problems cannot be resolved but it should be possible to agree to disagree instead of letting frictions impede co-operation in other spheres. In time, both sides will learn to live with the fact that a sound relationship can be built between two countries with very different international perspectives on the basis of the common ground that they can still find. Friendships in a multipolar world cannot be sustained otherwise.

Report on BJP Activities Among Bihar Tribals

90OI0072A New Delhi NAVBHARAT TIMES
in Hindi 26 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Ashok Kumar: "BJP's Vananchal Movement in South Bihar"]

[Text] As elections drew nearer, the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] tried to intensify its Vananchal movement in South Bihar. The object of this movement, which was launched last October, is to strengthen its weak position

in South Bihar and to stake claim to the maximum number of seats in the election. Overtly, the object of this movement is described to be the same as that which the Jharkhand leaders have so far been ascribing to the Jharkhand movement—economic development of the local people and an end to their exploitation. But covertly, both movements are demanding separate states on account of their political ambitions for control of power. There is no doubt that factors such as the violent turn in the Jharkhand movement, cooperation among the missionaries, and a weak situation in the coming election shook the state BJP leadership, and only last year, after a long discussion in the national working committee, they obtained permission to start a peaceful and non-violent movement in the name of a separate state named "Vananchal." Since the days of Jan Sangh, the BJP has enjoyed good influence among the tribals and the non-tribals of Chhota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana. Since the 1952 elections, the former Jan Sangh has been putting up its own candidate in every constituency. Usually 10 out of the BJP's 14 members in the Bihar assembly have been returned from Chhota Nagpur and Santhal pargana. Two among them are tribals. Inder Singh Namdhari, the BJP's state chairman, is also from Chhota Nagpur.

There is a difference between the separate state of Jharkhand agitators and BJP's Vananchal Pradesh. Whereas in Kharkhand state, it is the interests of the tribals that are mainly espoused, in the context of Vananchal Pradesh, the interests of all of Chhota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana's communities and castes are kept in view. Here it will be relevant to point out that only 30.5 percent of the total population of this area is tribal. The remaining nearly 70 percent of the population is non-tribal.

While the leaders of the Jharkhand movement demand a Jharkhand state, created out of the 21 tribal districts from Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh, BJP is demanding the creation of a small Vananchal Pradesh carved only out of South Bihar's Santhal Pargana and Chhota Nagpur. The BJP's contention is that even if a separate state of Jharkhand is formed, instead of being a small, self-sufficient unit, it will be another big state, with all of the drawbacks of a big state. Moreover, from the point of view of geography and natural resources, this region is different from the other parts of Bihar. This region of South Bihar is a plateau, with lots of forests, whereas the rest of Bihar is a plain. It contains Ajay, Damodar, and Swaranrekha hills whereas the remaining Bihar is a level plain area. Here, the means of livelihood consist of minerals, forests, and agriculture based on the cultivation of uneven and stony land. Therefore for the development of this region, plans will have to be made and implemented in a completely different manner. This region's way of life and cultural base is also different from the rest of Bihar. Ever since the British days, the laws relating to land and revenues have remained different. In the Chaibasa region of Kolhan, instead of village councils, the Mundamanaki

tradition has been going on for years. During his tour of this region last year, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi also praised this system. Therefore, it is the contention of the BJP leaders that, considering all these factors, a separate Vananchal Pradesh has to be created for the sake of all-round development and good administration of this region. They also maintain that an examination of the newly organized states shows that in the fields of administration and development, the big states are significantly backward.

There is a widespread feeling among the residents of Chhota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana that the natural resources of this region are being exploited and that the aborigines here are getting nowhere. On the contrary, they are being exploited. One fifth of all the capital investment of the Central government's public industries is right here, but despite this there has been no improvement in the local people's life. Thousands of villages have been uprooted to make room for various river valley schemes and installations, and the forests have been ravaged. Out of 1.2 million aborigines, with the exception of a few families, none has been awarded compensation. The people uprooted from their lands are going from pillar to post. The villagers do not enjoy the any facilities such as irrigation, electricity, and cottage industries. Because of the scarcity of jobs here, the natives are moving to other states for means of livelihood. The leaders of the Vananchal movement are raising these very issues. The BJP workers have sought to rouse public opinion for Vananchal Pradesh, through the medium of Vananchal carriages. On the other hand, leaders of the Jharkhand movement have characterized BJP's movement as a movement spreading communal tension. According to these leaders, its ill effects will be felt in the near future. They also charge that BJP, by severing the traditionally good ties between tribals and non-tribals through this movement, is trying to achieve its evil political objectives. The BJP's movement has also been described as a conspiracy to undermine the Jharkhand movement.

Meanwhile, keeping in view the coming elections, the object of the BJP's Vananchal movement is to recover its lost political ground in South Bihar, so that it may give a good account of itself in the elections. As a matter of fact, the leaders of the Vananchal movement concede that compared to the Jharkhand movement, the Vananchal movement is weak. According to them, the reason for this is that they have been running this movement for a year, whereas the Jharkhand movement has been going on for nearly the last 4 decades. Moreover, they use much care and keep away from the violent and undesirable elements whereas the same is not true of the Jharkhand movement.

Commentary Laments Decline in Democratic Traditions

*90O10038A Calcutta RAVIVAR
in Hindi 8-14 Oct 89 pp 8-9*

[Article by Upendra Vajpeyi: "Bloody Democracy"]

[Text] At present, so much rivalry is going on to strengthen democracy that the poor fellow has started

moaning. Helplessly it is wondering how it can get rid of its protectors. The situation is that both the possibilities are being predicted. If it survives the present onslaught, it may regain its past glory. On the other hand, it is also possible that it may succumb to the onslaught and commence its last journey on the shoulders of its caretakers. When hardly 2 and ½ months are remaining in the last battle for democracy no commander has any time to be involved in inept theoretical discussions. From time immemorial, the greatest principle of a war has been to win it. Therefore, whatever technique is applied in order to encourage one's own army and demoralize the opposing army is all fair. For this purpose all four principles of pacification, bribery, punishment, and sowing dissension may be employed. Even if it becomes necessary to try physical force, one should not hesitate to do so.

At one time it was thought that in running a democratic government the council of representatives elected by the people played a prominent part. There, decisions are made with mutual consultations and discussions. Be it a parliament or a legislative assembly, by virtue of its manners it continues to prove how much of democracy is practiced in the country. The history of the different representative councils in the world tells us that they can be the best means of reflecting the hopes, aspirations, and determinations of the people. However, if they get derailed from their idealism, they can also become the worst instrument of oppressing the people in the name of the people. It depends mostly on how much lively interrelationship exists between the electors and the elected. Possibly the council of representatives that was elected by the people to be their messenger, patron, and their leader might have fallen into the clutches of some groups of plunderers.

A few days ago some events took place which should alert every lover of democracy. If not alerted, some hair-raising situation might arise. Abuses and scuffles took place in the state assembly of Gujarat, the birth place of Mahatma Gandhi, the doyen of truth and non-violence. The people who had taken an oath to eliminate the suffering of the masses tore the clothes off each other. They took aim at each other with paper weights that were supposed to keep loose papers from flying. Luckily, those were new types of paper weights that were not very heavy. For 2 days, the assembly speaker repeatedly tried to pacify the members and adjourn the assembly so that the members could have some time to calm down. On the third day, both sides expressed their regret and the matter was taken to be closed.

The question is not who hit who or who tore whose clothes. An account of the incident has already been published in the newspapers. It is only an indication of the fact that the confidence of winning over others by means of negotiations has been lost. Several other examples of this have been found elsewhere. Both the houses of the parliament, themselves, are witness to this fact. Why should Gujarat alone stand apart from the mainstream in the name of Gandhi? It is not proper to think

that Gandhi belonged to Gujarat alone. It had been necessary for the people of Gujarat to remove this kind of illusion from the minds of the outsiders, for which they actually did make a few attempts on some occasions in their own way.

As far as the deeds of other assemblies are concerned, the pandemonium that took place in the Tamilnadu assembly had not been far off, during which the hands of chief minister Karunanidhi's sympathizers had reached even the hairs and clothing of Jayalalitha. The chief minister himself, along with some of his associates, had become a victim of the wrath of the opposition's muscle men.

In the country's glorious history, the state of Bihar has never fallen behind any one. It provided an opportunity for Gandhi to experiment with his passive resistance (Satyagrah) in Champaran. It offered the first president (Rajendra Prasad) to the country. It inspired the Loknayak Jayprakash Narain to embark upon his total revolution from here. One of the most important tenets of this revolution was to make the legislative assemblies realize their responsibilities. Under this tenet, the legislators were coerced and their resignations were demanded because instead of making legislations with wisdom and good sense they had become victims of governmental obstinacy. Their primary duty was to put their thumb impression on the government's ordinances. We did not think it necessary to learn any lesson from the subsequent train of events, otherwise, the humiliations that were met both inside and outside of the house on replacements of chief ministers would not have taken place. Not because of any opposition but because of the inner conflicts among the government legislators themselves that there were difficulties even in getting the budget passed. If there had been a non-Congress government there, it would have been brought under the president's rule, just as it happened in Karnataka. Because in this case their own kids were toying, the chief minister was made a scapegoat. And who was the chief minister? It was Bhagwat Jha Azad. The general opinion of him was that for the first time Bihar had gotten a chief minister who had forced even the Mafia groups to yield. After Azad's exit, a controversy arose in the Congress quarters, both in Patna as well as in Delhi, as to whether he had quit because of his nature or because of the fact that no chief minister could exist by fighting the Mafia groups. Perhaps both reasons complemented each other.

The new chief minister (Chhote Saheb) Satyendra Narain Singh had hardly taken charge when, last July, questions were raised in the assembly about the murder of a Congress member and the disappearance of a Congress ex-member. For the government, perhaps these matters were not important. It might have also been thought that in the event of the murder of a government legislator the opposition had no business in making a hue and cry. When the matter went beyond simple slogan making, blows were exchanged. By the speaker's order one member had to be forced out of the assembly. Some legislative assembly workers were also injured.

About 30 years ago, one of the chief originators of agitation politics, Raj Narain, was physically removed from the assembly by the marshal with help of some other persons and was deposited by the roadside. However, no scuffles had taken place with the legislative assembly's staff.

This problem is not limited to a couple of legislative assemblies. The opposition members in the Orissa legislative assembly created an uproar while demanding the ministers to declare their assets, and they held a sit-in on the assembly premises. In the Kerala legislative assembly, allegations against some of the ministers created an uproar, during which members of both parties demonstrated their art of wrestling, tearing some of their clothes.

In West Bengal, there used to be a speaker named Vijay Banerjee. He had taken such a stance that the legislative assembly could not function at all. Later, when the assembly was dissolved and he was removed by the president's ordinance (normally the speaker of the legislative assembly continues in his position even after the dissolution of the assembly until a new assembly is formed), he used to show a key in public meetings and state that it was he who had locked the assembly and it could be unlocked only by him. Subsequently, the left front might have felt that if they had to uphold the dignity of the assembly they would be losers in the event of supporting a speaker like Vijay Banerjee.

In this context, it may be said that the position of a chief or speaker in the parliamentary system as such cannot be compared to any other position. In our country there have been speakers like Rajarshi Purushottom Das Tandan, Vitthal Bhai Patel, and Ganesh Vasudev Mavalankar who by virtue of their impartiality, firmness, and knowledgeability have, apart from gracing the position of a speaker, made great contributions to the conduct of the parliamentary system as a whole.

Tandan had even once declared, before the full house, that he did not want to continue with the support of the majority party alone, if the opposition party had any doubt in his impartiality he would rather resign. At one time he was determined to resign but the prominent leaders of the opposition requested him to continue. This incident took place in that pre-independence Uttar Pradesh legislative assembly in which the main opposition party used to be the Muslim League.

As it is, in those days, if the chief of the lower house of the parliament had also depended on the mercy of the prime minister and avoided giving rulings on delicate issues, the parliamentary system would have degraded even before taking shape. The situation today is such that, by going through the previous proceedings of the legislative bodies, one cannot necessarily know what events took place on what day. The reason for this is that, contrary to the intentions of the provisions of the Constitution as well as the rules of the house, the discussions of the day are not recorded in their entirety.

according to government practice. What to speak of others even some of the prime minister's words are expunged from the proceedings. In regard to unparliamentary expressions, the earlier tradition was that the speaker or the acting officer gave formal rulings on which words constituted unparliamentary expressions. Now we cannot find a trace of such words. In a way, even the privilege of courteous language is disappearing. On several occasions, having been annoyed by the members' behavior, the chief of the lower house of parliament forbid recording of the whole procedure. Hundreds of words, thus, are not recorded at all.

On the basis of whatever is happening in the parliament, and on its imitation in the legislative assemblies, it is difficult to say that these bodies are giving vent to the day-to-day needs, hopes, and aspirations of the people. The funny part is that those who conduct the houses as well as those who are conducted in the houses all are dissatisfied with the present situation. Then, for whose satisfaction is all this showing off? Is it for democracy? Where is it? And, if it is there how long is it going to continue?

Haryana: Commentary Questions Creation of New Districts

*90OI0049A New Delhi JANSATTA
in Hindi 12 Oct 89 p 6*

[Article by Om Prakash Tapas: "What Is This Fever of Creating New Districts For?"]

[Text] The concept of so-called development has created great regional imbalance in the states. Because of this, in several states there is a growing demand for creating new states. On the other hand, this disease has grown into making demands for separate districts. Devi Lal, the chief minister of Haryana, conceding injustice caused by the regional imbalance, has created four new districts in his state. With this creation of new districts, the state of Haryana will have to incur an additional expenditure of about 1 billion rupees per year. The fact of the matter is, however, that on the issues of regional imbalance and demand of new districts the governments will have to modify their concept of development. With such demands, the problem of regional imbalance becomes all the more serious. By creating four new districts, the number of districts in the state has been increased from 12 to 16. The new districts are named: Rewari, Panipat, Kaithal, and Yamuna Nagar.

The question is whether after the creation of these four new districts, there will be an increase in the development of these areas, or even whether the districts from which the new districts have been carved out will develop more rapidly because of becoming smaller? According to the chief minister, Devi Lal, making the districts smaller helps in their development. The knowledgeable sources, however, contend that this is not true. Even if it was true, the new districts will become smaller than even today's subdivisions. Therefore, if it was

necessary to make the districts smaller it would have been proper to reorganize them.

The fact of the matter is that among the four, Rewari is known for its backwardness. For the last several years there has been a demand of making Rewari a district. It is alleged that the district of Mahendragarh does not provide enough resources for the development of this area. On the other hand, Panipat and Yamuna Nagar are business centers. The businessmen of this locality wanted the formation of separate districts to ease getting license, etc., for their businesses. The knowledgeable sources contend that because of this the lawyers will get higher cadre for working in district courts. The local lawyers, therefore, are also supporting this demand. Effective 1 November, the new districts will run with an additional cost of 1 billion rupees per year.

As a matter of fact, the political leaders in power have so far been increasing the number of districts according to their needs. One can surmise from the fact that in 1966 there were only seven districts in the state—Ambala, Karnal, Jind, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Mahendragarh, and Hisar. Then, Hisar was one of the largest districts in India. The chief ministers of the state carved several districts out of it. The former chief minister, Bansi Lal, separated the district of Bhiwani. Bansi Lal belonged to this area. Later, a separate district of Sirsa was made. Devi Lal comes from this area.

Other chief ministers formed other districts in order to set up a business of colonization. In addition to this, Kurukshetra and Faridabad districts were made into new districts solely for this purpose. At the time of forming new districts, the main slogan had been to accelerate development in those areas. Later, the foundations of regional imbalance were strengthened.

It will not be appropriate to compare Haryana with Rajasthan or Himachal Pradesh, in view of the fact that Rajasthan, being a desert area, and Himachal, being a hilly area, the districts of both these states are larger. But by comparing the districts of Haryana with those of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, one can get a comparative idea of their size, population, and development. According to the 1981 census, the population of Haryana is 12.9 million, while at that time the population of Punjab was 16,788,915. Obviously, the population of Punjab is greater than that of Haryana. Again, Punjab is inhabited in an area of 50,362 square kilometers while Haryana has an area of 44,212 square kilometers. However, in Punjab there are 12 districts, while in Haryana there are 16. The average size and population of the districts of Punjab are bigger than the average size and population size of the districts of Haryana.

A district in Punjab, on the average, covers 4,196 square kilometers, while in Haryana it covers 3,684 square kilometers. After the formation of the four new districts, the average area of a district in Haryana will be reduced to 2,763 square kilometers. Evidently, an average district of Haryana will be covering 60 percent of the area of an

average district of Punjab. While Haryana is approximately less than one half of Uttar Pradesh in area, one district in the later covers over 5,165 square kilometers. The 57 districts of Uttar Pradesh have a total area of 294,411 square kilometers.

Several things should have been kept in mind while forming the new districts. That was not done. Before making a new district, a central point has to be fixed, from the point of view of size, area, and population. Also, it has to be ascertained whether the people from all sides can easily reach the district headquarters. In making the new districts, these matters have totally been overlooked. On the national highway itself there are five districts of Ambala, Kurukshetra, Karnal, Panipat, and Sonipat. Evidently, these districts will develop more rapidly than the others.

In the new districts even parts of neighboring districts cannot be merged because the neighboring districts are small. Close to the new district of Rewari is Gurgaon, close to Panipat are Sonipat and Jind, and close to Kaithal is Kurukshetra. Yamuna Nagar is adjacent to the borders of Uttar Pradesh. Also, Ambala, Karnal, Panipat, and Sonipat cannot be extended because the river Yamuna forms the borders of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh.

While forming the new districts, along with the administrative units even the boundaries of the electoral regions for the assembly and parliament were not taken care of. For example, the electoral region for the legislative assembly should have matched with the borders of the block development areas. If a single block area is covered by several districts it cannot be run efficiently. Similarly, at the time of making new districts one has to keep in mind the regions for the parliamentary constituencies. The same district should not fall under two constituencies because in such a situation the members of the legislative assembly or the parliament will find it inconvenient to get their developmental plans implemented.

A fact that cannot be overlooked is that creating new districts will increase the regional imbalance. In several places, the demand for new districts is on an increase, especially the demand for making Jhajjar a new district.

IRAN

Nooil Products Exported in First 7 Months of Current Year

90OJ0083A Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 2 Dec 89 p 15

[Text] Economic Service—According to the statistics published by the Customs Department of the Islamic Republic, in the first 7 months of the current year, 778,000 tons of non-oil products valued at 42 billion 470 million rials, equivalent to 606 million dollars, were exported. Compared to a similar period during the

previous year, this was an increase, by weight and value, of 36.5 and 33.6 percent respectively.

According to the public relations office of the Islamic Republic's customs department, four principal export items constituted 66.1 percent of the value of the total items exported. These four items are: Hand-made woollen floor coverings, with a total weight of 5,088 tons and a value of 12 billion 363 million rials, constituted 31.5 percent of the total value of exports. Compared to the same period last year, this was an increase, by weight and value, of 24.8 and 15.3 percent respectively. Pistachios and pistachio meat, with a total weight of 31,105 tons and a value of 8 billion 774 million rials, were the second most important items of export and constituted 200.6 [as published] percent of the total value of the exports. Compared to the first 7 months of the previous year, this was an increase, by weight and value, of 19.3 and 40.4 percent respectively.

In the period under review, 9,958 tons of various skins valued at 4 billion 253 million rials were exported. These constituted 10 percent of the total value of the exports and were the third principal item. Compared to a similar period last year, this was an increase, by weight and value respectively, of 48.9 and 56.3 percent. Caviar was the fourth principal item of export. In the first 7 months of the current year, 140 tons of caviar with a value of 1 billion 708 million rials was exported. Compared to a similar period in 1367 [21 March 1988 - 20 March 1989], this constituted an increase by weight and value respectively, of 54.3 and 51.8 percent.

Uranium, Molybdenum Discovered in 10 Areas

90OJ0083E Tehran RESALAT in Persian 2 Dec 89 p 11

[Text] Mr Ayatollahi, the Atomic Energy Organization's undersecretary for primary materials and fuel, in an interview with a Central News Unit correspondent, answered the correspondent's questions regarding uranium deposits.

The Atomic Energy Organization's undersecretary for primary materials and fuel, responding to the correspondent's question regarding the extent of the uranium deposits recently discovered said, "Efforts for finding uranium have been centered in ten areas: in the first stage, 3200 tons of uranium and 4200 tons of molybdenum have been discovered."

Railroad Network Expansion Part of 5-Year Plan

90OJ0083C Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 2 Dec 89 p 14

[Text] Mashhad, Islamic Republic News Agency—Thursday afternoon, the minister of roads and transport, participating in the closing ceremonies of the second seminar of the study of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Railroad manpower capabilities, held in Mashhad, announced: "In the first 5-year plan for the country's

economic development, useful, specialized, and contracted resources will be absorbed into this ministry."

Engineer Sa'idi Kya added: "The executive directors should have planning in their organizations and should supervise the affairs and administrative matters under their jurisdiction."

In conclusion, the minister of roads and transport added: "A credit of 370 billion rials has been allocated for the expansion of the railroad network under the first 5-year plan. The Railroad's executive powers should seek to utilize the credit for the improvement and expansion of the railroad network."

The second seminar reviewing the Islamic Republic's Railroad manpower capabilities started 4 days ago at the Mashhad Railroad and ended on Thursday afternoon. The seminar deliberated on matters relating to management, executive methods, manpower training, technical and safety training.

New 'Selection Center' To Improve Manpower Usage

*90OI0083B Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 2 Dec 89 p 14*

[Text] Mashhad, Islamic Republic News Agency—The meeting of the officials of the Interior Ministry's 30 selection centers was held on Thursday afternoon in Mashhad at the Central Committee of Manpower Selection.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Dari Najafabadi, the Vali-e Faqih's [vice-recency, jurisconsul] representative in the Central Committee of Manpower Selection, at the commencement ceremonies of this two-day meeting, announced: A comprehensive plan dealing with manpower selection was drawn up recently and sent for review and approval to the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

The speaker noted that based on this plan, the level of selection use will increase and a new post called "selection center" would be created in executive organizations.

In this meeting, attended by Mr 'Atriyanfar, the Interior Ministry's political undersecretary, Mr Janati, the governor of Khorasan, said in his speech that selection centers would guarantee a healthy work atmosphere in the country's administrative departments.

New Coupons Issued for Gasoline, Motor Oil

*90OI0083D Tehran RESALAT
in Persian 2 Dec 89 p 11*

[Text] Tehran, Islamic Republic News Agency—Holders of designated white and red tag pickup trucks throughout the country are hereby informed that gasoline coupon number 362, reserved for pickup trucks, each section for the amount of 30 litres to be used over 15 days and valid from 12/9/68 [3 December 1989] to the end of the day 11 Dey 68 [1 January 1990] can be obtained.

In addition, all taxi owners, white and red tag designated pickup trucks throughout the country are notified that oil coupon number 11, reserved for taxis, each section for 4 litres, and oil coupon number 54, reserved for pickup trucks, each section for 4 litres to be utilized over a period of 1 month, and valid from 12/9/68 [3 December 1989] until the end of the day 7/11/68 [27 January 1990] can be obtained.

Likewise, all owners of passenger cars with big or small gasoline tanks and owners of motorcycles throughout the country are hereby informed that blue-colored oil coupon number 165, issued for large tank passenger cars, for the amount of 4 litres, and green-colored oil coupon number 123, issued for passenger cars with small tanks, for the amount of 4 litres, and oil coupon number 1 issued for motorcycles, each section for the amount of one litre to be used over a period of 2 months, valid from 12/9/68 [3 December 1989] until the end of the day 7/12/68 [26 February 1990], can now be obtained.

PAKISTAN

Article Analyzes Antitorture Movement in Pakistan

*46000052D Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES
(Supplement) in English 5 Dec 89 p A*

[Article by Rehana Rasul: "Torture: A Growing Menace"]

[Text] Time stood still. Hours, days, weeks and months all merged into a blur. The musty, dingy walls, the devouring darkness had been staring at her from what seemed to her ages and ages. Constant physical torture filled her with excruciating pain.

The cigarette burns all over her arms throbbed at the slightest movement. Mental anguish had driven her to the verge of a breakdown. As she peered down the precipice a dark chasm of despair opened its gaping jaws. Often she wondered why was she being subjected to such inhuman treatment. Was speaking out one's mind such a heinous crime to merit this treatment. No doubt it was true that mankind though born free was in chains everywhere.

He had been hanging by the shoulders for cons [aeons?]. The tormenting pain had driven him into a semi-conscious state. He was living in a limbo. The only faces around him were alien and hostile. The systematic beatings had left him bewildered and frightened. He was chained in a nightmarish world. What was the nature of the crime he had committed? Voicing the right of all to freedom of thought had landed him in this living hell.

Men, women and even children all over the world are increasingly becoming victims of physical and mental torture. Torture has been described as that extreme and deliberate form of violence inflicted upon a victim who experiences it consciously and who has not control over its form and duration.

Torture exists everywhere in our society. The despotic character of socioeconomic fabric uses torture as an essential instrument for its survival and for snuffing out any dissent. It takes various forms starting from the family, on to schools, streets, work places, interrogation centres, police stations and prisons. It seems our daily lives are replete with it. Frequent cases of stove bursts, where the victims are mainly the daughters-in-law, child abuse in the form of child labour, intimidation of the weaker sex, pressurisation of employees, exploitation of the lower classes are all examples of torture we come across in our daily lives.

However, during the period of military dictatorship a rapid growth in the dimensions of torture and its further institutionalisation occurred in Pakistan. Incidents of criminals succumbing to police interrogation or being conveniently shot during police encounters have appeared regularly in the press. During the Martial Law era, the ire fell on political workers. Thousands of political prisoners were incarcerated in prisons all over Pakistan. Flogging, a painful and humiliating form of physical torture became the order of the day. For the first time in the history of Pakistan educated men and women were flogged and subjected to physical abuse for their conviction and behalfs. And torture for political purposes is its most frightening aspect.

Today torture has become a science. It is performed by skilled people and there seems to be a specific aim to it. The purpose is to destroy the brain, personality and identity of the victim. Torture for political purposes is aimed at courageous people who have dared to stand up to the system. It is the destroyer of both the body and the soul. And the soul is the worst affected. Torturing is a long, drawn out process. The main aim is not to break down the prisoner. This can be achieved in a few days. But torture damages incurred in a short period are easily healed. Irreparable damage to the victim's psyche is the purpose. This serves as a warning and deterrent to like minded people. For the victim, when he return is scarred and scared. 'Beware', says the system 'the same can happen to you'.

The former includes beatings, rape of both men and women, electrical shocks, water-torture, bueming [burning?] and knocking out the victims teeth. Worse than this form of torture is mental pressure. Its most harrowing form is solitary confinement. Isolation often leads to hallucinations. "I thought I saw my grand child in the cell with me" says a torture victim, "I kept asking myself was I going out of my mind?"

The effects of torture are lasting. The victims often suffer from anxiety, depression, fear, irritability and nightmares. They have difficulties picking up the thread of their lives. After the release of POW's from Vietnam there seemed to be spate of senseless murders committed by men who had faced years of confinement and torture. Their sudden release into the society proved too much for them and they went beserk. Hence the rehabilitation of these victims becomes a social issue. As an awareness

about the plight of these victims grows so does the realisation that help must be given to them. Doctors have shown a grave concern for this issue. The main factor that seems to be worrying them is the involvement of doctors in 60 percent of the tortures that take place all over the world. Can doctors whose oath binds them to alleviate pain become a party to inflicting pain?

To bring this grievous issue into the limelight and to throw light on the role of the medical personnel a seminar was held recently in Lahore under the auspices of the Pakistan Medical Association.

Speaking at the seminar Dr Mehdi, informed the audience that the voice against Torture (VAT) had been launched in the early months of 1988. The organisation is an interdisciplinary network of doctors, nurses, psychologists, lawyers, journalists and social workers. They have joined hands to struggle against torture. This organisation aims at mobilising public opinion against torture, to provide medical and psychological help to victims of torture and their families, to run a Rehabilitation and Health Aid Centre for Torture, Victims (RAHAT) to provide 'Rahat' to torture victims and their families.

The doctors who read papers were concerned mostly with the involvement of their colleagues in the torture sessions. They emphasised the framing of a new code of medical ethics which would make it impossible for members of the health profession to participate in. Full support was promised to all those doctors who were courageous enough to refuse participation in this inhuman act.

Dr Genefke from Copenhagen, who has spent most of her life working for the rehabilitations of these torture victims called upon doctors all over the world to pool in their experiences and help each other in devising methods to identify torture victims. She said that a research centre had been set up in Copenhagen to collect and store data about torture methods being used in various parts of the world. She suggested that educating the doctors and nurses to deal with such victims was very important. Various modes of treatment should form a part of the medical course. Torture is a Human Rights issue. As international struggles to secure the release of prisoners of conscience, and VAT opens its arms to offer solace to torture victims, we can do our bit, by reporting cases of torture to VAT, by bringing torture cases to the public eye or by joining the network of VAT.

Privatization: Process Seen Increasing Poverty

46000053D Lahore *VIEWPOINT*
in English 7 Dec 89 pp 21-24

[Article by Jamil Rashid: "Political Economy of Privatization and Pakistan"]

[Text] The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character of production and consumption in every country... All old established national industries have been destroyed or are

daily being destroyed. They are destroyed by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw materials, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe... The bourgeoisie, by rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

This rather lengthy quotation from Marx gives the essence of privatization. It is a higher phase of capitalist development in which personal and public property is privatized for higher profitability. Every inch of producible resource, labour and land is internalized by the international bourgeoisie for retaining a higher rate of return on accumulated capital. This is the way that capitalism can spread its wing, to each and every corner of the globe. Thus, privatization is a process of capital accumulation at the world level. Privatization entails legal forms of privatizing public and personal property. By introducing division of labour in every sphere of life, and the market mechanism forced upon the underdeveloped parts of the world, the bourgeoisie are re-routing capital to the centre and its periphery.

The Germs

The germs of privatization were laid in the crisis of 1970s. During 1980s the ruling class of North America and its periphery in Western Europe revamped the economic growth by an attack on the Welfare State. By curtailing expenditure on social services, rewards of higher growth went to capital-owning groups. The agenda of the 1990s can be looked at from the Third World countries, where privatization will be expedited by the forces of capitalism. In the previous two decades labour power emigrated to the centre and periphery. In this decade, new entrepreneurs are encouraged to accumulate capital for re-routing it to the centres of production.

In the post-World-War period, capitalism went through three phases. The old industrialised regions with attached empires declined and a process of decolonization was set in, passing the mantle of imperialism to North America. Second, emigration of labour from the less developed to the more developed countries produced new capital formation in the higher developed regions. Third, the crisis of the late 1970s was resolved for another historical period, by supply side economics, monetarism and privatization. It is the third phase that

we are concerned with. By pulling in the Newly Industrialized Nations (NIN) of South-East Asia into the orbit of capitalism and raw material and labour power from the less developed regions like Pakistan, the international bourgeoisie will continue the accumulation of capital at a higher level.

The theory of privatization propagated in the 1970s that Britain, the oldest capitalist centre, could be on the verge of collapse because of the Welfare State, which had established a strong public sector. Accumulated funds from private savings went to State enterprises and expenditure on welfare benefits. Economic theorists expounded, through econometric models, that crowding out effects were starving private enterprises. Lower production created inflation, as welfare funds supported purchasing power without a parallel level of investment. Thus, supply-side economics became the popular discourse of the 1980s.

Britain Gives the Lead

Britain under Margaret Thatcher gave the lead. She popularized monetarism and supply-side theories, developed in North America under different circumstances. Her slogan was "rolling back" the welfare State and reintroducing the old greed of Adam Smith's man of self-interest. In the 18th and 19th centuries, it was privatizing the rural common property, in the late twentieth century, public and personal properties are being privatized. This basically means a contractual basis of exchange, and in that process, surplus is extracted from individuals and/or from a group of people in labour processes.

In the 1980s another slogan was deregulation and/or liberalization. It was considered to be the pre-condition for privatization. In the matured capitalist areas, the old Smithian world returned. The government only gave succour to private enterprise in protecting property, with minimum intervention.

In Third World countries, deregulation and liberalization were devised, infused by loan donors through the World Bank. It meant liberal import policies and unhindered foreign investment. Fewer labour laws for the protection of workers reduced cost, and made exportable goods from the Third World cheaper. Essentially, the agenda unfolded in lower tariffs on imports; and increased export from the first world. Finally, the lowest possible prices for raw material from the Third World created extra profit for the industrialized nations. The Third World regions were advised to restructure their economies by higher indirect taxes, lower income and company taxes, users fees and reduced subsidies. All these measures of deregulation were grafted on an already heavily burdened bureaucracy. As far as the Third World workers are concerned, they have the worst of the two worlds; lower wages and higher prices for essential goods including social services.

Pakistan was a classical case in decolonization and the structuring of a praetorian State. The areas which constitute the State of Pakistan today were on the periphery of colonial capitalism in the Sub-continent. There were two basic activities: providing soldiers for the imperial army in India and raw material for the Britain textile factories. It was a case of mixed tribal and feudal formations across the four provinces of the new country. After 42 years, it can, at best, be classified as a neo-feudal formation. A military-bureaucratic structure has been grafted from the top by imperialism for its own strategic interests in the area. The ruling class comes predominantly from landowning interests.

From the very beginning, Pakistani rulers opted for a free enterprise model. Merchant capitalists and feudal lords used the State apparatus in devising economic policy. However, they worked without any cohesive ideology. It was either ad-hocism or a policy designed from abroad. Except for the Bhutto era, the shadows of imperialism have always loomed over indicative planning and the training of defence personnel.

The 42-year period can be divided as follows: 1948-58 Mercantilist nation-building activities, mixed with domestic democratic processes and international penetration; 1958-68. Decade of development under imperialist design; decay of socio-political structure built in the previous decade; 1969-71 Ad-hocism; 1972-77 Bhutto's democratic socialism—re-structuring of social democracy; 1977-79 Ad-hocism; 1980 Liberalization/deregulation and privatization; revival of imperialist penetration.

In actual practice, privatization came to Pakistan much earlier. Industries were set up in the public sector and heavy investment incurred on the infrastructure. Foreign exchange was provided at a lower rate than in the open market. Wages for factory workers were kept below the poverty level. Once these factories were going concerns, private entrepreneurs had a free hand to run them at the best possible profit levels.

After the initial period of chaos from post-colonial years, Pakistani rulers became active in a planning process to create a capitalist class. In 1952 the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) was set-up, stating unequivocally: "The primary objective of the PIDC Act is the promotion and not the State ownership of the Industries. The Corporation is expected to associate private capital and transfer its share capital to private investors as or when practicable".

The Funds

Funds for the infrastructure and heavy import of machinery came from the earnings of the peasantry and urban workers. The feudals paid very little tax. Profits were made by paying as little as possible to landless labour in rural areas and poverty-level wages without any fringe benefits to factory workers. Early Industrialization was in textiles. The raw material came from

indigenous sources. Once the factories were going concerns, they were auctioned to merchants/traders who had accumulated primitive capital from import business activities. Direct taxation was at a minimum; the ordinary consumer paid a heavy price through indirect taxation.

The foundation was already laid for a comparadore bourgeoisie by the time Ayub Khan took over in October, 1958. Military alliances pampered the praetorian State. Economic growth under the second and third five-year plans was achieved through loans and aid. Privatization was undertaken, by selling off a number of profitable PIDC projects. Robber barons were lauded as catalysts for development. Financial institutions were specifically established to procure domestic savings which were converted into funds for private enterprise to buy up factories from the public sector. Foreign exchange was also provided to these enterprises for purchase of capital intensive machinery from abroad. In this process, the people went into a debt trap. Heavy interest payments along with repatriation of profits helped imperialists in accumulating capital at the centre and the periphery.

The table below [omitted] gives an indication of how accumulated capital from Pakistan was transferred to overseas centres. Between 1951 and 1988, around \$14 billion was paid out; as of June, 1988 Pakistan still owed \$14 billion to the U.S. and other capitalist countries. A good portion of this loan aid is military equipment, and training expenditure on higher-level defence officers.

Another figure of significance is the real transfer of aid to Pakistan. It should be pointed out that any unpaid interest becomes part of the principal, and so the real transfer becomes a smaller part in the long term. It is worth noting that during the past decade, net transfer as a percentage of gross disbursements was as low as 13 per cent in 1986-87. During the period when the U.S. provided strategic "Afghan" aid, debts were accumulated at a faster rate. In essence, the Pakistani people paid for the "Afghan war" through interest-bearing strategic military-economic aid. Only a small portion constituted grant which was also wiped out by the payment of higher interest rate on loans during the monetarist era in the U.S.A. and Britain.

Ad-hocism

Whenever imperialists found diminished strategic interest, the fragile Pakistani State, and the under-developed bourgeoisie, resorted to ad-hoc economic policy. This also led to deterioration in socio-political relations among various ethnic groups. In the period of 1969-71, when General Yahya was isolated because of the East Pakistan crisis, foreign loans drastically declined and ad-hocism became the policy of the day. Civil war and separation of Bangladesh in December, 1971, led to a deeper crisis, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took-over as a civilian Martial Law Administrator and President.

The Bhutto era is remembered for its partial nationalisation policy. But it was also a period when feudal relations were revitalized. Between 1972 and 1974, the Government took control of 31 industrial units in 10 basic categories and nationalized scheduled banks and life insurance companies. Land reforms, if of any significance, strengthened the hold of the bigger landlords. No agricultural tax was introduced, in spite of massive transfer of resources, through the Green Revolution, to agriculture. Landowners reaped good harvests, higher profit and minimum taxes, via a regressive fixed land tax. In effect, it was a contradictory policy. Nationalised industries were starved of funds; tax collection remained at its lowest level. Whatever resources were available, a large portion of them went to agriculture.

The Beginning

It was also the beginning of the world economic crisis. The Bhutto period was caught in that. Low economic growth, pent-up discontent unleashed by merchants and industrialists and resurgence of mullah power led to his downfall. His minimum social reforms—in education, labour relations and curtailed bureaucratic power—were sabotaged by vested interests. Ziaul Haq took over in July, 1977, in the midst of political chaos and economic crisis brought on by disgruntled petty industrialists and urban lower middle classes who suffered from the downward trend in production.

Until 1980, the regime resorted to ad-hocism. Bhutto's trial and execution isolated the dictator, but foreign remittances from overseas Pakistani workers helped the military regime to survive with difficulty. Denationalization, or privatization in today's language, procured funds for his bankrupt government. In the first few months, he returned the most profitable industries (ghee, cement and Ittefaq Engineering) to their owners. Owners of returned ginning factories sold machinery as scrap and exchanged land for cash. This cash was squandered in conspicuous expenditure. The financial corporation bubble proved to be the worst form of corruption in which even people from the army were allegedly involved. Islamization of the economy became the bogey to hide corrupt practices by the junta. Corruption in the bureaucracy and the higher echelons of the services became rampant. On the eve of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Zia regime was in disarray.

Intervention Again

Once again, the imperialists intervened. Military aid gave succour to the repressive regime. In economic policy, liberalization and deregulation were the starting points. Dr. Mahbubul Haq returned from Washington to redesign the economic policy, dictated by the World Bank. The privatization of the 1980s should be analysed from that background.

In the first instance, the foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act of 1976 was consolidated. People with black money and funds acquired

from extra-economic activities were encouraged to invest in private ventures with full Government support. Extra incentives gave an open invitation to foreign investors, including the purchase of divested shares in nationalised industries. The Chairman of the All-Pakistan Textile Mills Association, in a disconcerted mood, said: "A comprehensive set of incentives has been offered to both foreign and private entrepreneurs and overseas Pakistanis. Yet, the response so far has been rather meagre. The total approved foreign private investment in the decade 1978 to 1988 amounted to Rs. 50 billion of which the investment from private entrepreneurs was only Rs. 5 billion, while bulk of the remaining came through private—foreign loans (Rs. 37 billion)."

It became clear that the restructuring programme of the World Bank included emphasis on extending loans to private firms and reducing funds to public sector enterprises. This is the link with the Third World countries on privatization—reduce the risk for public sector projects, as it involves writing off loans from time to time. Private foreign loans provide direct links with the international bourgeoisie. Zia's regime offered generous terms for foreign investors in tourism, banking services, shipping, hotels and foreign trade. Some areas could be classified as very sensitive to national interest. The June 1985 budget provided a blank cheque for purchasing equity shares in PIA [Pakistan International Airlines], Pakistan State oil, Sui Gas Transmission, Sui Northern Gas and Fertilizer/Cement Corporations. Private investors were given generous loans from nationalized banks to buy-up some very profitable concerns. The loss-makers remained the target of propaganda against the public sector. One of the spokespersons from the World Bank reported: "Direct use of its loans and co-financing B-loans to help financing joint venture projects, perhaps by financing the local partners. Share of equity...; privatization in this context can be a potentially valuable restructuring instrument."

Thus, the World Bank and the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] focussed their industry operations towards restructuring. There is a special department for Third World regions—the industrial Restructuring Division. In Pakistan, the major case is the Hub River Project under Hub River Group (HRG). A private sector power generation project, it is heavily sponsored (not financed) by international (private) financial institutions. The HRG project is headed by Hawker Siddeley, a British company, and is an undertaking of nearly \$1 billion. The HRG has already arranged to recover its money by selling power at a pre-arranged price to the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) for the first 23 years of the station's operation. Most of the foreign exchange loans are acquired privately at market rate. The plant itself is the collateral, with minimum Government intervention.

However, the state of Pakistan is very much involved in (foreign) privatization projects. In the real sense, it is the guarantor, where foreign capital risk could be covered. For instance, a Private-Power Cell (PPC) established the

Private-Sector Energy Development Fund (PSEDF) to help private sector companies procure loans from various donor agencies. For the Hub River Project, entrepreneurs hoped to raise \$630 million from World Bank agencies, the Asian Development Bank and the Nordic Bank.

Perhaps the biggest project in the public sector is the Pakistan Steel Mill, heavily financed by the Soviet Union over the past 20 years. It was an expenditure with assets of a book value of Rs. 24,410 million (\$2.4 billion). The total book value of the public sector in Pakistan by 1984 was estimated around Rs. 47 billion. During Zia's regime, Mr. Khurshid Ahmed, a Jamaat-i-Islami lobbyist in the Senate, attacked the Soviet financed steel mill and asked it to be privatized. The issue became quite political, and there is still a lot of pressure on Benazir Bhutto's Government to privatize the whole enterprise. It also sounds a very ideological stance—specially for a project financed by the USSR and not from loans of the World Bank.

Continuity

When Benazir Bhutto's Government assumed office, the U.S. Government, through its Ambassador Robert Oakley, announced that there was to be a continuity with Zia's regime in foreign policy and economic (privatization) policy. Within the first eight months, two national seminars were organized by the United Nations Development Programme in Islamabad to encourage Privatization. In these seminars, no input came from the democratically elected National or provincial Assemblies, except for the opening remarks by the Prime Minister, who encouraged national and foreign investors so generously, by shares in privatized financial institutions and other profit-making ventures.

Privatization thus is a process of expansion in capitalism at the world level. But it is much more detrimental to the least developed countries like Pakistan, where a small compradore bourgeoisie has linked its fortune with foreign private investors.

Two specific outcomes can be envisaged from this worldwide movement of privatization. First, personal and public property is privatized for higher profit and greater level of capital accumulation at the world level. It will reduce the standard of living for the urban proletariat, in lowered real wages and reduced social sector benefits. Contractual labour, and less security for all employees, will continue to create another reserve army of potentially productive but under/unemployed workers. Second, imperialist countries will continue internalizing the labour/land resources of the Third World for higher profitability and exploitation on the global level. The deprived will become poorer and more oppressed in every part of the world. The privatization is a process of increasing poverty in the Third World.

(Excerpted from a paper read by the author at the 20th anniversary conference in Manila of the Journal of Contemporary Asia.)

Article Discusses Environmental Awareness

46000074B Lahore *VIEWPOINT*
in English 21 Dec 89 pp 11-14

[Article by Dr Parvez Hassan]

[Text] As one who has been long involved in the effort of identifying the growing environmental degradation in Pakistan, I am happy to see that our voice is finally beginning to get the attention of the nation.

We are getting this attention because of the slow but perceptible growth of environmental consciousness in the country. And this consciousness has emerged and is emerging as a reaction to the neglect of our decision-makers who in the past have pursued developmental planning without regard to environmental factors. The result is that environmental degradation has reached practically every doorstep in this country. These manifestations have included deforestation, the indiscriminate use of pesticides and fertilizers, the unbearable burden of the growing populations, the increasing urbanization, the unregulated disposal of industrial and municipal wastes, and the contamination of the food chain. This all-pervasive reach is adversely impacting on the quality of life whether it is in the rural areas or in our crowded metropolises. From this tragedy is evolving an environmental consciousness that may, if properly channelled, reverse the unfortunate trends.

Before identifying the new frontiers of progress in the growth of environmental consciousness, let us look at the conditioning factors in which this growth is taking place.

In many areas, particularly of water, air, noise and marine pollution, environmental degradation has already reached crisis levels in certain areas of Pakistan. Deforestation, desertification, destruction of wildlife habitats, species depletion and in many cases extinction of many forms of flora and fauna threaten the survival of the eco-system. Our vulnerability to floods, soil erosion and contamination in our food chain is distressing. If the country has gone through a green revolution and decades of development, such progress has not ushered in a quality of life commensurate with it. Instead, our public water canals, rivers and the seas are polluted. Our mountains are being denuded of forest cover. Effluents from factories and exhausts from rickshaws, wagons and buses have raised levels of atmospheric pollution that threaten human health.

Although it is a mistake to view industrial activity as the only source of pollution, it cannot be denied that haphazard growth of factories has contributed substantially to some of our environmental problems. But in fairness to the industrialists of this country, it must be acknowledged that they played a commendable role in the development and progress of Pakistan. We all know the almost negligible industrial base inherited by us in 1947. The need of the time was to fill this important vacuum—and on an urgent basis. With limited financial resources and in the absence of developed sources of borrowing,

our entrepreneurs turned to second-hand machinery and plants. Even when new plants were purchased, low budgets denied access to state-of-the-art equipment. The result was that right from the beginning, the plants imported into Pakistan were outdated and obsolete and, inevitably massive polluters.

In our desire to develop our industrial base, we allowed all kinds of plants and equipment to be imported and installed. No thought was given to the pollution caused by these industries. We never evolved any environmental guidelines of dos and donts for our industrialists. The result was that while the industrialists performed an important national duty in setting up factories, their activities led to increasing environmental degradation.

Licensed Degradation

For many years, I have been suggesting that this licensed degradation must end forthwith. No new industries should be allowed to be set up without a full review of their environmental consequences under the new environmental order. We must introduce the Polluter Pays Principle for new industries. Old industries which responded to earlier governmental policies that did not impose any environmental safeguards should not be penalized. Their owners did not do anything illegal at that time. They should instead, be given fiscal incentives to regularize the pollution from their activity. Exemptions from customs duties on pollution abatement equipment, tax write-offs and accelerated depreciation would induce these existing industries to conform to the new environmental order.

The population of Pakistan today is in excess of 100 million. At the present rate of population growth of over 3 percent, it shall be about 150 million in the next 10 years. Such phenomenal growth in the population shall impose a heavy burden on our resource base. New industries will be required to be set up to provide jobs and food to the increasing millions. Forests will be cut to provide fuel wood and construction material for our housing needs. Our lands will be over-grazed, over-harvested and over-exploited. The problem of an ever-increasing population would thus haunt any effort for the sustainable use and development of our resources.

Population Pressure

The population pressures being faced by Pakistan are common to our neighbor. In India, the population explosion is mind-boggling. Every minute 50 babies are born in India, 3,000 every hour, 72,000 per day of whom 70,000 survive. Seventeen million babies are added to India's population every year. There was a recent comment that India adds another Australia to its population every year.

In both India and Pakistan, ambitious developmental plans seek to better the lot of the common man by rapid industrialization and breakthroughs in agricultural productions. But this has led to indiscriminate use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides which

have not only impaired soil quality but have also found their way into public waters, threatening aquatic and other life.

The 1983 Law

The Pakistan Environmental Protection Ordinance was promulgated at the end of 1983, and although it has technically been law since that time, it has not been meaningfully implemented to date. Its only substantive provision requires an Environmental Impact Statement at the time of the approval of industrial projects. But even this has proved illusory as its implementation is contingent on the making of rules which the Government has not done to date.

This basic flaw notwithstanding, this Ordinance has provided some psychological comfort to the environmentalists. At all environmental fora, national and international, Pakistanis acknowledge and talk about the Environmental Ordinance as indicative of the country's important commitment in the field.

The 1983 Environment Ordinance provides for the establishment of a Pakistan Environmental Protection Council headed by the President of Pakistan. The Council includes Federal and Provincial Ministers in charge of the environment and some public representatives. Although the Council is mandated with the statutory duty to lay down environmental policies for the nation, it has not met at all in the last six years.

The Ordinance also provides for a Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency to be headed by a Director-General. This agency has not been fully activated at the federal level, although Provincial Environmental Protection Agencies have been set up in the provinces.

The provincial EPAs lack a specific statutory mandate. Yet they have started working to assist the environmental objectives of the Government.

Against the above background have emerged new frontiers in the growth of environmental consciousness in Pakistan.

Environmental matters at the federal level were until recently handled through the Division of Environment and Urban Affairs in the Ministry of Environment and Urban Affairs. The present Government has for the first time in this country appointed a Minister of State for the Environment. To the environmentalist lobby, this is by far the most important achievement in the first year of the Bhutto Administration.

The efforts to introduce environmental education in the syllabi of schools in the country will be another visionary measure by this Government. This would have a permanent impact in the evolution of a future citizenry that will diligently watch its environmental rights—an important ingredient in the successful enforcement of any Governmental laws and policies.

The involvement of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (I.U.C.N.) in the preparation of a National Conservation Strategy for Pakistan has been a major milestone in our environmental history. Aspects of the national Conservation Strategy were reviewed and debated at our in-service training academies like the National Institute of Public Administration. This facilitated a useful dissemination among the decision-makers. The Government has also set up a high level Committee headed by Mr A.G.N. Kazi, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, to oversee the development and preparation of this strategy.

Commonality

Pakistan and India have immense commonality. I am convinced that from such commonality of history, geography, problems, and experiences of Pakistan and India must emerge a common cause, a common commitment. Particularly because there are several activities that have a trans-boundary impact, it would be useful for Pakistan and India to cooperate and regionalize their environmental concerns.

Some of the areas for cooperation between India and Pakistan to promote environmental awareness could, I submit, include the following:

(1) Support for national conservation strategies—As noted, Pakistan's experience in formulating its National Conservation Strategy has been a happy one. We should open a dialogue in this regard with India and benefit from its efforts and experience in evolving its conservation strategy.

(2) Regional environmental secretariat—India and Pakistan should institutionalize their response to environmental matters by supporting the setting up of a permanent SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] or Pakistan-India Secretariat for Environmental Affairs. This Secretariat should provide support to the various national efforts and help evolve areas for regional cooperation. Such a secretariat, among other things, could prepare and implement plans for disseminating environmental awareness with particular emphasis on grass-root levels; provide a data base encompassing well-researched and systematically collected information on various environment related fields; develop regional standards of pollution control including emission levels for industries and automobiles; develop training programmes for the region's environmental administrators and scientific manpower; collect and disseminate information on national legislation on environmental matters; prepare model statutes in specific areas such as wildlife protection and marine pollution; collect, receive and provide information regarding certain national environmental efforts; and publish a journal highlighting the sub-continental efforts and problems in environmental fields.

(3) Support to existing regional efforts—India and Pakistan should strengthen the efforts of the South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP) already active in the region.

(4) Trans-boundary activities—Efforts should be made to highlight activities that have a trans-boundary environmental impact. Such activities could be coordinated to effect optimal protection to the region's shared resources. People of both the countries should be made to realize the common legacy and their ability to pollute each other's environment. The rivers are one common resource which could be saved from pollution by the joint efforts of the co-riparian States and their peoples. Similar joint efforts can be made in other areas.

(5) Environmental impact assessment—Particularly when an activity in one country is likely to have a direct affect on the environment of a neighbor or on the region, such activity must only be undertaken with due consideration of the interests of the affected parties. The Environmental Impact Assessment of projects should develop a regional rather than merely a national perspective.

(6) Project financing—A salutary development in recent years has been the increasing emphasis against environmental degradation in the lending policies of international and regional financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank and Eximbank of Japan. A condition in the lending arrangements is that the project being financed shall be designed constructed and operated so as to avoid adverse effects on the environment. This trend, if encouraged, will appropriately regionalize concern in this important matter.

(7) Exchange of visitors—There is much credibility when the experience of the countries in the region are shared through exchange of visitors.

Need Substitution

(8) Need substitution—Needs for fuel-wood, fodder, and farm products are considered major constraints handicapping the implementation of forestry management plans in the Sub-continent. No institutional or legislative framework will succeed unless these needs are first met. Importance should, therefore, be given by Pakistan and India to innovate alternative sources so that the corresponding strain on the forests is reduced. Cooperation could extend to devising new and renewable sources of energy such as bio-gas to ease pressures on the fuel-wood.

(9) Public awareness—It is undoubtedly the experience in all countries that any environmental order requires the support of the people for its implementation. Without the citizens playing this important role of

watchdogs, Governments are known to ignore or overlook their basic obligation to provide a clean environment to their citizens. A comprehensive national environmental programme would, therefore, include measures to create public awareness.

At the seminar on "Regional Cooperation for the Protection of Environment in South Asia" held in New Delhi earlier this year, I had suggested that the SAARC summit in Islamabad showed clearly that unique in its history the region has for the first time defined its environmental vision. I had then expressed the hope, borrowing the eloquence of Jawaharlal Nehru, that its tryst with destiny will be a successful one. It is bound to be if we realize that time is running out and should we not act today, tomorrow may be too late. (Condensed from the keynote address delivered by Dr Parvez Hassan at the inaugural session of the India-Pakistan Environment Conference.)

Commentary Views India-Pakistan Cooperation on Environment

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in English 21 Dec 89 pp 5-6*

[Text] The first Indo-Pakistan conference on environmental protection augurs well for future bilateral cooperation in grappling with a whole range of common problems whose magnitude has assumed frightening proportions because of long years of neglect. The fact is undeniable that, despite statistical progress, the two subcontinental neighbors have witnessed an increased deterioration in their peoples' real living standards, largely on account of similar causes. The most significant of these factors is a virtually unchecked rise in their populations without commensurate economic growth, thereby condemning ever larger numbers to a struggle for survival at sinking levels of subsistence. The pressures of an expanding population have encouraged trends towards over-exploitation of existing resources, without giving sufficient thought for tomorrow's needs. For example, areas under forests have steadily been reduced with adverse consequences that presage disaster for the affected areas and adjoining territories, as a result of rapid soil erosion and uncontrolled floods. Then, development without protective planning and environmental safeguards has permitted pollution of our land, air, and water, to such an extent that it constitutes a growing threat to the safety of human and animal life. Industrialization has created its own problems and rapid urbanization compels millions of people to live in shanty towns without adequate provision for the basic amenities of life. It can be said, thus, that the earth is dying slowly because of humankind's disregard of the essential laws of nature that must be respected if life on this planet is not to be extinguished.

Realization of this basic truth began to spread in the world over recent decades, but in Third World countries the need to protect the environment has been accepted reluctantly and tardily. Although global environmental studies have for years warned the world's governments against the continued reckless use of natural resources, the clamor was

not heeded in countries like Pakistan until very recently. Seemingly influenced by persistent international advice and guided by action taken in other parts of the world, the Government of Pakistan was persuaded by knowledgeable persons to issue an Environmental Protection Ordinance in 1983. This law provided for safeguards against industrial pollution, and outlined certain other measures that could help protect the earth and maintain its ecological balance. However, since its promulgation, the Ordinance has not been utilized at all to serve its laudable purpose. The Council proposed has not met once in the six years since its enactment, and even the required rules and regulations have not yet been drafted. While in some provinces Environmental Protection Agencies have been set up, the Federal Agency has not yet been structured. As a result, for all practical purposes, the law has been held in abeyance, and nothing worthwhile has been done or attempted in this vital field. Then, it is known widely that the area under forests in Pakistan totals only 3 percent of its territories; yet, apart from ceremonial tree plantation weeks or days twice every year, nothing has been done to ensure expansion of Pakistan's forest wealth so that its lands can be protected; even existing forests are under constant attack and no-one seems concerned about the consequences of this denudation. At the same time, all the known pollutants flourish in the land without any serious effort to check the harm that they do, including, among many others, industrial waste, poisonous effluents, smoke and exhaust fumes, contaminated water and adulterated food, and ear-splitting, nerve-racking noise. In India, the situation is not very different, a little better in some matter and worse in others.

The three days of discussions between concerned citizens from India and Pakistan have reportedly helped to bring about better understanding among the delegates of the crisis situation that concerns the two countries. The exchanges have brought the realization that they can learn a great deal from each other's experiences in this and many related fields. It was also agreed that in order to achieve mutually beneficial results there must be close cooperation between the two States. The example of common rivers was cited and it was said that joint management of catchment areas was vital. In other matters, too, it was seen that cooperation could be of great benefit to both countries, particularly in fields where either has succeeded in taking successful action to halt degradation of the environment and reduce pollution. Above all else, the two countries must accept that public opinion can and should be mobilized to compel their governments to evolve policies that will safeguard national interests and protect public welfare, ensuring that vested interests do not stand in the way of devising correct policies and implementing them without delay. The Lahore conference may be seen as a small beginning, a useful first step in the right direction. Hopefully, the two sides will not now begin to falter and fumble, because they have a long way to go. Both in terms of domestic action and bilateral cooperation, they must move forward without hesitation or hindrance towards the essential goals designated at the Lahore moot.

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